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l)GOVERNANCE, CEO IDENTITY, AND QUALITY PROVISION OF FARMER COOPERATIVES
Governance structure specifies the allocation of ownership rights, decision rights, and
income rights. A cooperative is characterized by collective ownership, democratic control,
and member benefits. This thesis empirically delineates the genesis and the governance
structure characteristics of farmer cooperatives in China and theoretically examines the
efficiency of cooperatives with different CEO identities and quality provision of cooperatives.
The main conclusions are as follows. First, the genesis of farmer cooperatives in China
is mainly due to entrepreneurial farmers and the government rather than a bottom-up,
collective action process of many small farmers. Second, the allocation of ownership
rights, decision rights, and income rights is quite skewed towards core members in
cooperatives in China. Third, the efficiency of cooperatives with different CEO identities
depends on the interaction between upstream farming task and downstream value-adding
task as well as the productivity difference between the two tasks. Fourth, the quality
provision of cooperatives is dependent crucially on the payment treatment of members
regarding quality within the cooperatives. The presence of cooperatives in food market has a
competitive yardstick. A larger degree of differentiation in the payment and a larger
market share of a cooperative indicate stronger yardstick effect.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overall introduction of the research, including the background of the research 
(1.1), a brief introduction to cooperatives in China (1.2), the research objectives and questions (1.3), 
and the outline of the thesis (1.4). 
1.1 Background and problem statement 
The agricultural supply chain in China is diversified and undergoing transformation in both structure 
and management. It includes not only the traditional production-supply-marketing system consisting 
of small farm households, peddlers, processing enterprises, wholesalers and retailers, but also new 
retailers such as comprehensive supermarkets and specialized fruit supermarkets. The rise of 
supermarkets and specialized distribution centers is a challenge to small farmers. They can hardly deal 
with the private standards of these modern transaction parties, nor do they have the countervailing 
power to gain reasonable value added shares. The characteristics of agricultural markets tend to cause 
market failure due to farmers’ investments in sunk assets and buyer concentration in local markets 
(Sexton and Lavoie, 2001).  
Farmers are searching for ways that may help them to face these challenges. Theoretically, an increase 
in farmers’ production scale may alleviate the difficulty. However, a scale increase is not always 
feasible due to the special characteristics of agricultural production. It is costly and not easy to enlarge 
production scale by renting additional land. Neither is it always efficient to hire and supervise labour 
other than family members. Collective action via farmer cooperatives is often recognized as a possible 
response to market failure (LeVay, 1983; Hansmann, 1996; Valentinov, 2007). Cooperatives are 
expected to emerge to address these problems such as small scale production problems, powerful 
intermediaries or retailers, and missing markets.  
Various governance structures are observed in agricultural markets, such as firms, contracts, 
cooperatives, franchises, networks, and so on. A governance structure is defined as the allocation of 
ownership rights, decision rights and income rights over relevant assets (Hansmann, 1996; Baker et al., 
1999). A cooperative is a member-owned, member-controlled, and member-benefitted enterprise 
(Dunn, 1988). Returns are usually distributed according to patronage or use rather than equity (Shaffer, 
1982). The three essential characteristics of cooperatives highlighted by Shaffer (1982) are service at 
cost to members, democratic control by members, and limited return on equity capital. Nevertheless, 
cooperatives in different countries vary in terms of their development and internal governance. 
Nowadays cooperatives in the West are transforming and restructuring from traditional cooperatives 
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to new cooperative modes, or investor-owned firms (IOFs). Cooperatives correspondingly need to 
adjust their internal governance mechanisms, their external strategies, and their management (Cook, 
1994).  
The genesis of farmer cooperatives depends on the environment and is influenced by various 
constrains, such as bargaining problems, information constrains, political constrains, and the local 
history and culture. The way organizations are founded has lasting effects on their structure and 
performance (Kuilmanat al., 2009). Poor organization in the initial period is hard to effectively 
recover later (Hannan and Freeman, 1984).In China a farmer cooperative is defined as ‘an economic 
organization, based on rural household contact management system, which is organized voluntarily 
and controlled democratically by farmers and which aims to provide and serve members with 
agricultural inputs purchase, product sale, processing, transport, storage, and other services related to 
technique and information’ in the National Farmer Specialized Cooperative Law (briefly named as 
Cooperative Law or Law instead). Most farmer cooperatives in the West are the outcome of horizontal 
cooperation between farmers. It is a bottom-up process of collective action by farmers. Cooperatives 
in China follow an alternative pathway and choose an alternative model than cooperatives in the 
Western countries. The initiation of farmer cooperatives in China is due to the economic behavior of a 
group of entrepreneurs with the support of the government, rather than the collective action of small 
farmers. Most cooperatives in China have a member as CEO, whereas most cooperatives in Western 
countries have an outside CEO. However, empirical studies regarding the internal governance and 
management of farmer cooperatives in China are scarce. This research contributes to the 
understanding of Chinese farmer cooperatives in terms of governance and management.  
The functions of cooperatives are addressed by many scholars (Clark, 1952; Staatz, 1987; Zusman and 
Rausser, 1994; Valentinov, 2007). As an organization of small farmers, farmer cooperatives can be 
regarded as an enterprise collectively owned by many independent farmers as input suppliers (Feng 
and Hendrikse, 2011). This makes it possible to combine the advantages of family based farms with 
the economies of scale in purchasing, marketing, and bargaining of the collectively owned cooperative 
enterprise. More important, farmers depend on cooperatives to improve market competitiveness by 
enhancing bargaining power, economies of scale in marketing, and technological improvements. 
Nowadays there are not only traditional supply chains characterized by spot markets, wet markets, and 
wholesalers, but also modern supply chains where there are cooperatives, specialized processing firms, 
and supermarkets (Huang and Liang, 2009). The co-existence of various governance structures raises 
a question regarding how farmers choose their product outlet between cooperatives and various 
alternatives. Farmers’ outlet choice is not only influenced by various factors such as product 
characteristics, market structure, and governmental support, but also by farmers’ age, education, and 
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so on (Guo and Jiang, 2004). As the economy develops, consumer preferences are becoming more 
diversified and have a higher demand for quality. Due to farmers being small in China, cooperatives 
have become the main adopters of food quality standards (Zhou and Jin, 2009). However, to date not 
much work has been done regarding the outlet choice of farmers with different product quality. This 
research examines how farmers with heterogeneous product quality choose their outlet(s). 
1.2 Cooperatives in China 
This section starts with the emergence and evolution of farmer cooperatives in China during the past 
60 years (1.2.1). Next different models of farmer cooperatives in China are distinguished (1.2.2). 
1.2.1 Emergence and evolution of farmer organizations in China 
Farmer organizations in China have experienced ups and downs during the past 60 years. Three types 
are distinguished in their development: community cooperation, the people’s commune, and the 
farmer cooperative. The development phases are depicted in figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1 The development phases of farmer organizations in China 
 
Community cooperation: 1952-1957 
After the land reform in China in the 1950s, farmers began to have the usage right over land as well as 
the residual right over products. However, each farmer had a quite small size of arable land due to the 
large population of farmers. They were not able to meet the demand of industrialization. The 
government therefore launched a series of cooperative movements in order to help farmers improve 
their scale of production. Mutual groups, primary cooperatives, and advanced cooperatives were the 
three forms of cooperatives adopted. Mutual groups arose first. They were established based on 
 
Community cooperation: 1952-1957 
People’s communes: 1958-1982 
Farmer cooperatives: 1980s-2012 
Mutual 
groups 
Primary 
cooperatives 
Advanced 
cooperatives 
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farmers’ joining voluntarily and the reciprocity principle. Farmers had the ownership rights regarding 
their production land and tools. Farmers supported each other regarding production and harvest by 
sharing production tools. Subsequently, the primary cooperative came into being. It was characterized 
by collective production and benefit allocation based on land size. Finally, advanced cooperatives 
emerged. Farmers’ land and tools were owned collectively by the cooperative and farmers were paid 
on the basis of their working time. At the end of 1956, 88% of farmers in China had joined advanced 
cooperatives (Sun, 2006). 
People’s commune: 1958-1982 
Due to the governmental requirement, the advanced cooperatives began to be restructured into the 
people’s communes in 1958. Almost all (99%) farmers joined the people’s commune. A people’s 
commune was characterized by collective and centralized ownership by the commune rather than by 
farmers. All members transferred their production land and tools to the commune. All farmers 
received the same wage.  
The collectivity and egalitarianism weakened farmers’ incentives to work and consequently hurt the 
efficiency and development of agriculture. Furthermore, market transactions were ruled out due to the 
planned purchase and marketing by the state. China paid a huge price for this orientation and 
institutional structure. Farmers became poor and weak. However, the failure at this stage triggered the 
development of a new type of cooperative. 
Commune and brigade enterprises are another important organization. They emerged in the 1950s in 
the rural area. Commune and brigade enterprises were initiated at the lowest government level by 
village leaders. They were mainly involved in the processing of agricultural products (Huang, 2012). 
Farmer cooperative: 1980s-2012 
The most important issue in the late 1970s is the shift from the collective ownership system to the 
Household Responsibility System (HRS). The operation rights regarding agricultural land are 
distributed to farmer households, whereas the ownership rights stay with the State. Nowadays farmers 
can have 30 years of operation rights regarding agricultural land. The contract period can be extended 
after 30 years, or land may be redistributed within a local village, depending on the governments’ 
planning. This reform in the rural area triggered institutional innovations. One is the flourishing of 
township and village enterprises (TVEs). They are restructured commune and brigade enterprises after 
the rural economic system reform in 1978 (Huang, 2012). TVEs are established by local government 
and are collectively owned by local residents (Bolton, 1995). They are generally in consumer goods 
industries, such as transportation, construction, food processing, paper making, and spinning, with the 
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initial aim of supporting and capitalizing local agricultural development. TVEs include enterprises 
located in rural areas that are either owned collectively by local residents or owned privately by 
individual(s). For privately owned TVEs, authority resides with the owners. For publicly or 
collectively owned TVEs, control rights are held by local governments. They hire managers to run the 
enterprises. The local governments hold the residual income rights of TVEs. Profits are used to 
finance local infrastructure projects, local education, etc, and a share of the profits is obtained by local 
governmental officials (Wang, 2010). Both managers and other workers of TVEs are paid wages. 
However, the incentives to produce and to develop new markets are limited. This caused the 
privatization of TVEs at the end of the 1990s. Many TVEs were sold to local entrepreneurs who may 
also be officials. This change in ownership rights contributes to the development of privately owned 
TVEs. Nowadays, TVEs are owned and managed by local entrepreneurs. 
Due to the HRS, farmers began to have the usage rights over the land and the ownership rights over 
the yields of the land. However, it also means that farmers need to sell the products themselves. The 
problem of smallholders entering into large markets emerged. There are still worries about small 
farmers’ ability to enter into the large markets and to obtain reasonable benefits. Farmers are faced 
with multiple challenges. Examples are a small marginal profit, industrialization, specialisation, 
informatisation and globalisation of other participants in the agricultural supply chain. Small farmers 
are incapable of negotiating effectively with other participants in the supply chain due to the scarcity 
of market information and their small production scales. They hardly benefit from the value added of 
products. Farmer cooperatives, different from the previous organizations, have developed to help 
farmers with this problem.  
Farmer cooperatives emerged in the 1980s and developed slowly. They began to grow rapidly in the 
2000s (Xu, 2005). As the promulgation of the National Farmer Cooperative Law (Law afterwards) in 
2007, the development of farmer cooperatives was even faster. The government helps and subsidizes 
the development of agriculture because of its importance to the entire economic development. By the 
end of March, 2012, there were 525,300 farmer cooperatives with 43.0 million members in China.1 
More than 17% of the farmers have joined cooperatives. Four stages in the development of these 
farmer cooperatives in China are distinguished in table 1.1. 
  
                                                          
1 Data source: The Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China. Available at http://www.moa.gov.cn/ 
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Table 1.1 Stages of development of farmer cooperatives in China during 1980s-2010 
Period   Events  Characteristics  
Early 1980s- 
Early 1990s  
Emergence of Farmer 
Specialized Association  
Government led; Service oriented; Civil Bureau 
Registration. 
1990s  Transformation from 
Farmer Specialized 
Association to Farmer 
Specialized Cooperative 
Civil Bureau registration or Industrial and 
Commercial Bureau Registration. 
End of 1990s-
2007 
Take-off and consolidation 
of Farmer Specialized 
Cooperatives 
More market orientation; Civil Bureau registration or 
Industrial and Commercial Bureau Registration; 
Government promotion. 
2008- The promulgation of 
National Cooperative Law 
More market and profit orientation; Capital seeking; 
More value adding; Registered only with Industrial 
and Commercial Bureau. 
Notes: Summarized by the author. 
 
1.2.2 Models of farmer organizations 
Farmer cooperatives in China are mainly referred to as farmer specialized cooperatives and farmer 
specialized associations. They differ from farmer specialized associations. A farmer specialized 
association is an organization established and operated by the government. It aims to standardize and 
promote the development of a specific product, and meanwhile provide farmer members with 
technical instruction, market information, intermediary services between farmers and buyers, and so 
on. It is an effective communication bridge between the government and farmers. However, 
agricultural associations can not take part in economic activities in the markets. Many associations in 
China have transformed to farmer specialized cooperatives in order to enter into the markets and to 
negotiate for farmers directly. 
Rural credit cooperatives are financial institutions owned and controlled by rural residents engaged in 
agricultural production and sale. They aim to offer financial services for members. Its establishment 
must be authorized by the state bank of China. However, separated from the original aims of rural 
credit cooperatives, financial loans are not easily accessible for small farmers due to the high risk in 
agricultural production. 
The focus is on farmer specialized cooperatives in this thesis. There are different types of farmer 
cooperatives in terms of the function of a cooperative. Marketing cooperatives are most frequent. 
Others are processing cooperatives, service cooperatives (input purchasing cooperatives, agricultural 
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machinery cooperatives), land shareholder cooperatives, and so on. In addition, Xu and Wu (2011) 
distinguish five basic types of farmer cooperatives in China:  
1) Traditional or classical cooperatives account for approximately 10% of the total number. 
Traditional cooperatives in China are characterized by democratic decision making and equal 
distribution of profits.  
2) Investment share cooperatives account for approximately 40% of the total. They are mainly 
located along the eastern coast. Most or all of the capital shares are being held by a few core 
members. This is the most distinctive characteristic of investment share cooperatives. Profits are 
allocated to members largely based on capital.  
3) Modern cooperatives are similar to new generation cooperatives in North America (Xu and Wu, 
2011). This type accounts for approximately 10% of the total. They are also located along the 
eastern coast. They are more market-oriented. Profits distribution is usually on the basis of both 
capital and delivery, where delivery payments are more important than in investment share 
cooperatives. These three types of cooperatives, traditional cooperatives, investment share 
cooperatives, and modern cooperatives, are registered at the Industrial and Bureau Department.  
4) Association cooperatives are roughly 30% of the total cooperative number. Association 
cooperatives are generally founded by the governments, in order to help farmers with production 
technology, market information, product promotion, brand established, and so on. They may help 
farmers to establish contacts with downstream buyers, but not sell products for farmers.  
5) Allied cooperatives or cooperative unions account for less than 5% of the total. A cooperative 
union is a horizontal cooperation between specialized cooperatives of the same or similar product. 
Members of a cooperative union therefore are cooperative firms, rather than individual farmers. It 
is established to share technological and market information, build brands, and promote products. 
 
1.3 Research objectives and questions 
This thesis addresses the genesis and governance of farmer cooperatives. Attention is given to both 
the internal governance of cooperatives in China and the external function of cooperatives. Specific 
research objectives are: 
to provide an overview of farmer cooperatives in China, including the emergence, the development 
route, and their different modes; 
to identify the actors in the genesis of Chinese farmer cooperatives; 
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to delineate the governance of cooperatives in China in terms of ownership rights, decision rights, and 
income rights; 
to analyze the impact of CEO identity, a member CEO or an outside CEO, on the efficiency of 
cooperatives; 
to analyze the impact of cooperatives’ payment scheme on farmers’ outlet choices and payoffs. 
The following research questions are addressed to reach the research objectives: 
Question 1: Who are the main actors in the genesis of farmer cooperatives in China?  
Question 2: What are the governance characteristics of cooperatives in China in terms of ownership 
rights, decision rights, and income rights? 
Question 3: What are the incentive differences between a cooperative with a member CEO and a 
cooperative with an outside CEO?  
Question 4: How do heterogeneous farmers choose different governance structures? Do cooperatives 
serve as a competitive yardstick? 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
The structure of the thesis is described in figure 1.2. In Chapter 2 we start with a descriptive analysis 
regarding the genesis of farmer cooperatives in China. Data collected from 37 farmer cooperatives in 
Zhejiang province, China, is used. The characteristics and main actors in the genesis of farmer 
cooperatives in China are identified. 
We address the governance structure of cooperatives in China in Chapter 3. One of the distinguishing 
features of Chinese cooperatives is the distinction between core and common members. The 
distribution of ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights within the membership is 
examined. The allocation of ownership rights is described in terms of assets and voting rights, 
decision rights in terms of both formal and informal control rights, and income rights in terms of the 
distribution of residual payments. 
A principal-agent model is formulated in Chapter 4 to address the efficiency of cooperatives with 
different CEO identities: member CEOs and outside CEOs. Management is important to the 
performance and efficiency of cooperatives. Cooperative management differs from the management 
of investor-owned firms due to the user-owner relationship. For example, the management of an IOF 
focuses on the objective to maximize the capital investment return for investors, whereas the 
management of a cooperative has to take into consideration members’ interests which are more 
complex than those of owners of IOFs. Another aspect of the management between cooperatives and 
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IOFs is that managers in a cooperative may also be owners of the cooperative enterprise. A 
cooperative has therefore to choose as a manager either a member who has residual claim rights in the 
cooperative or an outsider who is purely employed without residual claim rights.  
In Chapter 5, we examine the impact of cooperatives’ pooling policy on the outlet choices of farmers, 
delivering to the cooperative or the IOF. Cooperatives and IOFs are the main governance structures in 
agricultural supply chains. They differ in policies regarding pricing and profit distribution. The co-
existence of various governance structures raises the question why one governance structure is 
preferred to another. A non-cooperative game between farmers and enterprises is formulated. Given 
the heterogeneity among consumers, farmers are therefore assumed to be heterogeneous in product 
quality.  The model not only examines how cooperatives’ pooling policy influences farmers’ product 
outlet choices but also addresses how the presence of cooperatives in agricultural markets affects 
farmers’ surpluses. 
We summarize the main findings in Chapter 6. 
 
Figure 1.2 Structure of the thesis 
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Chapter 2: Core and Common Members in the Genesis of Farmer 
Cooperatives in China2 
 
Abstract 
This paper addresses the genesis of farmer cooperatives in China in terms of the actors. Empirical 
results from a multiple case study indicate that the genesis of cooperatives in China is due to 
entrepreneurial farmers and the government, rather than a bottom-up, collective action process of 
many small farmers.  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Most small farmers face small scale production problems, powerful intermediaries or retailers, and 
missing markets. It is therefore to be expected that solutions will emerge to address these problems. 
One of the solutions is a farmer cooperative. It is an enterprise established and collectively owned by 
many farmers in an adjacent stage of production. Its primary aim is to serve the interests of members, 
i.e. to realize economies of scale, to build countervailing power, to gain access, and to provide 
member services. 
Farmer cooperatives emerged in the Western world at the end of the nineteenth century, while starting 
later in other parts of the world. Various stages of development in their evolution have been 
distinguished by Cook and Plunkett (2006): genesis, growth, emergence of internal conflicts, 
recognition and analysis, and options choice stages. The initiation of farmer cooperatives turns out to 
vary across countries. The member orientation of cooperatives makes it likely that members initiate 
the cooperative, but there are also many cases where other parties have been important in the genesis 
of cooperatives, like national or regional governments, or local entrepreneurs. This article addresses 
the genesis of cooperatives in China.  
The earliest Chinese cooperatives were named People’s Community Cooperation. In the 1950s they 
appeared under the planned economy and Marxist tradition. People’s Community Cooperation were 
established by the central government and characterized by collective ownership, central planning, 
and state-embeddedness (Xu, 2005). People’s Community Cooperation disappeared several years later. 
They were restructured into the People’s Commune in 1958. Almost all (99%) farmers joined the 
People’s Commune (Sun, 2006). Different from People’s Community Cooperation, the People’s 
                                                          
2 The chapter is forthcoming in Managerial and Decision Economics. 
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Commune is characterized by collective and centralized ownership by the commune rather than 
farmers. All members transfer their production land and tools to the commune. Farmers have no 
ownership rights or residual income rights over the products. They were merely workers who were 
paid equally.  
A new model of cooperatives, characterized by farmer ownership and market economic-orientation, 
began to be established in the 1980s after the implement of the Household Responsibility System 
(HRS). According to the HRS, agricultural lands are collectively owned by villages. Farmers have the 
operation rights including using and re-renting rights of lands and most importantly residual income 
rights of outputs. We refer to these new model cooperatives as farmer cooperatives (translated as 
“farmer specialized cooperatives” in Chinese). There were 26,400 farmer cooperatives at the end of 
2006. Since the promulgation of the National Farmer Cooperative Law in 2007, the number of farmer 
cooperatives has increased very rapidly. By the end of March, 2012, there were 552,300 farmer 
cooperatives with 43.0 million members in China. Around 17.2% of Chinese farmers have joined 
cooperatives.3 
There is a scarcity of data about the genesis of cooperatives in China. The contribution of this article 
is to address empirically the genesis of farmer cooperatives in China with the research question ‘Who 
are the main actors in the genesis and early development of farmer cooperatives in China?’. Section 
2.2 delineates the genesis stage of the life cycle of cooperatives. Section 2.3 presents the methodology. 
The data and descriptive analysis are presented in section 2.4. Section 2.5 discusses the results. We 
conclude in section 2.6. 
2.2 Bottom-up versus top-down initiation 
Three types of initiation regarding farmer cooperatives are distinguished in this section. 
Bottom-up initiation 
Various countries have experienced the bottom-up initiation of farmer cooperatives. A number of 
examples are presented. The German wine cooperative Moselland has its origins in the19th century. 
Small wine-growing cooperatives were formed regionally by many individual growers. Various 
mergers between regional cooperatives have resulted in the current large cooperative Moselland 
eG. In Germany timber merchant Hans Tenhaeff organized, together with several farmers, farmers 
into a fruit & plant growing association in 1910. Their aim was to develop a modern production and 
marketing system for agricultural and decorative plant products. A subsequent process of investments, 
mergers, and takeovers resulted in the current horticultural cooperative Landgard (Landgard, 2012). 
                                                          
3 Data source: The Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China. Available at http://www.moa.gov.cn/  
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Cooperatives have also been initiated by key persons in a village or province, or farmer organizations. 
Priest Van den Elsen has been instrumental in setting up many cooperatives in the south of the 
Netherlands (Internationaal Cooperatief Centrum, 2012). Most agricultural cooperatives in the 
Northern USA evolved through Farmers Union, a farm lobbying group created by small farmers. This 
nonpolitical, bottom up organization emerged as a response to market failure. Golovina and Nilsson 
(2009, p225 and 230) state more generally that ‘… cooperatives experiences historically and 
internationally …’ show that they are ‘… grass root organizations’.  
These examples do not imply that the bottom-up emergence of cooperatives goes fast, or emerges at 
all. It requires that somebody steps forward to initiate the farmer cooperative and that somebody 
becomes the leader of the cooperative. This requires not only various skills, but it is also time 
consuming to provide this collective good for the entire membership. Qualified persons may therefore 
not take the lead, despite the collective need to start a farmer cooperative. 
Top-down, government  
There are various cases in the world where cooperatives are initiated top-down by the government. We 
provide examples from the United States, Spain, and Russia. Olson (1965) describes that in the early 
1900s the Farm Bureau was crucial for the formation of cooperatives in the states Illinois and Indiana 
in the USA. The Farm Bureau was created by the government and benefited farmers through provision 
of technical aid and education. 
The Franco regime in Spain introduced the Law of Cooperatives in 1942, which set up and organized 
agricultural cooperatives in Spain so as to be compatible with its government and social strategy. 
Thereafter, legislation was set up for rural credit cooperatives and also agricultural cooperatives, 
where the rural credit cooperatives initially loaned only to agricultural entities.4 The cooperative 
legislation was clearly ‘top down’ and resulted in setting up cooperatives. The case of Spain illustrates 
that farmer cooperatives are frequently considered as instruments for governments to structure 
society.5 However, the eventual success of the agricultural cooperatives was ‘bottom up’ initiatives 
carried out by a rejuvenated cooperative sector in the 1980s. Investment in technology is a key feature, 
as is the dissemination of such technical knowledge. 
                                                          
4 Giagnocavo (2010) addresses the resulting co-evolution of agricultural and rural credit cooperatives in the Spanish 
province Almería. Statistics regarding the number of ‘top down’ cooperatives formed and the percentage of the 
cooperative market share in various sectors are presented by Cervantes and Fernandes (2008). Núñez-Nickel and Moyano-
Fuentes (2004) show that Andalusian cooperatives in the olive oil and milling industry have an advantage over their 
commercial rivals and are robust to a regime being hostile to the democratic tradition in cooperatives. 
5  Greece is another example of a country where cooperatives are considered as an instrument for political parties 
(Iliopoulos and Valentinov, 2012). 
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A top-down initiation of farmer cooperatives by the government occurred also in Russia. Post 1990 
farmer cooperatives are organized, financed and managed by governmental bodies. Farmers are then 
invited to become members of the cooperatives without investing any money. Farmers do not have 
any capital share in the cooperatives (Golovina and Nilsson, 2009). This type of cooperative is usually 
characterized by unallocated equity, collective decision-making, and equal treatment, which impedes a 
profitable functioning of cooperatives. These cooperatives are therefore more legislation oriented and 
service-oriented. Gardner and Lerman (2006) argue that this is more likely to happen in the economic 
environment of transition economies. However, the prospect of such cooperatives is limited due to 
farmers’ low trust and low level of dependence on these cooperatives (Golovina and Nilsson, 2009).6 
Top-down, entrepreneurs 
Farmer cooperatives may also be initiated by entrepreneurs, including entrepreneurial farmers, 
entrepreneurial officials who used to work in governmental departments related to agriculture, and 
entrepreneurial businessmen engaged in agri-products (Huang and Xu, 2006). This type of cooperative 
is commonly seen in China. Entrepreneurs who initiate the cooperative are members of the 
cooperative and generally hold the essential and scarce production factors, such as knowledge 
regarding production technologies, asset capital, marketing capabilities, social networks, and so on 
(Lin and Huang, 2007). 
2.3 Methodology 
To develop a better understanding of how cooperatives are organized in China, we employ a rigorous 
descriptive micro analytic approach. A multiple-case study is developed to describe and analyze the 
start-up of farmer cooperatives in the Zhejiang province, China. The sample consists of 37 farmer 
cooperatives. Data is collected from documents and first-hand interviews. Firstly, documents such as 
statutes and by-laws of cooperatives were collected. Secondly, face-to-face individual interviews with 
chairpersons or managers were conducted in order to collect primary data. Face-to-face individual 
interviews with cooperative members were carried out during March 2011 and June, 2011. The 
chairperson or a manager of each cooperative in the survey was interviewed. The questionnaire is 
provided in Appendix 1. 
It is important to recognize that cooperatives in different parts of China vary in their stage of 
development. Cooperatives firstly came into being in eastern China where the economy and market 
levels are more developed and agriculture is more industrialized. Cooperatives in western China are 
                                                          
6 Carroll et al. (1988) present evidence that the organizational structure and the behavior of agricultural cooperatives are 
strongly affected by the structure of the Hungarian state, where Hungary had a communist system with one party and 
various decentralized economic forms. 
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still in the start-up phase. Within the population of farmer cooperatives in China, we surveyed a 
sample of cooperatives in Zhejiang province. Zhejiang is located in the southeast of China (see Figure 
2.1) and is one of the most developed provinces in China. The GDP per capita of Zhejiang province 
was $7690, ranking first among the provinces in China, while the GDP per capita of China was $4382 
in 2010.7 However, the average arable land area per capita is smaller than 0.4 mu (1 hectare = 15 mu) 
in Zhejiang, while the national average plantation land area per capita is 1.38mu in 2010.8 Due to its 
scarcity of land and its relatively developed economy, Zhejiang specializes in high value products, 
such as fruits and vegetables. We focus on fruit and vegetable cooperatives during the field 
investigation in order to ensure relative homogeneity of cooperative enterprises.  
 
Figure 2.1 Map of China 
 
Zhejiang province was chosen as the survey area for two main reasons. The first reason is that Zhejiang 
is leading the way in farmer cooperative development in China, in terms of both quantity and 
performance. There were 3916 farmer cooperatives with a total membership of 270,000 in Zhejiang in 
2006.9 At the end of 2010, there were 20,678 farmer cooperatives with a membership size of 768,000.10 
Among these cooperatives, more than 70% of them are row crop or field cooperatives, while the other 
30% are livestock cooperatives. Fruit and vegetable cooperatives are the two most common types of 
                                                          
7 Data source: China Statistical Yearbook 2011. 
8 Data source: Ministry of Land and Resources of the People’s Republic of China. Available at http://www.mlr.gov.cn/  
9  Data source: Agricultural Department of Zhejiang Province. Available at 
http://www.zjagri.gov.cn/html/main/gb2312/index.html  
10 Data source: Zhao et al. (2011). 
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field cooperatives. Fruit cooperatives account for around 40% of crop cooperatives, while vegetable 
cooperatives account for around 30%. The number of cooperatives has been increasing rapidly and 
farmer cooperatives are playing an increasing role in agriculture markets in Zhejiang. 
Secondly, Zhejiang put into practice the Zhejiang Farmer Cooperative Law at the beginning of 2005. 
It is the first provincial and official cooperative law in China. The National Farmer Cooperative Law 
in China was promulgated on July 1st, 2007, which was based on the Zhejiang Cooperative Law. It 
implies that cooperatives in Zhejiang are considered to be leaders in cooperative organizational design. 
Random sampling is used. We chose 50 farmer cooperatives randomly from the documented list of 
cooperatives provided by Zhejiang Agricultural Department, all of which are vegetable and fruit 
marketing cooperatives. These 50 farmer cooperatives are distributed over different cities of the 
Zhejiang province. We failed to interview members of 5 cooperatives that we initially chose, due to 
unavailability of interviewees. Therefore we interviewed members from 45 farmer cooperatives. A 
questionnaire was counted as valid when there were no significant inconsistencies between the 
information collected from members of a cooperative and no important information was missing. An 
example of an inconsistency of information is a substantial difference between a chairperson’s capital 
share reported by the chairman and the chairperson’s capital share reported by others. One reason may 
be that a chairperson may try to hide the truth about his capital shares by offering wrong information 
when he owned shares beyond the ceiling of shares required by the Law. We discarded this 
questionnaire when we were not able to find out the verifiable information. Among all the 
cooperatives visited, data from 8 of them were discarded due to missing information or informational 
inconsistencies. We have therefore 37 cases.  
2.4 Descriptive statistics 
The data is provided in Appendix 2, while the descriptive statistics are presented in the Tables 1 to 4. 
Table 2.1 shows that all the cooperatives in the survey were founded between 2001 and 2006. 
Products of these cooperatives were in fruits and vegetables. Most cooperatives (83.7%) had their 
production bases within a local city.  
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Table 2.1 Genesis, main product, and geographical scope of 37 Zhejiang fruit-vegetable cooperatives 
(2011) 
 Number of 
cooperatives 
Proportion (%) 
Total number of cooperatives 37 100 
Genesis 2001 1 2.7 
2002 10 27.0 
2003 11 29.7 
2004 6 16.2 
2005 7 18.9 
2006 2 5.4 
Main products of 
cooperatives 
Fruits 28 75.7 
Vegetables 7 18.9 
Vegetables & fruits 2 5.4 
Geographical scope of 
production bases 
Within a local village 4 10.8 
Within a local town 15 40.5 
Within a local city 12 32.4 
Within a local province 1 2.7 
Nationwide 4 10.8 
International 1 2.7 
 
Table 2.2 presents the membership size and members’ geographical distribution of the farmer 
cooperatives. Two thirds of the cooperatives had membership sizes between 100 and 200. Three 
fourths of all cooperatives had their membership within a local town, while only one of the 37 
cooperatives had a beyond city membership.  
Table 2.2 Membership size and location of 37 Zhejiang fruit-vegetable cooperatives (2011) 
 Number of 
cooperatives 
Proportion 
(%) 
Total number of cooperatives 37 100 
Membership size <100 7 17.9 
[100-200) 25 67.6 
[200-500) 3 8.1 
≥500 2 5.4 
Geographical scope of 
the membership11 
Within a local village 8 21.6 
Within a local town 20 54.1 
Within a local city 8 21.6 
Within a local province 0 0 
Nationwide  1 2.7 
 
All the cooperatives in the survey had a merged body of the management and the board. Members of 
the management and the board are referred to as core members, due to their key roles in the farmer 
                                                          
11 The location of the membership is different from the location of production base because some farmers rent additional 
lands from farmers within or beyond their own village. 
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cooperative. There are both male and female core members. A core member may either have individual 
farming or have discarded farming. This latter type of core members focuses on the management and 
value-adding business of cooperatives. A core member holds relatively large shares and is in charge of 
at least one of the key businesses areas (management, input purchasing, production, product 
purchasing, marketing, accounting, and so on). Other members are referred to as common members. 
The number of core members is presented in Table 2.3. There were on average 6 core members in the 
cooperatives in the survey, accounting for 3.5% of the membership. In addition, table 3 shows that 
there are usually three, five, or seven core members, which implies that numbers of core members tend 
to be an odd number. The cooperative with 40 core members is a nationwide cooperative having 
multiple production bases all over China and also one production base in Vietnam. In each of the 
production base, there were a few core members, which contributed to the large number of core 
members.  
Table 2.3 Number of core members in 37 Zhejiang fruit-vegetable cooperatives (2011) 
No. of core members 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 40 
No. of Coops 1 11 3 13 1 4 2 1 1 
 
To become a core member in a cooperative, at least one of the following conditions needs to be met. 
Firstly, a core member is usually one of the initiators of the cooperative. Exceptions are possible. A 
member joining the cooperative after its founding may also become a core member due to distinct 
capabilities. This happened in only one farmer cooperative we surveyed. Secondly, a core member is 
generally good at management, marketing, and/or has an important network with downstream buyers 
and processors. Examples are a chairperson who used to be the village head is good at organizing 
farmers; a chairperson who used to do transportation and sales has many skills in marketing and is able 
to establish a broad marketing portfolio of products; and a chairperson who used to run a company 
tends to guide the cooperative into the direction of demutualization. Farmers with greater asset capital, 
human capital, and social capital have a higher probability to obtain authority, economic benefits, or 
political benefits. In addition, the education level may also influence human resources. The education 
level of chairpersons was significantly higher than the average education level of farmers in China. 
Table 2.4 shows that 75.7% of chairpersons had middle-school education and 21.6% had high school 
education, while the average proportion of farmers in China having high school education was 48.1% 
and having senior high school education was 11.6%.12  
In addition, two fifths (40.6%) of the cooperative chairpersons were or used to be a village head or 
                                                          
12 National Bureau of Statistics of China. Available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/  
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worked in a governmental department; 29.7% of them used to do product transportation and sales; 16.2% 
of them managed a company before initiating cooperatives; and finally 13.5% of the chairpersons were 
large farmers.13 
Table 2.4 Education levels and working experiences of chairpersons of 37 Zhejiang fruit-vegetable 
cooperatives (2011) 
 Number of 
cooperatives 
Proportion 
(%) 
Total number of cooperatives 37 100 
Education levels of 
chairpersons 
Below primary school 1 2.7 
Primary school 8 21.6 
High school 20 54.1 
Senior high school 7 18.9 
College and university 1 2.7 
Working experiences 
of chairpersons 
Used to be a village head or worked in 
a governmental department 
15 40.6% 
Did product transportation and sale 11 29.7% 
Ran a company 6 16.2% 
Was a large farmer 5 13.5% 
 
2.5 Discussion 
This section addresses the membership size and locality of farmer cooperatives in China (2.5.1) and 
the actors involved in the genesis of these cooperatives (2.5.2). 
2.5.1 Membership size and locality 
The two distinctive features regarding farmer cooperatives in China are the small membership size 
and locality. There are at least four reasons. Firstly, local farmers have similar nature conditions such 
as climate and land. The nature conditions basically determine the specialization of a town or city in 
terms of industries and varieties of products. It is therefore much easier for local farmers to act 
collectively due to their similar products as well as similar production technologies.  
The second reason is that farmers from the same town or city have the same cultural and economic 
backgrounds, which implies that they are exposed to similar situations in information collection and 
market access experiences with large markets. These common experiences make cooperation easier. 
Thirdly, farmers from the same village or town usually know each other well. Farmers from the same 
village or town usually have a high degree of kinship (Huang and Xu, 2006).The mutual trust between 
members facilitates farmers’ cooperation and meanwhile can save on governance cost of the 
cooperative. Additionally, the same dialect within some area contributes substantially to smooth 
                                                          
13 A large farmer is defined as a farmer whose production area is much larger than the average production area in the local 
village and who needs to hire full-time workers in production. 
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communication. As a result, the costs of decision making and coordination would be relatively low if 
there is mutual trust and members speak the same dialect.  
Last but not least, the dominant position of the core members in the management of farmer 
cooperatives matters to a large extent. The management of Chinese cooperatives is seldom 
professional. All CEOs and the chairpersons in the cooperatives in the survey were members. Member 
managers may lack detailed knowledge of markets and management, compared with full-time 
professional managers (Sexton and Iskow, 1988). So they have to limit the membership size and also 
limit the membership within a certain area to ensure the homogeneity of interests of the members. 
2.5.2 Actors 
This section addresses the importance of core members, common members, and the government in the 
genesis of farmer cooperatives in China. 
Core members 
Farmers in China differ in asset capital, human resources, and social resources. In China some farmers 
have substantial capital, marketing capabilities, and/or social or professional networks. They are often 
entrepreneurial and are referred to as “elite” farmers. Examples include persons who used to manage 
private enterprises, those who used to work in the agricultural department, or persons having 
information about the product supply chain. Meanwhile, there are also common farmers, good at 
farming, but not experienced at marketing or management. Most farmers in China belong to this latter 
category. These differences determine different production and marketing strategies as well as 
different objectives between alternative groups of farmers. Farmers with high capabilities seek to 
realize entrepreneurship rents in terms of capital investment and authority through the management of 
cooperatives, whereas common farmers are satisfied by selling their products at reasonable prices. 
These entrepreneurial farmers organize common farmers into farmer cooperatives. A vital feature of 
cooperatives in China is therefore that they attract key production factors (Xu, 2005). A core member 
generally holds relatively more shares of the cooperative and correspondingly has more income rights, 
whereas a common member is expected to patronize the cooperative but is seldom involved in the 
operational decision-making. Though it is essential that common members produce and provide 
products that meet the demand of consumers, yet more important is that core members use their 
capabilities to enhance the value of cooperative enterprises by downstream value adding activities and 
acquiring higher profit in markets. 
The background of a chairperson generates benefits for the farmer cooperative. The experience of 
working in governmental departments improves the chairperson’s social capital and sequentially 
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enhances his capabilities in acquiring information, while the experience of doing product 
transportation and sales, managing company, and being a large farmer implies that the chairperson has 
more opportunity to access markets, which enhances the chairperson’s capabilities in information 
collection and marketing. 
Common members 
Common members are farmers who buy a small amount of capital shares or pay an entry fee to join a 
cooperative. They transact with the cooperative, but are seldom involved in the management or 
operation of the cooperative.  Common members therefore can be regarded as participants in the 
cooperatives. They participate in cooperatives mainly to pool risks and to obtain services provided by 
cooperatives such as input supply and marketing services (Sun, 2006). Hence, different from the core 
members’ profit-seeking objective, common members are usually risk adverse and are satisfied by 
procuring services and stable prices. 
Farmers obtain cooperative membership by buying capital shares. According to our investigation, in 
most cooperatives a farmer needed to buy at least one share of capital. However, in a small proportion 
of cooperatives, one share is bought by more than one member when they lack money.14  One share of 
capital can range from 500 Chinese Yuan (77USD) to 2000 Chinese Yuan (308USD). 15  Hence, 
common members make small contributions to the finance of cooperatives.  
In addition, common members usually do not participate in decision-making. In 34 (92%) of the 
cooperatives surveyed out of 37, decisions were made only by core members without the participation 
of common members, while common members participated yet core members still dominated in 
decision-making in the other 8% cooperatives. Therefore common members participate marginally in 
decision-making.  
Government 
The genesis and development of Chinese farmer cooperatives are not only due to the desire of 
entrepreneurial farmers, but is also driven and influenced to a large extent by the government. There 
are various aspects of the relationship between the government and cooperatives. Firstly, initiation of 
farmer cooperatives is to a large extent promoted by the government. The start-up stage of 
cooperatives in China began in the 1980s and entered into a period of rapid development in the 2000s. 
This development was reinforced in 2007 as the National Cooperative Law was promulgated.  
Secondly, the government supports cooperatives in various ways, particularly with tax relief and 
                                                          
14 We do not have the data regarding the proportion of cooperatives in which a member was required to have at least one 
share of capital and that of cooperatives in which more than one member can together have one share. 
15 Based on the exchange rate at the time of the survey, 1 Chinese Yuan equals to 0.154 USD. 
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subsidies. Normally, subsidies are these for infrastructure of villages, and investment in storage and 
processing equipment. Subsidies are important to cooperatives at the start-up stage due to 
cooperatives’ inability to raise sufficient capital. In addition, the government supports cooperatives by 
providing them production technique training and product promotions, and establishes competitions 
with rewards for brand establishment. No matter how important the role government plays, the 
initiation of farmer cooperatives in China is essentially due to market forces as well as farmers’ desire 
for investment. The government accelerates or normalizes the development of cooperatives. 
Thirdly, cooperatives do not only receive support from the government, but also the government uses 
cooperatives to realize some economic and political objectives. From the perspective of its economic 
function, the development of cooperatives can increase farmers’ incomes and promote the local 
economy, industrialization, and the agricultural supply chain (Xu, 2005). Cooperatives organize small 
farmers to realize production standardization and product brand establishment, which are difficult for 
individual farmers. From the view of its political function, cooperatives naturally have an anti-poverty 
function (Xu, 2005; Wu and Xu, 2009). The government both collects information and voice from 
farmers and implements various policies via cooperatives. The voice of small farmers is organized and 
receives more attention due to the existence of cooperatives. Farmer cooperatives help the government 
also to carry out policies more efficiently and effectively. Therefore the government takes advantage 
of cooperatives to carry out governmental activities such as technical extension, development of 
industrialization, subsidizing poor farmers, and so on.  
2.6 Conclusion and further research 
The number of farmer cooperatives in China has grown very rapidly since the promulgation of the 
national Cooperative Law in 2007. The genesis of cooperatives in China is dominated by 
entrepreneurial farmers’ economic ambitions and the government’s economic and political objectives, 
rather than the small farmers, if the evidence in this study can be generalized.  
There are many possibilities for further research. We formulate two possibilities. Firstly, one of the 
concerns regarding the development of farmer cooperatives in China is that they do not emerge 
bottom-up. Core members may be crucial for the genesis of farmer cooperatives in China, but farmer 
cooperatives will not survive if they do not serve the entire membership. The specifics of the genesis 
process of farmer cooperatives in China may have an impact on their subsequent development. For 
example, the dominance of a small percentage of the membership, i.e. the core members, may have an 
effect on the involvement of all members in farmer cooperatives in the subsequent stages of the life 
cycle of farmer cooperatives in China. Additionally, various farmer cooperatives in China have 
features similar to some farmer cooperatives in the Western world, like differentiation between 
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members in terms of quality premiums and voting rights and a focus on one product. This is allowed 
by the Cooperative Law.   
Secondly, the genesis of farmer cooperatives in China is a top-down process dominated by the 
government and entrepreneurs, rather than the common members. This seems to reflect the 
development of China during the last decade. China is on the one hand a country with one party and a 
large government, but on the other hand provincial governments seem to have considerable impact on 
local economic developments. It will be interesting to see whether there is an imprint of the specifics 
of the country (Stinchcombe, 1965) on the subsequent development of farmer cooperatives, or that the 
interaction between the legal system and the  economic incentives facing members in a farmer 
cooperative dominates (Williamson, 1996).  
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Chapter 3: Governance Structure of Chinese Farmer Cooperatives: 
Evidence from Zhejiang Province 
 
Abstract  
This paper addresses the distinction between core members and common members in farmer 
cooperatives in China in terms of the allocation of ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights. 
Empirical results from a multiple case study in the Zhejiang province (China) indicate that the 
distribution of ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights is quite skewed towards core 
members.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Farmer cooperatives in the Western world have gone through various stages of development during 
their evolution, such as genesis, growth, emergence of internal conflicts, recognition and analysis, and 
options choice (Cook and Plunkett, 2006). Most farmer cooperatives in China are still in the genesis 
stage, but the growth in the number of cooperatives indicates a revolution in the governance of 
agriculture in China. The number of farmer cooperatives was 26,400 when the Cooperative Law16 was 
promulgated in 2007. Subsequently, the number of cooperatives increased to 110,900 in 2008 and to 
246,400, 379,100 and 521,700 in 2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively. By the end of March 2012, there 
were 552,300 farmer cooperatives 17  with 43.0 million members in China. Around 17.2% of the 
farmers have joined cooperatives.18  
A governance structure delineates ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights regarding 
(physical or financial) assets (Baker et al., 2008; Hansmann, 1996).  Ownership rights specify the 
formal rights regarding the residual control of assets, such as the property rights regarding the assets 
and the distribution of voting rights among the membership. Decision rights address the question 
‘Who has control (regarding the use of assets)?’ and specify who directs the firm’s activities, i.e. the 
allocation of real authority. Finally, income rights address the question ‘How are benefits and costs 
allocated?’, thereby creating the incentive system faced by the members and the decision makers. 
These three rights are reflected in the classic characterization of a farmer cooperative by Dunn (1988, 
                                                          
16 The full name is Farmer Specialized Cooperative Law of the People’s Republic of China. We refer to it as Cooperative 
Law or Chinese Cooperative Law in this paper. 
17 According to an estimate, more than one third of cooperatives in China exist on “paper”, around one third develop 
beyond the cooperative principles, and the last one third are functioning properly (Sultan and Wolz, 2012). 
18 Data source: The Ministry of Agriculture of the People’s Republic of China. Available at http://www.moa.gov.cn/  
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p85) as user-owned, user-controlled, and user-benefitted, i.e. ‘A cooperative belongs to the people 
who use its services, the control of which rests with all the members, and the gains of which are 
distributed to the members in proportion to the use they made of its services’.  
A cooperative is characterized by member dominance, which is reflected in democratic control being 
one of the distinguishing features of farmer cooperatives. Decision-making based on democracy 
reflects the vesting control of the membership. “One member, one vote” is the classic principle of 
democratic decision-making, which is reflected in the second cooperative principle of the 
International Cooperative Alliance. However, the allocation of voting rights between the members 
differs between countries. Some countries prescribe to the principle of “one member, one vote” by law, 
but there are also countries where this is not specified in the law and a “one member, multiple votes” 
scheme has been adopted. Most of the cooperatives in the U.S. have a “one member, one vote” rule, 
while cooperatives in various countries in Europe adopt a proportional voting rule. China does not 
specify the principle of “one member, one vote” in its Cooperative Law. The Chinese Cooperative 
Law specifies that cooperatives are collectively owned and democratically controlled by members. 
Members present in the general assembly meeting should account for more than two thirds of the 
membership. The maximum share of votes during decision-making in the general assembly meeting is 
20% for a single member. In addition, at least 60% of residual profits should be allocated on the basis 
of delivery. 
Control in terms of decision rights and income rights in farmer cooperatives in China seems to mostly 
lie with a small group of members, called core members, while the other members, called common 
members, are hardly involved (Xu, 2005). The core members, rather than the whole membership, 
seem to be in charge of the cooperative (Huang and Xu, 2008). However, there is hardly any data 
supporting these claims about the governance structure (in terms of ownership rights, decision rights, 
and income rights) of farmer cooperatives in China. This paper presents data regarding these aspects 
of farmer cooperatives to characterize the governance structure. To be specific, we focus on the 
following research question: what are the governance characteristics of Chinese farmer cooperatives 
in terms of ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights? Topics highlighted are the 
distribution of votes among members, the way in which decision rights are allocated, the duties and 
responsibilities of the boards, the composition of the management, the decision rules, the equity 
capital structure, and the residual payment schemes in farmer cooperatives in the Chinese province 
Zhejiang. 
This study has various contributions. Firstly, it provides a detailed description of enterprise 
characteristics and governance features of farmer cooperatives in one of the most developed provinces 
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in China (Zhejiang). Secondly, we distinguish core and common members in farmer cooperatives in 
China and relate this distinction to the governance structure features. Thirdly, we address the 
differences between Chinese farmer cooperatives and cooperatives in the Western countries. Fourth, 
the benefits and possible problems pertained to the governance features of Chinese farmer 
cooperatives are discussed. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the methodology. The data and 
descriptive analysis are presented in section 3.3. Section 3.4 discusses the results. We conclude in 
section 3.5. 
3.2 Methodology 
A multiple case study is developed to describe and analyze the governance structure of farmer 
cooperatives in the Zhejiang province, China. Data is collected from documents and first-hand 
interviews. Firstly, documents such as statutes and bylaws of cooperatives were collected. Secondly, 
face-to-face individual interviews with chairpersons or managers were conducted in order to collect 
primary data. Face-to-face individual interviews with cooperative members were carried out during 
March 2011 and June 2011. The chairperson or a manager of each cooperative in the survey was 
interviewed. The questionnaire is provided in Appendix 1.  
It is important to recognize that cooperatives in different parts of China vary in their stage of 
development. Cooperatives firstly came into being in eastern China where the economy and market 
levels are more developed and agriculture is more industrialized. Cooperatives in western China are 
still in the start-up phase. The government is promoting the foundation of cooperatives and many 
cooperatives are still growing fast. Within the population of farmer cooperatives in China, we 
surveyed a sample of cooperatives in the Zhejiang province. Zhejiang is located in the southeast of 
China (see Figure 3.1) and is one of the most developed provinces in China. The GDP per capita of 
the Zhejiang province was $7690, ranked first among the provinces in China, while the GDP per 
capita of China was $4382 in 2010.19 However, the average plantation land area per capita is smaller 
than 0.4 mu (1 hectare = 15 mu) in Zhejiang, while the national average plantation land area per capita 
is 1.38 mu in 2010.20 Due to its scarcity of land and its relatively developed economy, Zhejiang 
specialises in high value-added products, such as fruit and vegetables. We focus on fruit and vegetable 
cooperatives during the field investigation, in order to ensure relative homogeneity of cooperative 
enterprises.  
                                                          
19 Data source: China Statistical Yearbook 2011. 
20 Data source: Ministry of Land and Resources of the People’s Republic of China. Available at http://www.mlr.gov.cn/  
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Figure 3.1 Map of China 
 
Zhejiang province was chosen as the survey area for two main reasons. The first reason is that Zhejiang 
is leading the way in farmer cooperative development in China, in terms of both quantity and 
performance. There were 3916 farmer cooperatives with a total membership of 270,000 in Zhejiang in 
2006. 21  At the end of 2010, there were 20,678 farmer cooperatives with a membership size of 
768,000.22 Of these cooperatives, more than 70% of them are planting cooperatives, while the other 30% 
are breeding and raising cooperatives. Fruit and vegetable cooperatives are the two most common 
types of planting cooperatives. Fruit cooperatives account for around 40% of planting cooperatives, 
while vegetable cooperatives account for around 30%. The number of cooperatives has been increasing 
fast and farmer cooperatives are playing an increasing role in agricultural markets in Zhejiang, and 
elsewhere in China. 
Secondly, Zhejiang put into practice the Zhejiang Farmer Cooperative Law at the beginning of 2005. 
It is the first provincial and official cooperative law in China. The National Farmer Cooperative Law 
in China was promulgated on 1 July 2007, which was based on the Zhejiang Cooperative Law. It 
implies that cooperatives in Zhejiang are leading for advanced modes of farmer cooperatives in China 
to a large extent.  
We chose 50 farmer cooperatives randomly from the documented name list of provincial pilot 
                                                          
21  Data source: Agricultural Department of Zhejiang Province. Available at 
http://www.zjagri.gov.cn/html/main/gb2312/index.html  
22 Data source: Zhao et al. (2011). 
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cooperatives23, which was provided by the Zhejiang Agricultural Department. All of the cooperatives 
chosen are vegetable and fruit cooperatives. These 50 farmer cooperatives are distributed over 
different cities of the Zhejiang province. We were not able to interview members of five cooperatives 
that we initially chose, due to unavailability of interviewees. Therefore we interviewed members from 
45 farmer cooperatives. A questionnaire was counted as valid when there were no significant 
inconsistencies between the information collected from members of a cooperative and no important 
information was missing. An example of an inconsistency of information is a substantial difference 
between a chairperson’s capital share reported by the chairperson and that reported by others. One 
reason may be that a chairperson may try to hide the truth about his capital share by offering wrong 
information when he owned a share beyond the share ceiling required by the Law. We discarded this 
questionnaire when we were not able to find out the true information. Among all the cooperatives 
visited, data from eight of them were discarded due to missing information or informational 
inconsistencies. We have therefore a data base consisting of 37 cases.  
3.3 Data 
The data regarding the cooperatives in the survey is reported in appendix 3. Data is coded by grouping, 
averaging, and summing and is presented by descriptive analysis. We start by presenting the 
descriptive statistics of the farmer cooperatives and their chairpersons in the survey (3.3.1). The 
governance structure choices are presented in terms of ownership rights (3.3.2), decision rights (3.3.3), 
and income rights (3.3.4).  
3.3.1 Cooperatives and their chairpersons 
All the cooperatives in the survey are fruit and/or vegetable cooperatives founded between 2001 and 
2006. The average membership size of the cooperatives is 171. The total sales value of cooperatives is 
3,240,000 dollars24 on average. 
There are on average six core members in the cooperatives in the survey, accounting for 3.5% of the 
membership. Almost all cooperatives have three, five, or seven core members (Liang and Hendrikse, 
2013). Working experiences and education levels of chairpersons are investigated due to the fact that 
Lin and Huang (2008) regard them as the two important factors influencing capabilities. According to 
the data presented in table 3.1, 75.7% of chairpersons have high school education and 21.6% have 
senior high school education, while the average proportion of farmers in China having high school 
                                                          
23 Pilot cooperatives are a subset of the cooperatives functioning properly (footnote 3). There are three levels of pilot 
cooperatives in China, i.e. the state level, the provincial level, and the city/county level. The others are ordinary 
cooperatives. The grading of cooperatives is done by the Agricultural Departments of corresponding levels based on a list 
of standards. Pilot cooperatives have the priority to receive subsidies as well as technical guidance from the government. 
24 The total sale value was 21,039,000 Chinese Yuan on average. Based on the exchange rate at the time of the survey, 1 
Chinese Yuan equals to 0.154 dollar. 
 30 
 
education is 48.1% and having senior high school education is 11.6%.25  
In addition, two fifths (40.6%) of the cooperative chairpersons are or used to be a village head or 
worked in a governmental department; 29.7% of them used to do product transportation and sales; 
16.2% of them used to manage a company before initiating a cooperative; and finally 13.5% of the 
chairpersons are or used to be a large farmer.26 
Table 3.1 Education levels and working experiences of chairpersons 
 Number of 
cooperatives 
Proportion 
(%) 
Total number of cooperatives 37 100 
Education levels of 
chairpersons 
Below primary school 1 2.7 
Primary school 8 21.6 
High school 20 54.1 
Senior high school 7 18.9 
College and university 1 2.7 
Working experiences 
of chairpersons27 
was a village head or worked in a 
governmental department 
15 40.6% 
Did product transportation and sale 11 29.7% 
Ran a company 6 16.2% 
Was a large farmer 5 13.5% 
 
3.3.2 Ownership rights 
Members of cooperatives always have the formal right to be engaged in the decision-making process, 
in terms of voting, voice, and exit. According to the Law, boards of directors and supervisors make 
decisions by the “one member, one vote” rule, while for general assembly meetings, both the “one 
member, one vote” and the proportional voting rule are allowed by the Law. Of these 37 cooperatives 
in the survey, 23 (62.2%) of them have the “one member, one vote” rule, while 14 (37.8%) of them 
have the proportional voting rule, according to the bylaws of the cooperatives. 
Empirically, there are usually two decision-making procedures. One is that core members proposed 
some decision options and all the members voted in favor of or against these decision options. A 
decision is approved when there are 50% or sometimes 70% of members in favor of it, depending on 
the rules of the cooperative. The other possibility is that decisions are made by core members without 
common members. Answers to question C-5 in the questionnaire (Appendix 1) show that 34 (92%) of 
the cooperatives surveyed use the latter decision procedure.  
                                                          
25 National Bureau of Statistics of China. Available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/  
26 A large farmer is defined as a farmer whose production area is much larger than the average production area in the local 
village and who needs to hire full-time workers in production. 
27 Sultan and Wolz (2012) classify them as bureaucratic entrepreneurs, agricultural entrepreneurs, business entrepreneurs, 
and farmers, which is consistent with our classification. 
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Figure 3.2 presents the formal and the real voting rules of the 37 cooperatives. Of the 23 cooperatives 
with the “one member, one vote” as the formal rule, decisions in 21 of them actually are made by only 
core members, while in two of the cooperatives decisions are made generally by the membership. 
Furthermore, though the “one member, one vote” is specified in the bylaws of the two cooperatives, 
only one of them applies the “one member, one vote” rule, whereas the other uses the proportional 
voting rule. Of the 14 cooperatives with the proportional voting rule, 13 of them are characterized by 
decisions being made by core members, while only one of them follows the bylaws that decisions are 
made by proportional voting of the membership. 
 
Figure 3.2 Formal and real voting rules 
 
3.3.3 Decision rights 
According to the Chinese Cooperative Law, the board of directors is a body of members who oversees 
activities such as 1) organising technical training and decision making through general assembly 
meetings, 2) presenting information about the performance of the past year as well as future 
challenges, and 3) working out production objectives and budget plans for the next year. The board of 
supervisors is regarded as a body of members that supervises the operation of the board of directors. 
The duties of the board of supervisors are mainly 1) ensuring the enforcement of decisions made 
through general assembly meetings and technical trainings, 2) supervising financial issues, 3) 
 
Formal 
voting rules 
Real voting 
rules 
Real voting 
rules 
1 0 1 1 
1 13 2 21 
14 23 
Voting rules 
One member, 
one vote 
Proportional 
voting 
Core members 
deciding 
Members 
voting 
Core members 
deciding 
Members 
voting 
One member, 
one vote 
Proportional 
voting 
One member, 
one vote 
Proportional 
voting 
 32 
 
monitoring the enforcement of duties of directors, and 4) recording the delivery quantity and quality 
of director members. 
The data shows that all the cooperatives in the survey have a merged body of the management and the 
board (Liang and Hendrikse, 2013). The management therefore consists of both the board of directors 
and the board of supervisors. Members of the management team are core members.  
There are on average three general assembly meetings in 2010 in each cooperative. However, most of 
the general meetings are held for the sake of production technical trainings, rather than decision-
making or voting. Key decisions are made through board meetings. There are on average five and a 
half formal board meetings in 2010 in the cooperatives in the survey. According to the voting rules 
presented in Figure 3.3, decisions are made only by core members in 34 cooperatives. Common 
members participate in the other three cooperatives, but core members still dominate in decision-
making, because the proportional voting rule is applied in two of the three cooperatives. Core 
members have more votes than common members. Figure 3 presents a distribution of members’ 
participation in decision-making reflecting this observation. The horizontal axis stands for members 
ranging from core members to common members, while the vertical axis refers to the percentage of 
decision rights. We therefore conclude that decisions in the cooperatives are made mainly by core 
members, instead of the membership. 
 
Figure 3.3 Distribution of members’ participation in decision-making 
 
3.3.4 Income rights 
Income rights are addressed in terms of equity capital (3.4.4.1) and the residual payment scheme 
(3.4.4.2). 
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Farmers obtain the membership by buying capital shares. According to our investigation, in most 
cooperatives a farmer needs to buy at least one share of capital. However, in a small proportion of 
cooperatives, one share is bought by more than one member when they lack money.28 One share of 
capital can range from 500 Chinese Yuan (77USD) to 2000 Chinese Yuan (308USD). Cooperatives 
therefore are usually under-financed by members. Subsidies from the government are another 
important source of financial support (Liang and Hendrikse, 2013; Sultan and Wolz, 2012). 
Information about capital share distributions between core members and common members is 
presented in Table 3.2. Core members, accounting for 3.5% of the membership, hold nearly half of the 
equity capital. Besides, chairpersons of cooperatives are the largest shareholders among core members. 
Table 3.2 Capital share distribution in cooperatives in the survey 
 Number/ proportion 
Average membership size 171 
Average number of core members 6 
Average proportion of core members out of membership (%) 3.5 
Average shares that all core members hold (%) 49.1 
Average shares that the chairperson holds (%) 16.0 
 
The capital share distribution of the 37 cooperatives is presented in Figure 3.4. The horizontal axis 
ranges from core members to common members, while the vertical axis refers to the percentage of 
equity capital in the cooperative. We have only data about the capital share of the chairperson and 
about the capital share of all the core members jointly. We assume in Figure 3.4 that all the core 
members except for the chairperson are identical in capital share and all the common members are 
identical in capital share as well. According to the data in appendix 3, the chairperson has on average 
16.0% of the capital shares, which determines the start point of the line in Figure 3.4. Core members 
(including the chairperson), accounting for 3.5% of the membership, have 49.1% of the capital shares, 
which determines the kink of the line in Figure 3.4.  
                                                          
28 We do not have the data regarding the proportion of cooperatives in which a member was required to have at least one 
share of capital and that of cooperatives in which one share is owned by several members. 
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Figure 3.4 Distribution of equity capital 
 
A member who exits the cooperative is reimbursed his initial share capital as well as the accumulated 
part of his capital. If a member exits the cooperative, there are two ways that he deals with his equity 
capital. One is that he transfers or sells his equity capital to someone else, either a member of the 
cooperative or a non-member farmer. The other way is that he withdraws his shares directly from the 
cooperative. In the latter case, total capital of the cooperative would be reduced and meanwhile shares 
of each current member increases.  
3.3.4.2 Residual payment scheme  
Total profits are firstly reserved in the cooperative for risk and future investment, and then allocated to 
members at the end of the production year. The allocation of profits to farmers is based on patronage, 
capital share, or both. As Figure 3.5 shows, 73.0% of the cooperatives in the survey distribute profits 
to farmers on the basis of both patronage and capital share, while 21.6% of the cooperatives distribute 
profits solely based on patronage and 5.4% solely based on capital share. Among the cooperatives that 
distribute profits according to both patronage and capital share, on average 56.1% of the profits are 
distributed on the basis of patronage, while 43.9% are distributed on the basis of capital share, which 
is almost in line with China’s National Cooperative Law that at least 60% of profits distributed to 
members should be based on patronage. 
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Figure 3.5 Average profit distribution of cooperatives 
 
Data regarding the income of farmers is not available. However, Figures 3.4 and 3.5 enable us to say 
something about the distribution of income rights. Figure 3.5 indicates that most cooperatives allocate 
profits to members on the basis of both patronage and capital share. Figure 3.4 reflects that core 
members have significantly more equity capital shares than common members. However, table 3.1 
shows that only 13.5% of the core members are large farmers, i.e. most core members do not have a 
larger production size than common members. The distribution of income rights is therefore less 
skewed than the distribution of equity capital. The distribution of profits is presented in Figure 3.6. 
The horizontal axis ranges from core members to common members, while the vertical axis refers to 
the percentage of profits allocated to farmers (based on patronage and capital share). 
 
Figure 3.6 Distribution of income rights 
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3.4 Discussion 
An appropriate choice of governance structure will direct activities in a productive way. It addresses 
coordination, motivation, and cognition problems. Coordination is required when the parties involved 
have joint interests, but they do not know each other’s course of action. Motivation problems are 
addressed in terms of incentives and authority allocation to reduce conflicts of interests as well as 
opportunistic behaviors (Feng and Hendrikse, 2011). Opportunistic behavior occurs when an 
individual, organization, or institution takes advantage of a market or contractual setting with 
incomplete or asymmetric information (Bijman and Hendrikse, 2003). Harris et al. (1996) point out 
that member opportunism is a prominent problem in cooperatives. Cooperative members are likely to 
act opportunistically by either overusing their cooperative or by limiting the amount of capital they 
provide (Fulton, 1995). Cognition problems in organizations are due to the limited capacities of the 
involved parties. A governance structure channels attention and cognition, which in turn determines 
the benefits and costs of various parties (Feng and Hendrikse, 2011). 
Ownership rights 
Farmer cooperatives are owned collectively by members. Members have the formal rights over the 
assets (Hendrikse, 2005). Ownership rights reside also with (the majority of) the farmers in a 
cooperative in China. This is in line with Hart and Moore (1990) and Hendrikse and Veerman (2001). 
They argue that control over the assets should lie with the agent, or simple majority voting among the 
group of agents, when an agent or a group of agents is key to an asset. 
Farmer cooperatives in China have been characterized for their noncompliance with the general 
cooperative principle of democratic decision making (Ma and Meng, 2008). All the members have 
rights to vote formally, but the number of votes differs between members. Formally, in Chinese 
cooperatives both “one member, one vote” and proportional voting are allowed by the Law on the one 
hand. The Law specifies that the ceiling regarding voting rights of a single member is 20%. The 
practice is that common members delegate and relinquish voting rights to core members, because core 
members are crucially important to the development and success of farmer cooperatives. Common 
members are aware that they are inferior in capabilities and have to free ride on high ability farmers. 
They regard that their efforts will not greatly affect the performance of the cooperative. Neither will 
they expect that their effort will be rewarded. The skewed distribution of ownership rights is 
addressed in a number of articles. Madhok (1996) shows that the network partner with higher 
capabilities should have a higher degree of control. Within a pyramid hierarchy, some agents 
specializing and others coordinating with them, is an efficient decision making structure (Hart and 
Moore, 2005). Similarly, Hojman and Szeidl (2008) model about network formation shows that the 
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core-periphery structure is the unique equilibrium architecture and there is a positive correlation 
between centrality and payoffs. 
The fact that core members have most authority may cause opportunistic behaviors (Fulton, 1995; 
Harris et al., 1996; Huang, 2008). Thus, it is important to alleviate members’ opportunistic behavior, 
which can be done in formal as well as informal ways. Firstly, members’ formal exit right can prevent 
core members’ opportunistic behavior to a large extent. Hirschman (1970) argues that exit is an 
important part of bargaining power. It is in accordance with Holmström’s (1999) statement that those 
who have good market alternatives will surely be well taken care of. Notice that though core members 
are more important than common members in the operation of farmer cooperatives, core members 
need the participation of common members as well. Otherwise product quality control, quantity 
stability, and economies of scale are not realized. Common members’ exit may therefore lead to the 
failure of the cooperative and sequentially curtailing of core members’ ambitions. Hence, core 
members have to balance benefits obtained by behaving opportunistically and losses due to members’ 
exit. However, it has to be acknowledged that ‘the exit mechanism operates less effectively in markets 
in which the costs of switching are high and when information about alternative options is incomplete 
(Pencavel, 2001). Therefore a member will not easily withdraw unless he has access to alternative 
outlet. Besides, members have already invested in the cooperative over the years. Their shares may 
not easily or sufficiently be recouped by transferring or selling, which may also prevent them from 
exit. 
Secondly, voting and voice rights are formally allocated to the whole membership, no matter whether 
they are used or not. According to the Cooperative Law, the general assembly meeting is the ultimate 
decision making body in of a cooperative. Common members have the rights to vote and voice against 
decisions when they are dissatisfied. The formal voting and voicing rights can effectively limit core 
members from being overly opportunistic. Additionally, it is formally required by the Law that the 
ceiling of voting rights of a single member is 15% and the ceiling of capital shares of a single member 
is 20%. Common members are willing to relinquish their decision rights to core members or not using 
the right as long as they are satisfied with the benefits derived from joining the cooperative.  
Decision rights 
The distinguishing feature of a cooperative is member dominance. This is reflected in democratic 
decision-making. However democratic processes are usually slow and costly. Democratic decision-
making entails a collective action problem. When ownership is distributed among many members, 
owners may be less inclined to participate in decision making because (s)he regards the results of the 
decision as a public good (Olson, 1965). Holmström (1999) regards it infeasible to have a large 
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number of people directly involved in corporate decision-making.  
Democratic decision-making may also elicit influence activities in the decision-making process 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Common members may seek to influence decisions. Common members 
spend time and energy to influence decisions made by core members, while core members spend time 
and energy to respond to these influence activities as well. Besides, common members may also 
behave opportunistically by shirking on quality or by delivering through alternative outlets. The 
cooperative therefore needs to supervise common members’ behaviors, which is also costly. Influence 
activities in cooperatives are observed to be costly (Cook, 1995; Iliopoulos and Cook, 1999; Gripsrud 
et al., 2000). Efficient organizations anticipate these observations and design their information and 
decision processes in such a way that these activities are channelled in value creating directions. 
Cooperatives may seem to be hampered by having the ownership rights allocated collectively to 
members, but there are many possibilities for structuring the bylaws, in terms of decision and income 
rights, in order to design incentives to elicit efficient behavior. One possibility is to distinguish formal 
and real authority. Formal authority resides with the members, whereas real authority can be either 
centralized or decentralized (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Baker et al, 1999; Hendrikse, 2005). The costs 
of collective decision making may be reduced by delegating formal decision rights informally to 
another party. Enterprises assign their formal rights of control to their owners, but the decision rights 
are generally exercised by them in an indirect way through voting for the board of directors, who then 
selects the management of the firm. Real authority is therefore delegated by the members to the 
management. The delegation of decision rights to a few people in Chinese cooperatives is consistent 
with these arguments. Common members in cooperatives in China do not participate in the decision 
making frequently or at all. Real authority lies with the management, rather than the membership. 
The members are facing control problems due to the delegation of decision responsibilities to 
managers. The precise agency problem depends on the type of enterprise due to differences in the 
available information (Feng and Hendrikse, 2012). For example, a cooperative lacks a source of 
information compared to an investor-owned-firm, i.e. a public listing. This makes the provision of 
incentives and the monitoring of the managers different than in a publicly listed investor-owned-firm 
(Staatz, 1987; Royer, 1999; Huang, 2008). The management in farmer cooperatives in China differs 
from cooperatives in other countries due to core members being owners and in the meantime in charge 
of the management of cooperative enterprises (Lin and Huang, 2007; Huang and Xu, 2008; Xiong and 
Zheng, 2008). This may be attractive for a number of reasons. Firstly, a member manager is likely to 
have more knowledge of production as well as the membership, whereas an outside manager is 
probably more professional in management and marketing (Sexton and Iskow, 1988). Chinese 
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cooperatives seldom have professional management or marketing. All CEOs and the chairpersons in 
the cooperatives in the survey were also members. Huang and Xu (2008) argue that the authority 
allocation structure characterized by the distinction between core and common members and core 
members being in charge of the management is beneficial, compared to introducing outside 
management. One reason is that it is not desirable to hire outside managers when cooperatives in 
China are short of asset capital at this stage. Another reason is that these core members, after investing 
a large quantity of capital in the cooperative, have interests similar to the cooperative firm. They 
would devote most of their resources such as asset capital, human capital, and social capital to 
cooperatives in order to gain more benefits for themselves and meanwhile for the cooperatives as well. 
Secondly, cooperatives and investor-owned-firms differ regarding the importance of the formal 
owners in the decision process. The CEO in an investor-owned-firm often has a large, if not dominant 
voice, in selecting the board of directors, despite that the board of directors has the legal power 
(USDA, 2002). The CEO often has substantial control over setting, ratifying and implementing 
company policy. In a cooperative, the CEO usually has significantly less influence over who sits on 
the board. Members have a substantial number of seats in the board of directors and they are not 
dependent on the CEO for their position. They are sufficiently independent to question management 
decisions and to reject its recommendations (USDA, 2002). The CEOs in Chinese cooperatives are 
core members. They have sufficient and dominant influence over the management and members, 
because they have partially consistent interests with other members. 
However, due to the merged management and board and the dominant position of the management, 
the board of supervisors may collude with, rather than supervise, the board of directors. Core 
members will favor their own benefits at the expense of common members when there are conflicts of 
interests (Xiong and Zheng, 2008). Core members tend to overuse their rights, including decision 
rights and income rights, to receive additional rents. Core members may capture rents due to having 
on the one hand superior information regarding market demand and subsidies from the government 
and on the other hand the cost for common members to supervise core members’ behaviors and 
performance. Ma and Meng (2008) point out that common members’ interests are hurt if core 
members behave opportunistically by hiding the true profits of cooperatives from common members. 
For example, the board of directors and the board of supervisors (in a cooperative in the survey) 
jointly rented an orchard in the name of the cooperative. Revenues from the orchard are distributed on 
the basis of equity capital and merely between board members, whereas costs of both renting and 
production of the orchard are covered by the cooperative, i.e. the membership. An effective 
supervising mechanism is therefore needed to constrain core members’ behaviors. 
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Income rights 
Ownership of the cooperative is important for the members, but the actual payments are often more 
important for them. There are many degrees of freedom to structure the income rights in a cooperative. 
LeVay (1983, p5) states even that ‘…cooperatives may behave no differently from other types of 
enterprise’. It turns out that the income rights in informal, repeated relationships can be structured in 
such a way that exactly the same distribution of power results in a cooperative as in other enterprises 
(Baker et al., 2002; Hendrikse, 2007b). However, the actual composition of income rights reflects 
often that a cooperative is collectively owned by many independent suppliers. Important issues 
regarding the structuring of income rights in cooperatives are geared towards the timely payment for 
deliveries (Royer, 1992), the quantity problem (Saitone and Sexton, 2009), dealing with the tension 
between pooling and member heterogeneity (Hendrikse, 2011), and the control problem (Cook and 
Plunkett, 2006; Hendrikse, 2011). 
A core member generally holds relatively more shares of the cooperative and correspondingly has 
more income rights, whereas a common member is expected to patronize the cooperative but is 
seldom involved in operational decision-making. According to the Zhejiang Cooperative Law, a single 
member is not allowed to hold more than 20% of the total capital of a cooperative, which prevents too 
much concentration of ownership rights. In spite of the restriction that a single member can not own 
more-than-20% shares of the equity capital, the majority of the capital shares is still in the hands of 
core members. Core members in some cooperatives limit common members’ equity capital by setting 
a ceiling amount of shares that each common member can buy, which contributes to the skewed 
distribution of equity capital.  
Income rights have also to be determined regarding capital or investment oriented capital. There are 
two concerns (Dunn, 1988). Firstly, it will cause a divergence between users and the ownership 
structure. The distribution of earnings among members will be different than the distribution of votes 
among members. Secondly, return to the equity capital will place pressure on the cooperative to 
become investment-oriented and maximize short-run profitability. Hence, most cooperatives return 
profits on the basis of delivery or patronage. For example, return on capital is limited in the USA. 
Cook and Plunkett (2006) state that cooperative founders in the United States take three hard-core 
principles, “one member, one vote”, service at cost, and limited return on equity capital. Most state 
incorporation statutes place specific limits on the rate of profit allocated based on equity capital. 
Baarda (1986) reports a rate of 8%. However, the income rights distribution mechanism in 
cooperatives in China deviates from the principle regarding profit distribution of US cooperatives. A 
small proportion (5.4%) of cooperatives in the survey allocates profits merely on the basis of capital. 
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Among the cooperatives that allocate profits on the basis of both capital and delivery, nearly half 
(43.9%) of the profits are distributed on the basis of equity capital, while the other 56.1% of profits 
are distributed based on delivery. 
The proportion of the return based on equity capital versus patronage depends to a large extent on the 
capabilities of the core members in the cooperative. Core members have superior knowledge over 
common members and are able to produce more benefits for cooperatives, which needs to be 
complemented by higher residual income. The allocation of profits based on both patronage and 
capital share may be desirable. On the one hand, if all the profits are distributed on the basis of 
patronage, core members would be insufficiently motivated, considering their inputs of asset capital, 
human capital, and social capital. Sufficient motivation of core members is vital to the development of 
cooperatives at this start-up stage. On the other hand, if all the profits are distributed according to 
capital share, small farmers holding a small amount of equity capital will receive nothing except for 
the sales revenues and they will lack the motivation to join cooperatives. Hence, in order to balance 
the interests of both core and common members, China’s National Cooperative Law requires that the 
profit distributed on the basis of patronage must be more than 60% of total distributable profit. 
Though it is essential that common members produce and provide products that meet the demand of 
consumers, yet more important is that core members use their capabilities to enhance the value of 
cooperative enterprises by downstream value adding activities and acquiring higher profit in markets. 
3.5 Conclusion and further research 
Farmers in China differ in asset capital, human resources, and social resources. Some farmers have 
substantial asset capital, marketing capabilities, or social relations. They are often entrepreneurial and 
are referred to as “elite” farmers (Huang and Xu, 2008). Examples include persons used to manage 
private enterprises, those who used to work in the agricultural department of the government, or 
persons having information about the product supply chain. Meanwhile, there are also common 
farmers, good at farming, but not experienced at marketing or management. Most farmers in China 
belong to this latter category. These differences determine different production and marketing 
strategies as well as objectives between alternative groups of farmers. Farmers with high capabilities 
seek to realize entrepreneurship in terms of capital investment and authority through the management 
of cooperatives, whereas common farmers are satisfied by selling their products at reasonable prices. 
These entrepreneurial farmers organize common farmers into farmer cooperatives. Common members 
are aware of their lack of knowledge in management and marketing. They delegate voting rights 
informally to core members. Chinese farmer cooperatives in China therefore are characterized by a 
skewed allocation of ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights between core and common 
 42 
 
members. Core members hold substantial rights over common members.  
There are advantages of governance featured by core members holding most power, such as lower 
decision costs and core members investing more effort in enterprise development. However, there are 
conflicts of interest in terms of the allocation of income rights between different groups of members. 
To limit members’ opportunistic behavior, formal institutions in terms of members’ exit rights, 
decision rights, and ownership rights specified in the Cooperative Law are important. The current 
structure of profit distribution is the combined result of both the interaction between heterogeneous 
members and government guidance. Core members hope that profits are distributed according to 
capital, whereas common members prefer profits being allocated on the basis of patronage. Since it is 
core members who are in charge of the management of cooperatives and most core members have 
substantial capabilities in finance and marketing, rather than production areas or output, it is expected 
that core members prefer to distribute revenues on the basis of capital contribution. Therefore, the 
Law specifies that at least 60% of distributable profits must be distributed to members according to 
patronage, in order to protect the benefits of common members. The data shows that 43.5% of profits 
are distributed based on equity capital in cooperatives allocating profits both on delivery and capital. 
It is probably an effective way at this stage to help farmer cooperatives in China to develop towards a 
direction where cooperatives are able to develop fast and different groups of members are satisfied at 
the same time. 
It is not desirable for cooperatives in China to blindly comply with traditional cooperative principles 
and it is also not possible (Xu, 2005). It is important that cooperatives learn from history and 
experiences of developed countries and even more important to develop and adapt to the local 
economic and cultural environment. A vital feature of cooperatives in China is therefore that they 
attract key production factors (Xu, 2005). Cooperatives in China are incapable to retain good 
managers at this stage. Substantial authority may therefore be allocated to core members, as long as 
the profit distribution satisfies both core and common members, and cooperatives are developing at a 
relatively high speed. As farmer cooperatives in China develop and as the history of cooperatives in 
China becomes much longer, members as well as memberships will stabilize and cooperative 
enterprises’ capital accumulation capability will improve; and simultaneously some degree of 
democracy may be realized in farmer cooperatives in China. Anyway, survival and development are 
the key issues at the current stage of the development of Chinese farmer cooperatives.  
The current paper is devoted to a description of the governance structure of cooperatives in China. 
This is informative for the study of the governance structure of cooperative enterprises in transition 
countries. Additional empirical studies in other parts of China regarding the effects of ownership 
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rights structure, decision rights, and income rights distribution on the performance of farmer 
cooperatives are desirable. The second possible domain for future research is the effect of the State’s 
institutional arrangements on the structure of farmer cooperatives in China. Carroll et al. (1988) show, 
based on an empirical study on farmer cooperatives in Hungary, that the structure of the state has 
significant effects on the organizational structure as well as the behavior of farmer cooperatives. This 
may result in another life cycle of cooperatives in China than in other parts of the world.  
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Chapter 4: Cooperative CEO Identity and Efficient Governance: 
Member or Outside CEO?29 
 
Abstract 
A principal-agent model is formulated to capture the efficiency of cooperatives with a member CEO 
and cooperatives with an employed outsider as CEO. Results of the model show that the incentive 
strength regarding the member CEO is stronger compared to that of the outside CEO in order to shift 
some effort of the member CEO from individual farming into the task of adding value to the 
cooperative enterprise. A cooperative with a member CEO is uniquely efficient when upstream and 
downstream tasks are substitutes to a certain extent, or complements. When the tasks are substitutes, 
the efficient CEO identity depends on the strength of the substitution effect and the difference of the 
marginal productivities between the two tasks. The scope of cooperatives with a member CEO being 
efficient becomes smaller when the substitution effect is at an intermediate level or the productivity 
difference between the two tasks is limited. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The changing economic environment has led many farmer cooperatives in both developed and 
developing countries to undertake substantial governance structure changes. Cooperatives adopt 
various strategies to adapt to different environments and situations. Among these various strategies, 
the management of cooperatives is regarded as an important tool affecting the economic performance 
of cooperatives (Fama, 1980; Cook, 1994). Cooperative management differs from the management of 
investor-owned firms (IOFs) due to the user-owner relationship. The management of an IOF focuses 
on the objective to maximize the capital investment return for investors, whereas the management of a 
cooperative has to take into consideration members’ interests. Members’ interests are more complex 
than those of owners of IOFs. Owners or members of cooperatives may have not only monetary 
interests in marketing, but also expectations such as utilizing the cooperative services and finding a 
home for products. Another aspect of the management difference between cooperatives and IOFs is 
that managers in a cooperative may also be owners of the cooperative enterprise. A cooperative has 
therefore to choose as a manager either a member who has residual claim rights of the cooperative or 
an outsider who is purely employed without residual claim rights. These differences and possibilities 
will be reflected in the incentives facing the manager in the model presented in this article.  
                                                          
29 This chapter has been published in Agribusiness, 2013, 29(1): 23-38. 
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Cooperatives in different countries differ in the CEO identity. The management of most cooperatives 
in China is executed by members (Liang & Hendrikse, 2012). Very few cooperatives in China employ 
outsiders as CEOs. The reverse holds for cooperatives in western countries. Most cooperatives employ 
outside CEOs as well as outside directors. For example, Burress and Cook (2010) identified only one 
cooperative with a member CEO in their sample of 1000 cooperatives. This situation is more mixed in 
Spain and Brazil. These countries have cooperatives with member CEOs as well as cooperatives with 
outside CEOs.  
Member CEOs usually have substantial capabilities in physical capital, marketing, management, or 
social relations, etc, compared to other common members. A member CEO has multiple roles: a 
member or supplier of the cooperative, a member of the management, a member of the board of 
directors, and/or a member of the board of supervisors of the cooperative30, while other members are 
mainly producers, inputs suppliers, and residual claimants of the cooperative. 
The identity and composition of the management and the board can have an impact on the 
performance of the cooperative (Cook, 1994; Lang 2002; Dunn et al., 2002).  However, little is known 
about the influence of cooperative CEO identity on the efficiency of the coopertive. We examine the 
efficient CEO identity of the cooperative. A member CEO is incentivized by ownership and residual 
claim rights, while an outside CEO receives a fixed salary and a payment based on measured 
performance. An outside CEO is incentivized to care about member interests and the value of the 
cooperative enterprise, whereas a member CEO, as both input supplier and an agent, is in addition 
concerned with the value of his or her individual farm.  
This paper addresses the following questions: 1) When is it efficient for a cooperative to delegate the 
management of the enterprise to a member instead of an outside CEO? 2) What is the optimal 
incentive intensity regarding each CEO in order to maximize the value of the cooperative enterprise? 
and 3) What is the optimal effort devoted to tasks by each CEO? 
The paper is organized as follows. Theories regarding the management in cooperatives and differences 
of CEOs in cooperatives and in IOFs are addressed in section 4.2. Section 4.3 is dedicated to the 
model. Section 4.4 presents the equilibrium results. Efficient CEO identity and task interdependencies 
are analyzed in section 4.5. Managerial productivity differences are highlighted in section 4.6. Section 
4.7 concludes. 
                                                          
30 Besides the member CEOs who are both farmers and managers, another type of member CEOs is also observed in 
cooperatives in China. This latter type of member CEO discards individual farming and focuses on the management of 
cooperatives. We focus on the former type of member CEO in this study. 
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4.2 Theory 
This section addresses the impact of the management and the board of an enterprise on its 
performance (4.2.1) and identifies the differences between CEOs in cooperatives and CEOs in IOFs 
(4.2.2). 
4.2.1 Impact of the management and the board on performance 
The impact of the management and the board on enterprise performance is addressed in various 
studies (Daily & Dalton, 1993; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Adams et al, 2008; Hillman et al, 2007). 
Board characteristics taken into account are size, composition, CEO duality, and the size of the 
enterprise. Jensen (1993) suggests that smaller boards have a positive impact on performance due to 
more effective monitoring. Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) establish empirically that firms with a 
large management team perform better. Moreover, firms with dominant CEOs perform worse in a 
turbulent environment than in a stable environment. Board composition refers to the distinction 
between inside and outside directors. Studies regarding the relationship between the ratio of outside 
directors and firm performance vary from positive to zero, to negative. Outside directors may extract 
and provide important sources from the environment that are unavailable to inside directors (Daily & 
Dalton, 1993), while inside directors have more information about their firm operation and may 
perform better when their ownership stake is larger (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Pearce, 1983). Daily 
and Dalton (1993) address CEO duality, i.e. the CEO is also the chairperson of the board. They 
examine two forms of management, i.e. entrepreneurial management and professional management, 
and find that most founder-managed firms or firms with entrepreneurial management are likely to be 
characterized by CEO duality. They establish that there is no significant relationship between CEO 
duality and firm performance. The size of the enterprise is also relevant. The management and the 
board of directors may be able to more directly influence organizational processes and outcomes in 
small firms than in large firms (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). 
Attention has also been paid to specify management issues in farmer cooperatives (Cook, 1994; Lang 
2002; Dunn et al., 2002; Bond, 2009, Burress et al., 2011; Burress & Cook, 2010 and so on). 
Examples are the role of the management, the compensation of the management, and the impact of the 
management on the performance of cooperative enterprise. Characteristics of the management and the 
board that have an effect on performance of cooperatives are size and composition of the board. Bond 
(2009) establishes that board size exerts a limited influence on the cooperative financial performance. 
Yet Lang (2002) points out that a reduction in board size can lead to greater accountability, less 
anonymity, and more efficient board meetings. A negative relationship between size and performance 
is also indicated by some empirical analyses (Burress & Cook, 2010; Burress et al., 2011). 
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Agricultural cooperatives are restructuring towards more entrepreneurial organizations (Bijman & 
Doorneweert, 2008), as the market competition between enterprises is becoming more and more fierce. 
Bond (2009) argues that cooperatives’ boards may suffer from more severe governance problems than 
their corporate counterparts like IOFs due to the identity of directors. Identity of directors refers to 
inside directors who are members and outside directors who are non-members. Therefore inside 
directors and outside directors are also called owner-directors and non-member directors respectively. 
Owner-directors of cooperatives are often professionals in agricultural production technique and 
management. However, they are not always sufficiently professional in making sound decisions and 
firm management. Lang (2002) observes that even capable member directors lack the range of skills 
needed on the board. In addition, owner-directors may use power to make decisions that benefit the 
individual at the expense of the cooperative enterprise (Dunn et al., 2000). The employment of full-
time and professional board members therefore is recommended (Dunn et al., 2000; Bond, 2009). 
However, Burress and Cook (2010) think owner directors are more likely to make value-maximizing 
decisions because they bear the wealth effects of their actions. Besides, an active and engaged board 
contributes to higher performance of the cooperative. Burress et al. (2011) find no support for a 
relationship between board equity holdings and performance.  
Ownership is an important factor in influencing job design and incentive contracting. The idea that 
stock ownership by management can reduce the underlying agency problem follows directly from 
agency theory. More stock owned by the management provides stronger motivation to work and raises 
the value of the firm’s stock (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). When the agent owns the asset returns, he 
or she will be more motivated to pursuing the value of the asset (Holmström & Milgrom, 1991). 
Therefore low-powered incentives may be sufficient to motivate the agent. Holmström and Milgrom 
(1991) further elaborate the favorable conditions for an agent to own the assets, i.e. that the agent is 
not too risk averse, the variance of asset returns is low, and the variance of measurement error in other 
aspects of the agent’s performance is low.   
4.2.2 CEOs in cooperatives versus investor-owned firms 
CEOs play a significant role in the performance of an organization (Thomas, 1988). CEOs’ behavior, 
compensation, and their relationship with performance are studied frequently by applying the 
principal-agent model (Tosi Jr. & Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Garen, 1994; Haubrich, 1994; Wang 1997). 
Agency relationships exist whenever an individual or organization (the agent) acts on behalf of 
another (the principal) (Ortmann & King, 2007). Principal-agent problems arise because the interests 
of the agent are usually not the same as the interests of the principal. The agent may therefore not 
completely pursue the interests of the principal (Royer, 1999; Sykuta & Chaddad, 1999). 
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Most principal-agent studies focus on CEOs in corporations or investor-owned firms, rather than user-
owned cooperatives. The relationship in cooperatives is more complex than that in IOFs (Staatz, 1987; 
Cook, 1994; Royer, 1999; Huang, 2008). There are various reasons, like memberships in cooperatives 
are more heterogeneous than shareholders in an IOF (Staatz, 1987; Royer, 1999); sometimes a CEO in 
a cooperative has dual identities, an agent and meanwhile a member (Huang, 2008); cooperatives have 
to take the interests of two stages of production into account (Feng & Hendrikse, 2012), and so on. 
CEOs in cooperatives and in IOFs are different in terms of several dimensions. Firstly, CEOs of a 
cooperative and an IOF have different objectives. CEOs in a cooperative maximize returns to patron 
members, while CEOs in IOFs try to maximize returns to investors (Hueth & Marcoul, 2009). 
Members are users and in the meantime owners of the cooperative enterprise. Members therefore have 
at least two sets of concerns, i.e. owner concerns and user concerns (Feng & Hendrikse, 2012). Owner 
concerns involve the security and overall profitability of their investments in the cooperative, while 
user concerns are issues of the pricing and quality of product and services. CEOs in cooperatives 
therefore bring the downstream enterprise to value and in the meantime serve upstream member 
interests. 
Secondly, incentive mechanisms between the CEOs’ performance in a cooperative and in an IOF are 
different. The distinguishing feature of a cooperative’s residual rights, their restriction to the patron 
agents, prevents them from being publicly listed, which leads to the absence of marketable common 
stock in cooperatives (Staatz, 1987; Royer, 1999; Hendrikse, 2007b; Feng & Hendrikse, 2012). 
Therefore the value of cooperative enterprises is not easy to be measured and subsequently designing 
incentive contracts for a cooperative CEO seems not easy. The compensation for CEOs in 
cooperatives is expected to be less reliant on performance incentives (Hueth & Marcoul, 2009). Feng 
and Hendrikse (2012) examine the different roles of a CEO in a cooperative and a CEO in an IOF, 
taking into account the absence of public listing of a cooperative. They determine the circumstances 
where cooperatives and IOFs are respectively efficient in a multi-task principal-agent model. There 
are two concerns that a CEO of a cooperative cares about, bringing the downstream enterprise to value 
and serving upstream member interests. They consider only the case of a cooperative with an outsider 
as CEO. However, many cooperatives, especially in China, Spain, and Brazil, have one of the 
members as a CEO, rather than employing an outsider. A member CEO not only devotes attention to 
member interests and enterprise value, but also dedicates effort to his or her individual farm. Out 
model is geared towards the implication of the distinction between a member CEO and an outside 
CEO.  
4.3 Model 
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A principal-agent model is formulated to capture the efficiency of cooperatives with different CEOs: a 
member CEO and an outside CEO. A member CEO has a dual identity in being a CEO as well as a 
member of the cooperative. We assume that members are on the one hand independent input suppliers 
and on the other hand residual claimants of the enterprise. Members therefore receive incomes of both 
individual farming and allocated revenue of the downstream enterprise’s profits. 
A cooperative either has a member CEO or an outside CEO. They are distinguished by their activities. 
A member CEO allocates efforts between the two tasks of individual farming and enterprise’s value 
adding activities, while an outside CEO has no farming activities and focuses therefore only in value 
adding activities at the cooperative enterprise.31 Assume that the membership size of a cooperative is 
݊. Let ݊௠ be the number of members not being CEO. Therefore ݊௠ = ݊ − 1 in the cooperative with a 
member CEO, while ݊௠ = ݊ in the cooperative with an outside CEO. A member not being CEO 
devotes all his or her effort to individual farming. Both the member CEO and the outside CEO are 
assumed to be risk-neutral. 
The production function of the CEO is  
ݕ௖ = ௎݂ܽ௎௖ + ஽݂ܽ஽௖ , 
where a୙ୡ  and aୈୡ  are the CEO's effort in the upstream farming task and effort in the downstream value 
adding activities respectively, and f୙ and fୈ are the marginal productivities of the upstream farming 
activity and downstream value adding activity. Each activity is nonnegative. 
A member not being CEO devotes all his or her effort to individual farming. The production function 
of member ݆ is 
ݕ௝ = ௎݂ܽ௎௝ , 
where ܽ௎௝  is the upstream production activity of member ݆, ݆ = 1, 2, … , ݊௠. 
Assume that the function of personal cost related to each player’s activities is: 
ܿ(݅) = ൫௔೔ೆ ൯
మ
ଶ + ݇ܽ௎௜ ܽ஽௜ +
൫௔ವ೔ ൯
మ
ଶ , 
where −1 < ݇ < 1 (Dixit, 2002; Feng & Hendrikse, 2012) and ݅ = ܿ, ݆, c = ݋ݑݐ, ݅݊ and ݆ = 1, 2, … , ݊.  
The parameter ݇ captures the interdependencies between upstream farming and downstream value 
adding activities. If ݇ is positive (negative), then the two activities are substitutes (complements). 
                                                          
31 An extended model may distinguish three tasks for a member CEO and two tasks for an outside CEO. The three tasks of 
the member CEO are individual farming, advancing upstream members’ interests, and downstream value adding. The 
outside CEO does not have the individual farming task. We do not present this extended model because the equilibrium 
results of the model with extended tasks are the same as in the current model. 
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When the two activities are substitutes, more effort in one activity increases the marginal cost of the 
other. An example is that the more time spent on farming, the less time a CEO spends on marketing. 
When the two activities are complements, more effort in one activity benefits the other activity. An 
example is the coordination between production and processing. Production according to standardized 
quality may one the one hand reduce the cost of grading and on the other hand  enhance value-added 
processing. 
Assume that the wage paid to the CEO is a linear function, i.e. ݓ = ݏ + ܾ ஽݂ܽ஽௖ , where s refers to the 
fixed salary and b captures the bonus rate based on measured performance of the CEO. The payoff 
(utility) function of member ݆ consists of his or her farm payoff and the residual claim payoff, that is 
ߨ௝ = ௎݂ܽ௎௝ + (ଵି௕௡ ஽݂ܽ஽௖ −
௦
௡) −
ቀ௔ೇ ቁ
మ
ଶ . 
The payoff (utility) function of the outside CEO is 
ߨ௢௨௧ = ݏ௢௨௧ + ܾ௢௨௧ ஽݂ܽ஽௢௨௧ − ൫௔ವ
೚ೠ೟൯మ
ଶ . 
The payoff (utility) function of the member CEO consists of his or her income from being a member 
and his or her wage as CEO, that is 
ߨ௜௡ = ௎݂ܽ௎௜௡ + (ଵି௕
೔೙
௡ ஽݂ܽ஽௜௡ −
௦೔೙
௡ ) + ݏ௜௡ + ܾ௜௡ ஽݂ܽ஽௜௡ − ቈ
൫௔೔ೆ೙൯మ
ଶ + ݇ܽ௎௜௡ܽ஽௜௡ +
൫௔ವ೔೙൯
మ
ଶ ቉. 
The total surplus of the ݊௠ members is 
ߨ௠ = ∑ ൥ ௎݂ܽ௎௝ + ଵି௕௡ ஽݂ܽ஽௖ −
௦
௡ −
ቀ௔ೇ ቁ
మ
ଶ ൩௡
೘
௝ୀଵ . 
Total surplus, i.e. the payoff of the CEO and the common members, is 
ߨ் = ߨ௖ + ߨ௠, 
where ܿ = ݋ݑݐ, ݅݊. We have therefore 
ߨ் = ∑ ௎݂ܽ௎௝௡
೘
௝ୀଵ + ௎݂ܽ௎௖ + ஽݂ܽ஽௖ − ൥∑
ቀ௔ೇ ቁ
మ
ଶ +௡
೘
௝ୀଵ
൫௔೎ೆ ൯మ
ଶ + ݇ܽ௎௖ ܽ஽௖ +
൫௔ವ೎ ൯మ
ଶ ൩. 
The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, incentives of the CEO are determined. In the 
second stage, the CEO and the members choose simultaneously activities that maximize their payoff. 
4.4 Equilibrium  
The backward induction method is used to solve the game. Firstly, the payoff maximizing activities of 
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the players are decided, given the incentive strength. The equilibrium incentive strength regarding the 
CEOs’ compensation is determined next. 
Each member chooses the effort to ݉ܽݔ௔ೇ  ߨ
௝ and simultaneously the CEO chooses his or her optimal 
effort by maximizing his or her payoff, i.e. ݉ܽݔ௔೎ೆ ,௔ವ೎  ߨ௖. In the cooperative with an outsider as CEO, 
the payoff maximizing activity of the CEO is ܽ஽௢௨௧∗ = ܾ௢௨௧ ஽݂, while in the cooperative with a member 
CEO, the payoff maximizing activities of the member CEO are 
ܽ௎௜௡∗ = ቂ ௎݂ − (ଵା௡௕
೔೙ି௕೔೙)
௡ ݇ ஽݂ቃ (1 − ݇ଶ)ൗ  and ܽ஽௜௡
∗ = ቂ൫ଵା௡௕೔೙ି௕೔೙൯௡ ஽݂ − ݇ ௎݂ቃ (1 − ݇ଶ)ൗ . The payoff 
maximizing activity of member ݆ in both the cooperative with an outside CEO and the cooperative 
with a member CEO is ܽ௎௝
∗ = ௎݂. 
Neither the activities of the outside CEO nor the activities of each member is influenced by the 
membership size. However, the activities of the member CEO are affected by the membership size. 
The surplus produced by the member CEO’s downstream task is distributed to the whole membership. 
The larger the membership size, the less effort the member CEO puts into the downstream task, given 
the level of bonus rate. However, if all the surplus from the downstream task is allocated to the 
member CEO, then the activities of the member CEO are independent of the membership size.  
The members are the principals. They choose the bonus rate that maximizes their total payoff. 
Anticipating the activities of the CEO, the principals chooses a bonus rate to motivate the CEO. 
Suppose that ܾ௖∗, where c = ݋ݑݐ, ݅݊, is the bonus rate that maximizes the payoff of the membership. 
The identity of the principals differs between the two cooperatives. Consider firstly the cooperative 
with an outside CEO. The equilibrium bonus rate is ܾ௢௨௧∗ = 1 2⁄ . Activities of both the CEO and each 
member are independent of the membership size. The bonus rate is therefore independent of the 
membership size as well. 
In the cooperative with a member CEO, both the member CEO and members are the principals. The 
equilibrium bonus rate in the cooperative with a member CEO is ܾ௜௡∗ = 1. Since the payoff of the 
member CEO is included as part of the total payoff of the members and the CEO has the rights to 
choose the bonus rate for himself as well, a stronger incentive leads to  a higher surplus of the 
cooperative.  
The incentive intensity regarding the member CEO is stronger compared to the outside CEO. This 
result is distinct from, but closely related to, the observation of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) that 
the incentives offered to employees in firms are lower than that offered to independent contractors. 
Employees in their model have no ownership rights over the asset, while contractors use and develop 
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their own assets and they shoulder risks of the asset. The member CEO therefore needs a higher 
incentive. In addition, the member CEO’s farming task is regarded by the membership as an outside or 
private activity of the member CEO, whereas the surplus produced by the downstream task belong to 
the cooperative. A higher bonus rate therefore is needed to motivate the member CEO to devote effort 
to the downstream task over the upstream task. 
The total surplus, and its composition, is determined by plugging the equilibrium value of the various 
activities in the surplus expression. The equilibrium payoff of the outside CEO is 
ߨ௢௨௧ = ݏ + ௙ವమ଼ . 
The equilibrium payoff of the members in the cooperative with an outside CEO is 
ߨ௠ = ௡ଶ ௎݂
ଶ + ௙ವమସ − ݏ. 
The total surplus when the cooperative has an outsider as CEO is 
ߨ௢்௨௧ = ௡௙ೆమଶ +
ଷ௙ವమ
଼ . 
The equilibrium payoff of the member CEO is 
ߨ௜௡ = ௡ିଵ௡ ݏ +
௙ೆమା௙ವమିଶ௞௙ೆ௙ವ
ଶ(ଵି௞మ) . 
The equilibrium payoff of the members in the cooperative with a member CEO is 
ߨ௠ = (௡ିଵ)௙ೆమଶ −
௡ିଵ
௡ ݏ. 
The total surplus when the cooperative has a member CEO is 
ߨ௜்௡ = ௙ೆమା௙ವమିଶ௞௙ೆ௙ವଶ(ଵି௞మ) +
(௡ିଵ)௙ೆమ
ଶ .
                                            
 
4.5 Efficient CEO identity and task interdependencies 
Let ∆ߨ = ߨ௜்௡ − ߨ௢்௨௧ , i.e. ∆ߨ  captures the difference in surplus between the cooperative with a 
member CEO and the cooperative with an outside CEO in equilibrium. We have therefore 
∆ߨ = ൫ସ௙ೆమାଷ௙ವమ൯௞మି଼௞௙ೆ௙ವା௙ವమ଼(ଵି௞మ) . 
If there is no interdependency between the upstream farming activity and the downstream value 
adding activity, i.e. ݇ = 0, the payoff  difference  
∆ߨ = ௙ವమ଼ ≥ 0. 
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Therefore the cooperative with a member CEO is always efficient, if there is no interdependency 
between the member CEO’s upstream farming task and downstream value adding task. When the two 
tasks are complements, i.e. −1 < ݇ < 0, the cooperative with a member CEO is the unique efficient 
governance structure, i.e. ∆ߨ > 0. 
When the two tasks are substitutes, i.e. 0 < ݇ < 1, the efficient CEO identity depends on both the 
substitution effect between tasks and the marginal productivity of tasks. There are two reasons why a 
cooperative with a member CEO may become inefficient when tasks are substitutes: the size of the 
substitution effect and productivity differences between tasks. The first reason is a high level of ݇. 
This increases the cost level. The effort that the member CEO puts in one task will increase the cost of 
the other task, which is disadvantageous to the cooperative with a member CEO. The disadvantageous 
substitution effect is compensated for by the stronger incentive for the member CEO when ݇ is small. 
In addition, the member CEO tends to put most effort in one task when ݇ is quite large to eliminate 
the disadvantage caused by the substitution effect. Therefore when the two tasks are substitutes, the 
cooperative with a member CEO is efficient if 0 < k< ସ௙ೆ௙ವି
ටଵଶ(௙ೆ௙ವ)మିଷ௙ವర
ସ௙ೆమାଷ௙ವమ  or 
ସ௙ೆ௙ವାටଵଶ(௙ೆ௙ವ)మିଷ௙ವర
ସ௙ೆమାଷ௙ವమ < ݇ < 1 , whereas the cooperative with an outside CEO is efficient at 
intermediate levels, i.e. ݇ ∈ ቌସ௙ೆ௙ವି
ටଵଶ(௙ೆ௙ವ)మିଷ௙ವర
ସ௙ೆమାଷ௙ವమ ,
ସ௙ೆ௙ವାටଵଶ(௙ೆ௙ವ)మିଷ௙ವర
ସ௙ೆమାଷ௙ವమ ቍ, subject to ஽݂ ௎݂⁄ < 2. 
The second reason for the inefficiency of a cooperative with a member CEO is the productivity 
difference between alternative tasks. The cooperative with a member CEO may be efficient when the 
productivity difference between tasks is large because the CEO can devote most effort to the task with 
higher productivity. Besides, the stronger incentive for the member CEO creates an advantageous 
impact. To be more specific, if the ratio of the value adding task’s marginal productivity to the farming 
task’s marginal productivity, ஽݂ ௎݂⁄ , is larger than  ସ௞ାଶ௞ඥଷ(ଵି௞
మ)
ଵାଷ௞మ  or smaller than 
ସ௞ିଶ௞ඥଷ(ଵି௞మ)
ଵାଷ௞మ , then a 
cooperative with a member CEO is efficient. However, if the ratio ஽݂ ௎݂⁄  is between ସ௞ିଶ௞ඥଷ(ଵି௞
మ)
ଵାଷ௞మ   
and ସ௞ାଶ௞ඥଷ(ଵି௞
మ)
ଵାଷ௞మ , then a cooperative with an outsider as CEO is uniquely efficient.  
Efficient governances as a function of the level of the task interdependencies and the productivity 
differences are depicted in Figure 4.1. A cooperative with an outside CEO is efficient in the grey area, 
while a cooperative with a member CEO is efficient outside the gray area. 
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Figure 4.1 Efficient governance, task interdependencies, and marginal productivities 
 
The complementarity between tasks provides an advantage to the cooperative with a member CEO. 
The effort that the member CEO devotes to one task reduces the cost of the other task, which 
determines the attractiveness of the cooperative with a member CEO. Cooperatives with member 
CEOs are therefore uniquely efficient when ݇ < 0.  
All the members, in both the cooperative with a member CEO and the cooperative with an outside 
CEO, devote the same effort ௎݂  to their farming. The member CEO receives a stronger bonus 
incentive than the outside CEO. The member CEO therefore provides more effort than the outside 
CEO, both on the individual farming task and on the enterprise’s value adding task. The cooperative 
with a member CEO is also efficient when ݇ = 0. 
The substitution effect creates additional cost of one task by devoting effort to the other task. Tasks 
being substitutable therefore have an unfavorable impact on the cooperative with a member CEO 
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a member CEO is efficient. 
∆ߨ < 0: The cooperative with 
an outside CEO is efficient. 
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since the member CEO has multiple tasks while the outside CEO focuses on one task. The cooperative 
with a member CEO therefore is still desirable when the substitution effect is very small because the 
stronger incentive effect more than compensates for the disadvantageous substitution effect. As the 
substitution effect increases, the cooperative with an outside CEO is likely to become an efficient 
governance structure due to the disadvantage in the costs of the member CEO. However, if the 
substitution effect increases to such an extent that the member CEO would devote most effort in one 
task and little or no effort in another, the cooperative with a member CEO is desirable again. 
When the productivity of the downstream task is more than double the productivity of the upstream 
task, the cooperative with a member CEO is always efficient. There are two reasons. Firstly, the effort 
allocation of the member CEO would be skewed to the downstream task because of its high 
productivity. Secondly, the stronger incentive motivates the member CEO to devote more effort to the 
downstream task. However, the cooperative with a member CEO may become inefficient due to the 
productivity difference between alternative tasks is limited. It elicits similar levels of activity, and 
therefore a high level of the interaction term in the cost function. Another way of formulating this 
argument is that the disadvantage of the substitution effect is prevented in a cooperative with a 
member CEO by allocating effort to only one task, the one with the higher marginal productivity. This 
occurs when the difference of the marginal productivity between the two tasks is sufficiently large. 
For example, if the marginal productivity of the value adding business activities is much higher than 
that of farming, then the member CEO would devote most of his or her effort to the value adding task 
and little effort to the farming task. If the marginal productivity of farming is much higher than that of 
the downstream value adding activities, the member CEO would invest as much effort as possible in 
his or her individual farming task and little effort in the value adding task. As a consequence, the 
disadvantage derived from the two tasks being substitutable would be counterbalanced by allocating 
most of the effort to the task with the high marginal productivity.   
4.6 Managerial productivity differences 
The efficiency of enterprises with different identities of managers as well as directors of cooperatives 
has always been discussed. LeVay (1983) argues that farmer directors of farmer cooperatives are more 
production-oriented, while outside experts are more market-oriented. Outside directors have more 
information regarding the external market environment (Burress et al., 2011). In addition, Lind (2011) 
thinks that farmer directors lack knowledge regarding markets as well as product development. 
Therefore, we may have to consider the case when the member CEO and the outside CEO differ 
regarding the marginal productivity of the value-adding task. According to Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1991), outside directors do a better job of acting in shareholders’ interests than insiders when it 
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comes to certain aspects of their jobs such as external information acquisition, whereas insiders are 
more likely to be preferred in other aspects such as information about the enterprise. Cook (1994) 
maintains that technical industry skills must be balanced with exceptional communication skills (such 
as conflict resolution, resource allocation, and information spokesperson) and the ability to develop 
group cohesiveness. 
This section addresses how the equilibrium results and the efficient governance structure depend on 
productivity differences between a member CEO and an outside CEO regarding the downstream task. 
The current model assumes that the member CEO and the outside CEO have the same marginal 
product with regard to the downstream value adding activity. However, a member CEO may be not as 
capable as a specialized outside CEO in the value-adding task. Denote the marginal productivities of 
the downstream value adding activities of the member CEO and the outside CEO to be ஽݂௜௡ and ஽݂௢௨௧ 
respectively. Then the equilibrium total payoff of the cooperative with a member CEO is ߨ௜்௡ =
௙ೆమା(௙ವ೔೙)మିଶ௞௙ೆ௙ವ೔೙
ଶ(ଵି௞మ) +
(௡ିଵ)௙ೆమ
ଶ , while the total payoff of the cooperative with an outside CEO is 
ߨ௢்௨௧ = ௡௙ೆమଶ +
ଷ൫௙ವ೚ೠ೟൯
మ
଼ . As previously defined, ∆ߨ = ߨ௜்௡ − ߨ௢்௨௧. Therefore  
∆ߨ = ߨ௜்௡ − ߨ௢்௨௧ = (௙ವ೔೙)మିଶ௞௙ೆ௙ವ೔೙ା௙ೆమଶ(ଵି௞మ) −
௙ೆమ
ଶ −
ଷ൫௙ವ೚ೠ೟൯
మ
଼ . 
We rewrite ∆ߨ as 
∆ߨ = (௙ವ೔೙ି௞௙ೆ)మଶ(ଵି௞మ) −
ଷ൫௙ವ೚ೠ೟൯
మ
଼ . 
Let ∆ߨ = 0 . We have (௙ವ೔೙ି௞௙ೆ)మଶ(ଵି௞మ) −
ଷ൫௙ವ೚ೠ೟൯
మ
଼ = 0 , i.e. ஽݂௢௨௧ = ฬ
ଶ
ඥଷ(ଵି௞మ) ( ஽݂௜௡ − ݇ ௎݂)ฬ . Hence, when 
஽݂௢௨௧ > ฬ ଶඥଷ(ଵି௞మ) ( ஽݂௜௡ − ݇ ௎݂)ฬ, the cooperative with an outside CEO is efficient, and vice versa. 
The relationship between efficient CEO identity and downstream marginal productivity differences 
are investigated now. Distinguish the cases no interdependency, complementarity, and substitution 
between the upstream and downstream tasks. Figure 4.2 depicts the relationship when tasks are 
independent. When k=0, we have ஽݂௢௨௧ = ଶ√ଷ ஽݂௜௡. The cooperative with an outside CEO is efficient if 
஽݂௢௨௧ > ଶ√ଷ ஽݂௜௡, while the cooperative with a member CEO is efficient if ஽݂௢௨௧ <
ଶ
√ଷ ஽݂
௜௡. A cooperative 
with an outside CEO is efficient if it is located in the grey area above the line ஽݂௢௨௧ = ଶ√ଷ ஽݂௜௡. It is 
located above the dotted line ஽݂௢௨௧ = ஽݂௜௡. This is in line with Figure 4.1, i.e. when k=0 and CEOs 
have identical marginal productivity of the downstream task, the cooperative with a member CEO is 
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efficient. 
 
Figure 4.2 Efficient governance structure when k=0 
 
Figure 4.3 depicts the relationship when tasks are complements. When −1<k<0, the cooperative with 
an outside CEO is efficient if ஽݂௢௨௧ > ଶඥଷ(ଵି௞మ) ஽݂௜௡ −
ଶ௞௙ೆ
ඥଷ(ଵି௞మ), i.e. if it is located in the grey area above 
the line ஽݂௢௨௧ = ଶඥଷ(ଵି௞మ) ஽݂௜௡ −
ଶ௞௙ೆ
ඥଷ(ଵି௞మ). It becomes steeper as k decreases. The value of the slope is 
between ቀ ଶ√ଷ , ∞ቁ. The line ஽݂௢௨௧ =
ଶ
ඥଷ(ଵି௞మ) ஽݂
௜௡ − ଶ௞௙ೆඥଷ(ଵି௞మ) is located above the dotted line ஽݂௢௨௧ = ஽݂௜௡. 
This result is consistent with Figure 4.1, i.e. when k<0  and CEOs are identical in marginal 
productivity of downstream task, the cooperative with a member CEO is uniquely efficient. 
 
0 ஽݂
௜௡ 
஽݂௢௨௧  
஽݂௢௨௧ = ஽݂௜௡ 
∆ߨ > 0 
∆ߨ < 0 
∆ߨ > 0: The cooperative with 
a member CEO is efficient. 
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Figure 4.3 Efficient governance structure when −1<k<0 
 
Figure 4.4 depicts the relationship when tasks are substitutes. When 0<k<1, the cooperative with an 
outside CEO is efficient if ஽݂௢௨௧ > (݇ ௎݂ − ஽݂௜௡) ଶඥଷ(ଵି௞మ) subject to ஽݂௜௡ < ݇ ௎݂, while the cooperative 
with an outside CEO is efficient if ஽݂௢௨௧ > ଶඥଷ(ଵି௞మ) ( ஽݂௜௡ − ݇ ௎݂) subject to ஽݂௜௡ > ݇ ௎݂. The cooperative 
with an outside CEO is therefore efficient if it is located in the grey area above the two lines. Both 
lines will be steeper as k increases. The intercept increases as k increases. There are two intersection 
points between the line ஽݂௢௨௧ = ฬ ଶඥଷ(ଵି௞మ) ஽݂௜௡ −
ଶ௞௙ೆ
ඥଷ(ଵି௞మ)ฬ  and the dotted line ஽݂௢௨௧ = ஽݂௜௡ . The 
intersection point A is characterized by ஽݂௢௨௧ = ஽݂௜௡ = ସ௞ିଶ௞ඥଷ(ଵି௞
మ)
ଵାଷ௞మ ௎݂, while point B is characterized 
by ஽݂௢௨௧ = ஽݂௜௡ = ସ௞ାଶ௞ඥଷ(ଵି௞
మ)
ଵାଷ௞మ ௎݂.This is in line with figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.4 Efficient governance structure when 0<k<1 
 
The relationship between efficient CEO identity, task interdependence, and the downstream 
productivity differences is summarized in Figure 4.5. The cooperative with an outside CEO is efficient 
when it is located in the grey area above the curve. Given ஽݂௢௨௧ ஽݂௜௡⁄ , there is more scope for 
cooperatives with member CEOs being efficient when the upstream and downstream tasks are 
complementary,  interdependent, or when the substitution effect is small or large. Given k, there is 
more scope for cooperatives with member CEOs being efficient when the difference between the 
marginal productivities of outsiders and member CEOs is small. 
When ௙ವ
೚ೠ೟
௙ವ೔೙
= 1, the efficient governance structure depends on both k and the productivity difference 
between upstream and downstream tasks. If ஽݂ > 2 ௎݂, then the cooperative with a member CEO is 
uniquely efficient. If ஽݂ < 2 ௎݂, then the cooperative with a member CEO is efficient when k is small 
or large. Otherwise the cooperative with an outside CEO is efficient. This is in line with observations 
from Figure 4.1. Suppose that dotted line C reflects ௙ವ
೚ೠ೟
௙ವ೔೙
= 1 when ஽݂ < 2 ௎݂, while the dotted line D 
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reflects ௙ವ
೚ೠ೟
௙ವ೔೙
= 1 when ஽݂ > 2 ௎݂. The curve ∆π = 0 therefore has two intersection points with the line 
௙ವ೚ೠ೟
௙ವ೔೙
= 1 when ஽݂ < 2 ௎݂ and has no intersection point with the line ௙ವ
೚ೠ೟
௙ವ೔೙
= 1 when ஽݂ > 2 ௎݂.  
 
Figure 4.5 Efficient governance, task interdependence, and downstream productivity differences 
 
Take cooperatives in China as an example to illustrate the results of the model. Cooperatives in China 
are generally in the start-up stage and most cooperative enterprises are characterized by small 
membership size and locality. Most cooperatives only have the first-stage processing such as packing 
rather than further processing. There is either no significant interaction, or a small negative (substitute) 
interdependency effect between the upstream farming and the downstream value adding activities. 
Cooperatives in China therefore favor member CEOs over outside CEOs. However, when 
cooperatives have been developing for many decades or even more than a century, they have a highly 
advanced and complicated value adding business. Most cooperatives in the Western world belong to 
this type. Given the limited time of a member CEO, the substitution effect between alternative 
businesses is large and a professional management therefore is necessary.  
In addition, it is difficult for farmer cooperatives in China to sufficiently motivate outside 
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professionals due to the under-development of cooperative enterprises. Professionals with high 
productivity would like to choose large companies rather than farmer cooperatives. Outside 
professionals willing to work in cooperatives may not be characterized by high productivity. The 
difference in productivities between member CEOs and outside professionals is small. Hence, 
cooperatives in China benefit from member CEOs. Nevertheless, as cooperatives in China develop in 
terms of member heterogeneity and enterprise size, and as the intensity of marketing competition 
increases, more and more member CEOs who lack professionalized training in marketing and 
management feel it beyond their capabilities to take charge of the marketing or the running of 
cooperative enterprises. Outside CEOs may become a good choice. 
4.7 Conclusions 
Management behavior in cooperatives is different from that in investor-owned firms. One of the 
distinctive features is that the manager in a cooperative can meanwhile be a member, and therefore an 
owner, of the cooperative enterprise. We compare the efficiency of a cooperative with a member as 
CEO and a cooperative with an outsider as CEO. Results of the model show that CEO identity, either 
a member of the cooperative or an employed outsider, affects the economic performance of the 
cooperative. The condition in which a member CEO or an outside CEO is efficient depends on 
marginal productivities of the upstream and downstream tasks, as well as the relationship between 
upstream farming and downstream value adding tasks.  
When the tasks are complementary and when alternative CEOs have the same marginal productivity 
regarding the downstream value adding activity, a cooperative with a member CEO is always efficient, 
compared to a cooperative with an outside CEO. The efficiency of CEO identity depends on the 
marginal productivities as well as the size of the substitution effect between upstream and downstream 
tasks. In cases where the difference of the marginal productivity between upstream and downstream 
tasks are sufficiently large and/or where the substitution effect of upstream and downstream tasks is 
sufficiently small or large, cooperatives with member CEOs are efficient. Otherwise, cooperatives 
with outside CEOs are efficient.  
CEOs with different identities may differ in marginal productivity regarding the downstream value-
adding activities. Outside CEOs tend to be more professional in management and marketing, while 
member CEOs are likely to be more production-oriented. Therefore, the scope for cooperatives with 
member CEOs being uniquely efficient becomes smaller when the marginal productivity of outside 
CEOs’ value adding activity is larger than that of member CEOs’ value adding activity, and vice versa. 
The interdependency between upstream and downstream tasks matters to the efficiency of alternative 
governance structures as well. When the two tasks are complements, as the interdependence becomes 
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stronger, the scope that cooperatives with member CEOs being efficient becomes larger. Yet when the 
effect of the substitution effect between the two tasks is small or large, the scope that cooperatives 
with member CEOs being efficient is relatively large. 
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Chapter 5: Pooling, Quality Provision, and the Yardstick Effect of 
Cooperatives 
 
Abstract  
Most agricultural markets show differentiated products and coexistence of cooperatives and investor-
owned firms (IOFs). Some markets have low quality products provided by cooperatives, whereas 
other markets have high quality product provided by cooperatives. This paper investigates the 
relationship between product quality and governance structure. We show in a non-cooperative game 
between farmers and enterprises that governance structure choices of farmers producing differentiated 
products depend crucially on the differential treatment of members regarding quality within a 
cooperative. The presence of cooperatives in a market has a competitive yardstick effect. Both the 
market share of cooperatives and the extent of payment differentiation inside a cooperative have a 
positive effect on the prices received by farmers. 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The changing production methods, increased concentration in supply chains, lower world prices and 
more international markets are threatening to small farmers (Hazell et al. 2006). Helper (1991) 
indicates that buyer-supplier relationships are becoming more dependent on factors such as quality, 
delivery performance, flexibility in contracting, and commitment to work together, as opposed to 
traditional relationships based on cost. Nowadays food quality and safety have become so important 
that suppliers have to pay more attention to them, as well as to consumers’ preferences. Given the 
substantial heterogeneity among consumers, there are opportunities for farmers to produce 
differentiated products. Farmers are potentially able to grasp these opportunities because they are 
heterogeneous regarding educational level, experience, geographic location, market orientation, farm 
size, production technique, quality, risk attitude, age, non-farm incomes, etc. (Iliopoulos and Cook, 
1999; Zusman, 1992). However, the rise of supermarkets and the subsequent specialized distribution 
centers is a challenge to small farmers (Hu and Reardon, 2004). They can hardly deal with the private 
standards of these modern transaction parties, nor do they have the countervailing power to gain a 
reasonable share of the value added. Uncoordinated private action may result in market failure. 
Zusman and Rausser (1994) argue that collective action via cooperatives may resolve this in 
efficiency. 
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The market and the firm are two alternative governance structures through which transactions occur 
(Coase, 1937). Other governance structures observed in agri-food production and marketing are 
contracts, contract farming, cooperatives, franchises, and networks. Governance structure is defined as 
the allocation of decision rights and income rights over relevant assets (Hansmann, 1996). Decision 
rights in the form of authority and responsibility address the question ‘Who has authority or control 
(regarding the use of assets)?’, while income rights address the question ‘How are benefits and costs 
allocated?’. The main distinction between an investor-owned firm (IOF) and a cooperative is that the 
decision rights reside formally with the investors in an IOF and with the input suppliers or buyers in 
an agricultural cooperative. The focus in this article is on the outlet choice of farmers for their produce, 
where the outlet choice is either an IOF or a cooperative. Different income rights structures are 
considered for the cooperative by distinguishing various degrees of pooling. 
An important feature of cooperatives is the equal treatment of their owners / members (Nilsson, 1998). 
It entails that the allocation of revenues as well as costs may be (partially) independent of quality 
and/or quantity. This practice of pooling is commonly believed to place cooperatives at a competitive 
disadvantage in quality differentiated markets. Fulton and Sanderson (2002) argue that traditional 
cooperatives have disadvantages in meeting markets’ demands for quality, due to several reasons. 
Firstly, revenue pooling generates adverse selection problems among heterogeneous farmers. 
Secondly, patronage-based financing leads to the horizon problem and underinvestment in long-term 
strategies that can enhance objective or perceived product quality. Thirdly, providing a “home” for 
member production is problematic both with respect to product quality and the potential to glut niche 
market. Finally, difficulties in dealing with “marginal” members lead to revenue inefficiencies of each 
member. However, pooling can also bring advantages (Saitone and Sexton, 2009, Hendrikse, 2011). It 
attenuates the incentive of farmers to overproduce high quality products, insures risk-averse farmers 
against stochastic variation in quality levels, and creates countervailing power. 
Cooperatives may experience adverse selection due to a heterogeneous membership, which has an 
effect on the level of  quality provided by cooperatives. Hart and Moore (1996) stress the member-
control characteristic of cooperatives and consider the relationship between a heterogeneous 
membership and the choice of governance structure. A cooperative becomes relatively less efficient 
than an outside exchange when the variation across the membership becomes more skewed and as the 
transaction faces more competition. Zago (1999) highlights the rights to vote for the payment scheme. 
The payment scheme chosen by members reflects the preferences of the majority of farmers, which 
entails adverse selection of the minority. Irrespective of the remuneration scheme adopted for quality, 
a differentiation mechanism or a pooling mechanism, the quality level provided by the cooperative is 
higher than the first-best when high quality members are the majority and lower when low quality 
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members are majority. Some constitutional rule is needed to avoid adverse selection of the minority 
and enhance total welfare. Hoffmann (2005) examines the quality provision of firms with different 
ownership structures. Cooperatives and IOFs have different objective functions and face different 
costs. The IOF maximizes the profit from processing, while the cooperative maximizes the joint 
profits of members. The results show that the cost of quality has an impact on the choice of quality 
levels and on total welfare. When there is a fixed cost of quality at the primary level, IOFs generate a 
larger consumer surplus and produce higher qualities, while cooperatives generate a larger producer 
surplus. When there is a variable cost of quality at the primary level, a cooperative produces higher 
quality and generates larger profits, larger consumer surplus, and larger social welfare. However, 
ownership structures themselves are not able to realize the highest total welfare. The government 
therefore may help to adjust the market structure and quality levels by, for example, promoting a 
certain ownership structure. Cooperatives may also use an appropriate payment scheme to motivate 
heterogeneous members to join and stay with the cooperative. The bylaws of cooperatives have the 
flexibility to design an income rights structure which tailors to the heterogeneity of the membership. 
Some cooperatives move towards high quality provision due to an incentive payment scheme paying 
for quality, but the opposite occurs as well (Hendrikse, 2011).  
The evidence regarding the relationship between governance structure and product quality in 
agricultural markets is mixed. Some markets have low quality products provided by cooperatives, 
whereas other markets have high quality provided by cooperatives. There are many cooperatives 
providing low quality products. Most wine cooperatives in Germany and in Spain are characterized by 
low quality due to the defense-oriented characteristics of traditional cooperatives (Frick, 2004; 
Theodorakopoulou and Iliopoulos, 2012). One example is that the income rights are based on 
patronage without incentives for quality. Pennerstorfer and Weiss (2012) report low quality of wine 
by cooperatives in Austria. Because members of cooperatives do not receive the full benefits of the 
investment in quality, and they tend to deliver low quality products due to the free-riding problem, 
there are many low quality wine cooperative in Italy (Bijman et al., 2012). However, there are also a 
few high quality wine cooperatives in Italy, like Terlan cooperative, Tramin cooperative, and Bozen 
cooperative. Other examples of cooperatives supplying high quality products are dairy cooperative 
FrieslandCampina and cheese cooperative De Producent in the Netherlands, most Tingo Maria coffee 
and cacao cooperatives in Peru, Jiaxing grape cooperative in Zhejiang, China, Hanguang fruit and 
vegetable cooperative in Taiwan, and broiler cooperatives in Brazil (Cechin, et al., 2012). It is also 
noteworthy that cooperatives in China have become the main adopters of food quality standards and 
they provide higher quality than individual farmers (Zhou and Jin, 2009). The cooperatives delivering 
high quality products are characterized by quality premiums. 
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The presence of farmer cooperatives in the market helps to avoid market failure due to the competitive 
yardstick effect. The competitive yardstick effect refers to the fact that the presence of cooperatives in 
the market forces investor-owned firms to offer higher procurement prices for farmers’ products. 
Empirical support for the competitive yardstick is observed in the food manufacturing industry in the 
US (Rogers and Petraglia, 1994), the wheat market in Canada (Zhang et al., 2007), the coffee market 
in Chiapas, Mexico (Milford, 2012), and the European dairy industry (Hanisch et al., 2012). 
Helmberger (1964), Cotterill (1987), and Milford (2012) establish a competitive yardstick effect in his 
homogeneous product models, Sexton (1990) and Tribl (2009) show this effect in spatial models. The 
driving force behind the competitive yardstick effect in these models is the elimination of the double 
mark-up and the service-at-cost principle of cooperatives, i.e. the vertical integration feature of the 
cooperative eliminates a mark-up by an intermediary or an IOF processor and the zero profit feature 
of the cooperative is established by paying the profits of the cooperative to members by a higher 
transfer price. Hendrikse (2007a) establishes a competitive yardstick effect in a model with production 
uncertainty by a contracting externality. Production uncertainty entails that an upstream party does not 
produce with a certain probability. In equilibrium high reservation demand is met by cooperatives, 
while low reservation demand is procured in the spot market. An additional cooperative takes 
additional high reservation demand out of the spot market, which has a decreasing effect on the 
expected spot market price. However, additional formation of cooperatives entails also additional 
residual demand in the spot market due to the production uncertainty, which has an increasing effect 
on the expected spot market price. Contract and spot market prices are positively related to the 
percentage of cooperatives in the market due to the second effect dominating the first effect. 
This article addresses the relationship between the sorting of heterogeneous members and the income 
rights structure of a cooperative in terms of the extent of pooling. It addresses the provision of product 
quality by different governance structures. Heterogeneous farmers in terms of product quality choose 
either an IOF or a cooperative. An IOF prices products differentially and earns the difference between 
input prices and output prices, while a cooperative adopts either a pooling or differential pricing 
policy and distributes all revenues to members. Farmers with low (high) quality products deliver to 
the cooperative when it adopts a complete pooling (quality premiums) price policy. The commitment 
of the cooperative to a (partial) pooling price policy is responsible for the competitive yardstick effect. 
It forces the IOF to increase procurement prices in order to attract farmers when it competes with a 
cooperative. Not only farmers delivering to the cooperative receive a higher surplus, but also the other 
farmers receive more compared to the IOF market. The competitive yardstick effect of cooperatives is 
therefore a public good (Staatz, 1984). 
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This article addresses the relationship between the sorting of heterogeneous members and the income 
rights structure of a cooperative in terms of the extent of pooling. It addresses the provision of product 
quality by different governance structures. Heterogeneous farmers in terms of product quality choose 
either an IOF or a cooperative, and how alternative payment schemes influence the competitive 
yardstick effect of the cooperative. An IOF prices products differentially and earns the difference 
between input prices and output prices, while a cooperative adopts either a pooling or differential 
pricing policy and distributes all revenues to members. Farmers with low (high) quality products 
deliver to the cooperative when it adopts a complete pooling (quality premiums) price policy. The 
commitment of the cooperative to a (partial) pooling price policy is responsible for the competitive 
yardstick effect because it forces the IOF to increase procurement prices in order to attract farmers 
when it competes with a cooperative. Not only farmers delivering to the cooperative receive a higher 
surplus, but also the other farmers receive more compared to the IOF market. The competitive 
yardstick effect of cooperatives is therefore a public goods (Staatz, 1984). 
This article is organized as follows. Section 5.2 specifies the game between farmers and enterprises. 
Section 5.3 determines the equilibrium. We extend the model by including differential payments 
regarding quality within cooperatives in section 5.4. We summarize and conclude with some 
possibilities for future research in section 5.5. 
5.2 Model 
This section develops a non-cooperative game highlighting the farmers’ choices of product outlet, and 
the pricing policies of the enterprises. The five ingredients of the game, i.e. players, choices, payoffs, 
information structure, and rules of the game, are specified in this section.  
Players 
Assume that there are three farmers, two enterprises, and three consumers. Farmer 1 (2, 3) produces 
low (median, high) quality product. The two enterprises act as marketing organizations that purchase 
products from farmers and sell to consumers.  
Choices  
An enterprise ݁ (= 1, 2) chooses between two governance structures, investor-owned firm (IOF) and 
open-membership cooperative. An IOF chooses a differentiated markup pricing policy, whereas a 
cooperative chooses a pooling price policy. Each enterprise having two governance structure 
possibilities implies that there are three possible compositions of the market, i.e. two IOFs, an IOF 
and a cooperative, and two cooperatives. An open-membership cooperative entails that farmers can 
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join in the cooperative without limitation or any cost. An IOF can reject farmers to deliver to it, 
whereas a cooperative can’t. 
A farmer chooses where to deliver and each farmer produces either nothing or one unit of product. Let 
ݍ௝௘௚ be the delivery and output choice of farmer ݆ (= 1, 2, 3) to enterprise ݁ (= 1, 2) with governance 
structure ݃ (= ܫ, ܥ), where ܫ (ܥ) is an IOF (a cooperative). ݍ௝௘௚ = 0 if farmer ݆ does not produce a 
unit of product. ݍ௝௘௚ = 1(0)  when farmer ݆ delivers (does not deliver) to enterprise ݁ with governance 
structure ݃. Consumer 1 (2, 3) buys either nothing or one unit of product.  
Payoffs 
IOFs and cooperatives are characterized by different payment schemes. The main distinction of 
payments between an IOF and a cooperative lies in the pricing policy and the distribution of income. 
An IOF prices products on the basis of quality when purchasing inputs from farmers. It earns the 
difference between the input price and the sales price. A cooperative pools inputs of differentiated 
qualities and pays farmers a pooling price. It distributes all revenues to members. Both an IOF and a 
cooperative price products discriminatorily when selling products in the final product market, 
depending on the quality of products. The pricing policy of the IOF is known as double markup or 
double marginalization (Spengler, 1950), where markup refers to the difference between the price and 
the marginal cost in each stage of production (Carlton and Perloff, 1990: p526).32  
Define ௝ܴ as the reservation price of a consumer for product ݆. Consumers attach value to quality, i.e. 
ܴଵ < ܴଶ < ܴଷ  . The production costs of product ݆  by farmer ݆  are ௝ܿ  ( ݆ = 1, 2, 3 ), where ௝ܿ  is 
increasing in ݆. Production costs are zero when the farmer does not produce. Reservation prices are 
assumed to be larger than the production cost, i.e. ௝ܿ < ௝ܴ for ݆ = 1, 2, 3.  
Enterprises earn the difference between the purchasing price and the sales price. Let ݌௝௕௘௚  be the 
procurement price that enterprise ݁ with governance structure ݃ pays when buying (ܾ) product ݆ and 
݌௝௦௘௚ be the sales price that enterprise ݁ with governance structure ݃ receives for selling (ݏ) product ݆ to 
a consumer. Notice that the two markups of the IOF are therefore ݌௝௕௘ூ − ௝ܿ  and ݌௝௦௘ூ − ݌௝௕௘ூ . A 
cooperative has only a single markup.   
                                                          
32 In a supply chain comprised of farmers, IOFs, and consumers, there are two markups. One occurs when an IOF 
purchases an input from a farmer, implying the procurement price being higher than the production cost of the product. 
The other markup occurs when a consumer buys the product with a sales price which is higher than the processing price. 
This double markup provides an incentive for vertical integration. A cooperative eliminates the markup between producers 
and processors to zero through vertical integration, i.e. a cooperative serves members at cost. 
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Enterprise ݁ with governance structure ݃ earns ∑  ݍ௝௘௚݌௝௦௘௚ଷ௝ୀଵ − ∑  ݍ௝௘௚݌௝௕௘௚ଷ௝ୀଵ , where ∑  ݍ௝௘௚݌௝௦௘௚ଷ௝ୀଵ  is 
the total revenue that enterprise ݁ with governance structure ݃ earns and ∑  ݍ௝௘௚݌௝௕௘௚ଷ௝ୀଵ  refers to what 
enterprise ݁ with governance structure ݃ pays to farmers. The revenue of farmer ݆ is ݌௝௕௘௚  when he 
delivers to enterprise ݁ with governance structure ݃ and zero if he does not produce. Assume that 
members of a cooperative shoulder production costs individually. Farmer ݆ earns ∑ ∑ ݍ௝௘௚(݌௝௕௘௚ − ௝ܿ)௚௘ .  
Denote the payoff of enterprise ݁ with governance structure ߙ, competing with an enterprise with 
governance structure ߚ , as ߨ௘ఈఉ . Define the payoff of farmer ݆  in an enterprise with governance 
structure ߙ competing with an enterprise with governance structure ߚ as ܨ௝ఈఉ. 
Information structure 
Product quality, product production cost, consumers’ reservation prices, and the enterprises’ pricing 
policy and income rights distribution strategy are common knowledge.  
Sequence of decisions 
The game consists of four stages. At stage one, each enterprise chooses its governance structure to be 
an IOF or a cooperative, and therefore its price policy. Governance structure choices are made 
simultaneously.33 At stage two, farmers choose the outlet of their products. The three farmers act 
simultaneously. At stage three, farmers decide about their level of output, i.e. to produce one unit of 
product or not to produce. Consumers decide to buy or not to buy one unit in the final stage. 
5.3 Equilibrium 
The game will be solved by the method of backward induction. Consumers will buy in the final stage 
of the game when the price of the product is not higher than the reservation price. Next, farmers’ 
production decisions and product outlet choices are considered, given the governance structure 
choices in the first stage of the game. Finally, the price of each product in each governance structure is 
determined, anticipating the choices of farmers, and governance structures are chosen. Section 5.3.1 
presents the production and outlet choices. The equilibrium governance structure choices in the first 
stage of the game are presented in 5.3.2. 
5.3.1 Production and outlet choices 
The production and outlet choices are determined based on the choice of governance structure in the 
first stage of the game. Three cases have to be distinguished, i.e. an IOF market (5.3.1.1), a mixed 
duopoly market (5.3.1.2), and a cooperative market (5.3.1.3). The relationship between the price paid 
                                                          
33 The equilibrium results when the two enterprises move sequentially are the same with that when the two enterprises 
move simultaneously. We therefore only present the case when the two enterprises move simultaneously. 
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to farmers and the market share of cooperatives, i.e. the competitive yardstick effect, is determined in 
section 5.3.1.4. 
5.3.1.1 IOF market 
Suppose that there are two IOFs in the market and that they decide prices simultaneously. Since 
producers are assumed to know the preferences of each consumer, all the consumer surpluses will be 
extracted away by the enterprises (Grossman, 1981). Prices that the IOFs charge consumers are 
݌௝௦௘ூ = ௝ܴ. There is price competition between the two IOFs to attract farmers. One IOF would always 
try to choose an input price for each product which is a little bit higher than that of the other IOF as 
long as it earns a non-negative payoff. Input prices of the two IOFs tend to  ݌௝௕௘ூ = ௝ܴ − ߝ, where ߝ is a 
small positive number. Both IOFs will hardly have any profit. If there is a positive sunk cost for 
entering the market (Sutton, 1991), then there will be a monopolistic market due to the IOFs 
anticipating the consequences of a contestable market. Assume that enterprise 1 is the monopolist. 
The monopolist will maximize its payoff by pricing inputs at marginal costs, i.e. ݌௝௕ଵூ = ௝ܿ + ߝ, and 
selling the outputs at ݌௝௦ଵூ = ௝ܴ. Equilibrium price policies, outlet choices, and production decisions in 
the IOF market are presented in table 5.1.  
Table 5.1 Equilibrium in the IOF market 
j  ݌௝௕ଵூ  ݌௝௦ଵூ ݍ௝ଵூ ݍ௝ଶூ 
1 ܿଵ + ߝ ܴଵ 1 0 
2 ܿଶ + ߝ  ܴଶ 1 0 
3 ܿଷ + ߝ  ܴଷ 1 0 
 
Revenues of the market participants are presented in table 5.2. The payoff of the IOF is ߨூ =
∑ ௝ܴଷ௝ୀଵ − ∑ ௝ܿଷ௝ୀଵ − 3ߝ and each farmer earns ߝ.  
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Table 5.2 Payoffs in the IOF market 
 Payoffs 
Enterprise  ߨଵூூ = ∑ ௝ܴଷ௝ୀଵ − ∑ ܿଵଷ௝ୀଵ − 3ߝ. 
ߨଶூூ = 0. 
Farmers  ܨଵூூ = ߝ. 
ܨଶூூ = ߝ.  
ܨଷூூ = ߝ. 
Total surplus ∑ ௝ܴଷ௝ୀଵ − ∑ ௝ܿଷ௝ୀଵ . 
 
Proposition 1: All farmers deliver to one IOF and earn almost nothing in a market with only IOFs. 
5.3.1.2 Mixed duopoly 
A cooperative distributes its revenues equally among its producer members. It entails that a 
cooperative has zero profits. Farmer ݆ delivering to the cooperative therefore earns 
݌௝௕௘஼ =
∑ ௤ೕ೐಴௣ೕೞ೐಴యೕసభ
∑ ௤ೕ೐಴యೕసభ
. 
There are two markups for product ݆ (݆ = 1, 2, 3) delivered by the IOF. One markup arises when the 
IOF buys from farmer ݆. The other markup arises when the IOF sells product ݆ to a consumer. Thus 
the IOF chooses two sets of prices, i.e. the procurement prices and the sales prices. The IOF earns the 
difference between the procurement price and the sales price.  
Equilibrium price policies, outlet choices, and production decisions are presented in table 5.3. The 
cooperative is not able to attract high quality farmers due to the collective pooling price. The IOF 
tailors its pricing policy to individual farmers. The IOF chooses a procurement price which is a little 
lower than the reservation price, ݌௝௕ଵூ = ܴଵ − ߝ, to deter farmer 1 from delivering to the IOF. If the IOF 
chooses  ݌௝௕ଵூ = ܴଵ, then farmer 1 is indifferent in delivering to the IOF and the cooperative. The IOF 
sequentially has to choose ݌ଶ௕ଵூ = ܴଶ and ݌ଷ௕ଵூ = ܴଷ in order to attract farmer 2 and farmer 3 when 
݌௝௕ଵூ = ܴଵ. The IOF therefore chooses a lower procurement price for the low quality product in order to 
establish lower opportunity costs for farmer 2 and farmer 3. The IOF chooses ݌௝௕ଵூ = ܴଵ − ߝ . It 
chooses ݌ଶ௕ଵூ = ோభାோమଶ + ߝ in order to prevent that farmer 2 goes to the cooperative. It chooses ݌ଷ௕ଵூ =
ோభାோయ
ଶ  + ߝ to prevent that farmer 3 goes to the cooperative. Farmer 1 delivers to the cooperative. The 
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pooling price policy of the cooperative causes adverse selection of farmer 2 and farmer 3. They 
choose to deliver to the IOF. Each farmer produces one unit of product.  
Table 5.3 Equilibrium in the mixed duopoly  
j  ݌௝௕ଵூ  ݌௝௦ଵூ ݌௕ଶ஼  ݌௦ଶ஼ ݍ௝ଵூ ݍ௝ଶ஼ 
1 ܴଵ − ߝ. ܴଵ ܴଵ ܴଵ 0 1 
2 ோభାோమ
ଶ + ߝ. ܴଶ ܴଵ ܴଶ 1 0 
3 ோభାோయ
ଶ  + ߝ. ܴଷ ܴଵ ܴଷ 1 0 
 
Payoffs of the players are presented in table 5.4. Farmer 1 earns ܴଵ − ܿଵ  by delivering to the 
cooperative. Farmer 2 receives ோభାோమଶ + ߝ  from the IOF and earns 
ோభାோమ
ଶ − ܿଶ + ߝ . The IOF earns 
ோమିோభ
ଶ − ε from the marketing of the medium quality product. Farmer 3 receives 
ோభାோయ
ଶ + ߝ from the 
IOF and earns ோభାோయଶ − ܿଷ + ߝ . The IOF earns 
ோయିோభ 
ଶ − ߝ  from the marketing of the high quality 
product. All farmers earn more in the mixed duopoly than in the IOF market. 
Table 5.4 Payoffs in the mixed duopoly 
 Payoffs 
Enterprises ߨଵூ஼ = ோయାோమିଶோభଶ − 2ߝ. 
ߨଶ஼ூ = 0. 
Farmers  ܨଵ஼ூ = ܴଵ − ܿଵ. 
ܨଶூ஼ = ோభାோమଶ − ܿଶ + ߝ. 
ܨଷூ஼ = ோభାோయଶ − ܿଷ + ߝ. 
Total surplus ∑ ௝ܴଷ௝ୀଵ − ∑ ௝ܿଷ௝ୀଵ . 
 
Proposition 2 states that the pooling function of a cooperative discourages farmers with high quality 
products from joining the cooperative. It entails adverse selection, which is a widely recognized 
problem regarding cooperatives (Fulton and Sanderson, 2002; Saitone and Sexton, 2009). Farmers 
providing low quality products are willing to deliver to the cooperative because they benefit from the 
elimination of the double markup. The IOF is in the high reservation price market niches. 
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Proposition 2. The low quality farmer delivers to the cooperative whereas the farmers producing 
medium and high quality products deliver to the IOF.  
5.3.1.3 Cooperative market 
Cooperatives are characterized by a price policy based on pooling. There is no Nash equilibrium in 
pure strategies in a market with only cooperatives. Low quality farmers like to deliver to the 
cooperative where high quality farmers deliver, in order to benefit from pooling. However, high 
quality farmers leave the cooperative where low quality farmers deliver and join the other cooperative. 
The choices of farmers therefore result in a mixed strategy equilibrium. Suppose that parameter values 
are such that all three farmers produce one unit of product. The equilibrium mixed strategy of each 
farmer is to choose enterprise 1(2) with probability 0.5(0.5). The equilibrium payoffs are presented in 
table 5.5.  
Table 5.5 Payoffs in the cooperative market 
 Payoffs of each player 
Enterprises  ߨଵ஼஼ = 0. 
ߨଶ஼஼ = 0. 
Farmers  ܨଵ஼஼ = ଵସோభାହோమାହ ோయଶସ − ܿଵ. 
ܨଶ஼஼ = ହோభାଵସோమାହ ோయଶସ − ܿଶ. 
ܨଷ஼஼ = ହோభାହோమାଵସ ோయଶସ − ܿଷ. 
Total surplus ∑ ௝ܴଷ௝ୀଵ − ∑ ௝ܿଷ௝ୀଵ . 
 
All farmers produce one unit of product when ோభାோమଶ > ܿଶ , 
ୖభାୖమା ୖయ
ଷ > cଷ , and 
ୖభାୖయ
ଶ > cଷ . The 
equilibrium mixed strategy changes when at least one farmer does not produce. Farmer 2 will not 
produce when ୖభାୖమଶ < cଶ, while farmer 3 will not produce when 
ୖభାୖమା ୖయ
ଷ < cଷ or 
ୖభାୖయ
ଶ < cଷ. The 
equilibrium mixed strategy of each farmer is to choose enterprise 1(2) with probability 0.5(0.5) and 
choose to produce when his expected payoff is positive while not produce otherwise. It is therefore 
not efficient when a farmer does not produce. 
5.3.1.4 Yardstick effect 
All the three markets are efficient regarding total welfare when all farmers produce. However, 
equilibrium farmer payoffs differ substantially between markets. Table 5.6 summarizes the price 
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received by each farmer in each market. Denote the equilibrium input price for product ݆ in market 
structure ݇ to be ݌௝௞, where ݇ = ܫ, ܯ, ܥ with ܫ referring to the IOF market, ܯ to the mixed duopoly, 
and ܥ to the cooperative market. 
Table 5.6 Market structure and input prices 
 IOF market  
 
Mixed duopoly  Cooperative market 
Farmer 1 ݌ଵூ = ߝ. ݌ଵெ = ܴଵ. ݌ଵ஼ = ଵସோభାହோమାହ ோయଶସ . 
Farmer 2 ݌ଶூ = ߝ. ݌ଶெ = ோభାோమଶ + ߝ. ݌ଶ஼ =
ହோభାଵସோమାହ ோయ
ଶସ . 
Farmer 3 ݌ଷூ = ߝ. ݌ଷெ = ோభା ோయଶ + ߝ. ݌ଷ஼ =
ହோభାହோమାଵସ ோయ
ଶସ . 
 
In the IOF market all the farmers deliver to one IOF. The IOF prices inputs at marginal costs. Each 
farmer earns a small profit. In the mixed duopoly market, the pooling policy of the cooperative results 
in adverse selection. Only farmers producing the lowest quality products deliver to the cooperative, 
whereas the other farmers deliver to the IOF. However, the prices received by farmers are much 
higher. The commitment of the cooperative to a pooling price policy forces the IOF to pay higher 
prices to farmers. In the cooperative market, there is a mixed strategy equilibrium. Farmers are 
indifferent in choosing either cooperative.  
Define the yardstick effect as the difference between procurement price paid to farmers in the market 
when cooperatives are present and the price when there is no cooperative. Denote the size of the 
yardstick effect to be ߜ௝௞ for product ݆ in the market structure ݇. We obtain ߜଵெ = ܴଵ − ߝ, ߜଶெ = ோభାோమଶ , 
and ߜଷெ = ோభା ோయଶ . The presence of a cooperative in the mixed duopoly has a comparative yardstick 
effect. Not only farmers delivering to the cooperative are better off, but also farmers delivering to the 
IOF earn more revenues than those in a pure IOF market.  
The sizes of the yardstick effect in the cooperative market are ߜଵ஼ = ଵସோభାହோమାହ ோయଶସ − ߝ , ߜଶ஼ =
ହோభାଵସோమାହ ோయ
ଶସ − ߝ , and ߜଷ஼ =
ହோభାହோమାଵସ ோయ
ଶସ − ߝ . Let ∆ߜ௝  be the difference in the yardstick effect of 
product ݆ between the cooperative market and the mixed duopoly. Then  ∆ߜଵ = ହோమାହ ோయିଵ଴ோభଶସ > 0, 
∆ߜଶ = ଶோమାହ ோయି଻ோభଶସ − ߝ > 0, and ∆ߜଷ =
ଶோయାହோమି଻ோభ 
ଶସ − ߝ > 0. All the farmers are better off in the 
cooperative market than the mixed market. The yardstick effect of each product in the cooperative 
market is stronger than that in the mixed duopoly. This result is summarized in proposition 3.   
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Proposition 3. The presence of cooperatives in the market has a yardstick effect and the effect gets 
stronger as the market share of cooperatives increases. 
Procurement prices in both the mixed duopoly and the cooperative market are higher than in the IOF 
market. If cooperatives provide better prices to farmers than IOFs do, IOFs would lose market share to 
cooperatives. Due to the cooperatives’ pooling price policy, IOFs also have to pay a pooling price. 
When the market shares of the cooperative increase from one third (only the low quality farmer 
delivers to the cooperative) to one, the size of the yardstick effect for each product becomes larger. 
Given farmers’ heterogeneity, the more farmers join the cooperative, the smaller market niche the IOF 
has. It therefore has to pay higher prices to compete for market share. The yardstick effect of each 
product for various market shares of the cooperative(s), ranging from zero, to one third, to one, is 
presented in figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1 Yardstick effect 
 
The competition between established firms and potential entrants is similar to the practice of limit 
pricing. Limit pricing entails setting a high output level, or a low price, to deter new firms from 
entering industries (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Sexton and Sexton, 1987). The potential entrants 
expect existing firms to maintain their pre-entry output or price after entry. This makes it less 
attractive for potential firms to enter the market. Our model shows the reverse effect in an 
intermediate product market. The presence of cooperatives in the market increases the price(s) at 
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which farmers are able to sell their products. The yardstick effect of cooperatives is to increase the 
procurement prices paid to farmers. The next section determines the equilibrium industry structure.  
5.3.2 Governance structure choice 
Equilibrium results of farmer and enterprise payoffs in alternative markets are presented in table 5.7. 
In each cell of the table, a vector ቀቂቀܨଵఈఉ, ܨଶఈఉ, ܨଷఈఉቁ; ߨଵఈఉቃ , ቂቀܨଵఉఈ, ܨଶఉఈ, ܨଷఉఈቁ; ߨଶఉఈቃቁ  is listed. It 
reflects the payoff of farmer ݆ in enterprise ݁ with governance structure ߙ facing competition of an 
enterprise with governance structure ߚ, as well as the payoff of the enterprises.  
In an IOF duopoly, the IOF prices inputs at marginal costs of production. Farmers therefore receive 
hardly any payoff. They will respond by starting a cooperative. A mixed IOF-cooperative duopoly 
market is also not stable. In the mixed duopoly market, the pooling policy of the cooperative leads to 
adverse selection. Only farmers producing the lowest quality level products deliver to the cooperative, 
whereas higher quality farmers deliver to the IOF. The presence of a cooperative has a competitive 
yardstick effect. Not only farmers delivering to the cooperative are better off, but also farmers 
delivering to the IOF earn more revenues than those in the IOF market. The IOF earns a positive 
payoff due to the double markup. Farmers earn even more when they leave the IOF and start a second 
cooperative. A cooperative market is the equilibrium industry composition. All the value-added 
product is obtained by farmers. 
Table 5.7 Market structure and farmer payoffs 
        ࢋ = ૛ 
ࢋ = ૚      
IOF Coop 
 
IOF  
 
(ൣ(ߝ, ߝ, ߝ); ∑ ௝ܴଷ௝ୀଵ − ∑ ܿଵଷ௝ୀଵ − 3ߝ൧, (ቂቀ0, ோభାோమଶ − ܿଶ + ߝ,
ோభା ோయ
ଶ − ܿଷ + ߝቁ ;
ோయାோమିଶோభ
ଶ − 2ߝቃ, 
[(0, 0, 0); 0]). [(ܴଵ − ܿଵ, 0, 0); 0]). 
 
Coop 
 
([(ܴଵ − ܿଵ, 0, 0);  0], (ቂቀଵସோభାହோమାହோయଶସ − ܿଵ,
ହோభାଵସோమାହோయ
ଶସ − ܿଶ,
ହோభାହோమାଵସோయ
ଶସ − ܿଷቁ ; 0ቃ, 
ቂቀ0, ோభାோమଶ − ܿଶ + ߝ,
ோభା ோయ
ଶ − ܿଷ + ߝቁ ;
ோయାோమିଶோభ
ଶ − 2ߝቃ). ቂቀ
ଵସோభାହோమାହோయ
ଶସ − ܿଵ,
ହோభାଵସோమାହோయ
ଶସ − ܿଶ,
ହோభାହோమାଵସோయ
ଶସ − ܿଷቁ ; 0ቃ). 
 
5.4 Partial pooling 
Although equal distribution of revenues in terms of quality used to be the basic principle of 
cooperatives, many cooperatives nowadays choose alternative payment schemes due to changed 
market conditions. Differential pricing is important for a cooperative’s stability and optimal 
production decisions when member heterogeneity is increasing (Sexton, 1986; Staatz, 1984). Take for 
example the Dutch cooperative Coforta (Hendrikse, 2011). High quality members left the cooperative 
due to the pooling strategy. However, high quality farmers returned to the cooperative when policies 
were more tailored to the high quality members. Other examples are provided in the introduction 
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section. Many cooperatives therefore grade members’ products and pay differential prices based on 
quality. We therefore extend the model by relaxing the assumption of complete pooling. The 
interactions between farmers’ outlet choice and partial pooling based on sales price (5.4.1) and partial 
pooling based on sales price and quality premium (5.4.2) are examined. 
5.4.1 Partial pooling based on sales price 
Define the payment differentiation parameter ߠ  as the extent of differentiation regarding the 
distribution of revenues in terms of sales prices. ߠ = 0  entails complete pooling, or the equality 
principle regarding the distribution of revenues, while ߠ = 1 entails no pooling, or distribution of 
revenues based entirely on sales prices. Suppose farmer ݆  delivering to a cooperative receives a 
payment comprised of the pooling price and a differential price based on the sales price, i.e.  
݌௝௕௘௖ = (1 − ߠ)
∑ ௣ೕೞ೐೎௤ೕ೐೎యೕసభ
∑ ௤ೕ೐೎యೕసభ
+ ߠ݌௝௦௘௖. 
Consider firstly the mixed duopoly market. When 0 ≤ ߠ < 1, the outlet choices of farmers and the 
governance structure choices are the same as in the case of complete pooling. Farmer 1 delivers to the 
cooperative, whereas farmer 2 and farmer 3 deliver to the IOF. Though the payment differentiation 
regarding quality in the cooperative offers an incentive to farmer 2 and farmer 3 to join the 
cooperative, the IOF is able to attract farmer 2 and farmer 3 by increasing the procurement price. The 
procurement prices that various farmers receive are ݌ଵெ = ܴଵ, ݌ଶெ = (1 − ߠ) ோభା ோమଶ + ߠܴଶ + ߝ , and 
݌ଷெ = (1 − ߠ) ோభା ோయଶ + ߠܴଷ + ߝ. As ߠ increases, the IOF facing competition from the cooperative has 
to increase the procurement prices to attract farmers. The procurement prices paid to medium and high 
quality farmers therefore increase as well. When ߠ = 1 , the prices paid by the cooperative are 
݌ଵெ = ܴଵ, ݌ଶெ = ܴଶ, and ݌ଷெ = ܴଷ. The IOF will earn nothing if it pays farmers the same prices as the 
cooperative does. It therefore is not able to attract farmers. All the farmers deliver to the cooperative 
rather than the IOF in the mixed duopoly market.  
Assume that the equilibrium ߠ is determined by majority voting of the membership of the cooperative. 
Farmer 3 prefers a high differentiation parameter and votes for ߠ = 1. Farmer 2 is aware that farmer 3 
delivers to the cooperative only when ߠ = 1. He would then choose ߠ = 1 to escape from the pooling 
with low quality farmer. Farmer 1 is indifferent in any value of ߠ, because he realizes that neither 
farmer 3 nor farmer 2 will deliver to the cooperative when ߠ is smaller than 1. The equilibrium in the 
mixed duopoly is that the cooperative sets ߠ = 1 and all farmers join the cooperative. Each farmer 
earns the sales price of his product. 
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Although partial pooling based on sales price does not result in different outlet choices of farmers, it 
affects the yardstick effect of the cooperative. The procurement prices for both farmer 2 and farmer 3 
delivering to the IOF increase as the price differentiation parameter ߠ  increases. There are more 
incentives for high quality farmers to join the cooperative when ߠ increases. As the differentiation in 
the cooperative’ pricing policy for differentiated qualities increases, the procurement prices that the 
IOF has to pay to farmer 2 and farmer 3 are increasing as well in order to prevent them from leaving. 
This drives the procurement price in the markets towards the sales prices. The yardstick effect 
therefore increases. All the farmers deliver to the cooperative. This result is summarized in 
proposition 4 and depicted in figure 5.2. When the cooperative adopts complete differentiation, i.e. 
ߠ = 1, the IOF is not able to compete in any market niche any more.  
Proposition 4. There is a positive relationship between the degree of payment differentiation 
regarding product quality within a cooperative and the yardstick effect. 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Yardstick effect when partial pooling is based on sales price 
 
In the cooperative market, farmers’ outlet choices are dependent on the degree of differentiation of the 
two cooperatives. Assume that the two cooperatives are identical regarding ߠ. There is a no Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies. Farmer chooses cooperative 1(2) with probability 0.5(0.5). Farmer ݆ 
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Consider again the choice of ߠ by the membership. Farmer 3 votes for ߠ = 1, while farmer 1 will vote 
for ߠ = 0. Farmer 2’s choice regarding ߠ depends on the value of ܴଶ and ோభା ோయଶ . If ܴଶ >
ோభା ோయ
ଶ , farmer 
2 votes for ߠ = 1. Otherwise farmer 2 votes for ߠ = 0. When ܴଶ > ோభା ோయଶ , cooperatives choose ߠ = 1 
and each farmer receives a price equal to the sales price of his product. When ܴଶ < ோభା ோయଶ , 
cooperatives set ߠ = 0 and the expected price, due to the mixed strategy equilibrium, of farmer 1 (2, 3) 
is ଵସோభାହோమାହோయଶସ  (
ହோభାଵସோమାହோయ
ଶସ , 
ହோభାହோమାଵସோయ
ଶସ ). 
In the IOF market all the farmers deliver to one IOF. The IOF prices inputs at marginal costs. Each 
farmer earns a small profit. 
Equilibrium farmer payoffs in different markets when ܴଶ > ோభା ோయଶ  are summarized in table 5.8. In 
each cell of the table, a vector ቀቂቀܨଵఈఉ, ܨଶఈఉ, ܨଷఈఉቁ; ߨଵఈఉቃ , ቂቀܨଵఉఈ, ܨଶఉఈ, ܨଷఉఈቁ; ߨଶఉఈቃቁ is listed. In the 
mixed duopoly market, the cooperative chooses a complete differentiation pricing policy to attract 
farmers. All the farmers deliver to the cooperative. In the cooperative market, there is mixed strategy 
equilibrium. Cooperatives choose the complete differentiation pricing policy and farmers are 
indifferent in choosing either cooperative. Only the IOF market is not an equilibrium market structure. 
The equilibrium is either a mixed market with all farmers in one cooperative, or a cooperative market. 
All the value-added is obtained by farmers, i.e. farmer ݆ receives a payoff of ௝ܴ − ௝ܿ in these market 
structures. 
Table 5.8 Market structure and farmer payoffs when partial pooling is based on sales price and 
ܴଶ > ோభା ோయଶ  
         ࢋ = ૛  
ࢋ = ૚      
IOF Coop 
 
IOF  
 
(ൣ(ߝ, ߝ, ߝ); ∑ ௝ܴଷ௝ୀଵ − ∑ ܿଵଷ௝ୀଵ − 3ߝ൧, ([(0,0,0); 0], 
[(0, 0, 0); 0]). [(ܴଵ − ܿଵ, ܴଶ − ܿଶ, ܴଷ − ܿଷ); 0]).
 
Coop 
 
([(ܴଵ − ܿଵ, ܴଶ − ܿଶ, ܴଷ − ܿଷ);  0], ([(ܴଵ − ܿଵ, ܴଶ − ܿଶ, ܴଷ − ܿଷ); 0], 
[(0,0,0); 0]). [(ܴଵ − ܿଵ, ܴଶ − ܿଶ, ܴଷ − ܿଷ); 0]).
 
Equilibrium farmer payoffs in the different markets when ܴଶ < ோభା ோయଶ  are summarized in table 5.9. In 
the mixed duopoly market, the cooperative chooses a complete differentiation pricing policy to attract 
farmers. All the farmers deliver to the cooperative. In the cooperative market, there is mixed strategy 
equilibrium. Cooperatives choose the complete pooling pricing policy and farmers are indifferent in 
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choosing either cooperative. Since ܴଶ < ோభା ோయଶ , the mixed market comprised of one cooperative (and 
an empty IOF) is the equilibrium outcome. 
Table 5.9 Market structure and farmer payoffs when partial pooling is based on sales price and 
ܴଶ < ோభା ோయଶ  
         ࢋ = ૛  
ࢋ = ૚      
IOF Coop 
 
IOF  
 
(ൣ(ߝ, ߝ, ߝ); ∑ ௝ܴଷ௝ୀଵ − ∑ ܿଵଷ௝ୀଵ − 3ߝ൧, ([(0,0,0); 0], 
[(0, 0, 0); 0]). [(ܴଵ − ܿଵ, ܴଶ − ܿଶ, ܴଷ − ܿଷ); 0]). 
 
Coop 
 
([(ܴଵ − ܿଵ, ܴଶ − ܿଶ, ܴଷ − ܿଷ);  0], (ቂቀଵସோభାହோమାହோయଶସ − ܿଵ,
ହோభାଵସோమାହோయ
ଶସ − ܿଶ,
ହோభାହோమାଵସோయ
ଶସ − ܿଷቁ ; 0ቃ, 
[(0,0,0); 0]). ቂቀଵସோభାହோమାହோయଶସ − ܿଵ,
ହோభାଵସோమାହோయ
ଶସ − ܿଶ,
ହோభାହோమାଵସோయ
ଶସ − ܿଷቁ ; 0ቃ). 
 
5.4.2 Partial pooling based on sales price and quality premium 
A cooperative adopting a partial pooling scheme based on only sales prices is not able to discourage 
low quality farmers from joining the membership. The effect of an additional parameter, quality 
premium, will therefore be investigated. Define ߛ௝ as the quality premium paid to farmer ݆. Farmer ݆ 
delivering to the cooperative receives a differential price comprised of the pooling price and a quality 
premium, i.e.  
݌௝௕௘௖ = (1 − ߠ)
∑ ௤ೕ೐಴௣ೕೞ೐಴యೕసభ
∑ ௤ೕ೐಴యೕసభ
+ ߠߛ௝. 
Consider firstly the mixed duopoly market. The case ߠ = 0, i.e. there is complete pooling, has been 
analyzed in the previous section. When ߠ = 1, i.e. there is no pooling, or complete differentiation, 
then ݌ଵ௕ଶ௖ = ߛଵ, ݌ଶ௕ଶ௖ = ߛଶ, and ݌ଷ௕ଶ௖ = ߛଷ, subject to∑ ߛ௝ݍ௝ଶ௖ଷ௝ୀଵ = ∑ ௝ܴݍ௝ଶ௖ଷ௝ୀଵ . The outlet choice of each 
farmer depends on the size of the quality premium. Farmer ݆ delivers to the cooperative when the 
quality premium for product ݆ is no less than the reservation price, i.e. ߛ௝ ≥ ௝ܴ. Otherwise the IOF will 
choose a procurement price larger than ߛ௝ to attract farmer ݆.  
Proposition 5: If quality premiums are part of the transfer pricing scheme in the cooperative, then any 
membership composition of the cooperative in the mixed market can be sustained as an equilibrium 
outcome by choosing the quality premium of the farmers outside the membership sufficiently low. 
Each member of the cooperative receives the consumer reservation price, while farmers outside the 
cooperative receive less than the consumer reservation price.  
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All three farmers deliver to the cooperative is an equilibrium when ߛ௝ = ௝ܴ. However, also ߛଵ = 0, 
ߛଶ = ܴଶ, and ߛଷ = ܴଷ is an equilibrium. This is a high quality cooperative. Farmer 1 will earn ߝ in the 
IOF. Similarly, ߛଵ = ܴଵ, ߛଶ = ܴଶ, and ߛଷ = 0 is also an equilibrium with a low quality cooperative. 
A payment scheme comprised of a quality premium can be set to include or exclude any farmer from 
the cooperative in the mixed market. This result entails an indeterminateness of the equilibrium 
composition of the membership of the cooperative in the mixed market. A cooperative can consist of a 
high quality membership, but a cooperative consisting of a low quality membership can also be 
sustained as an equilibrium membership composition. This raises the question how the quality 
premiums are determined. This question will not be addressed in this article. 
Quality premiums in the cooperative market will be set such that each farmer earns the consumer 
reservation price. Every composition of the membership of the cooperatives is an equilibrium 
outcome. Farmers earn hardly anything in the IOF market. The equilibrium market structure is now 
straightforward to determine. The cooperative market is the unique market structure when not all 
farmers are in the cooperative in the mixed market. Otherwise the mixed market with all farmers in 
the cooperative and the cooperative market, are equilibrium market structures. 
Research regarding quality provision and the role of cooperatives considers frequently the effect of 
membership policy (Sexton, 1990; Karantininis and Zago, 2001). The distinction between an open and 
closed membership policy is considered to be crucial. Both Helmberger (1964) and Sexton (1990) 
argue that the yardstick effect of cooperatives depends on the assumption of an open membership 
policy. Challenging this result, Karantininis and Zago (2001) point out that the relative advantage of 
the cooperative vanishes if it applies an open membership policy. LeVay (1983) maintains that an 
open-membership cooperative overproduces beyond the social optimum. However, we show that 
cooperatives determine their membership composition by their payment scheme, rather than via the 
membership policy. A cooperative may exclude low quality farmers by paying them a low quality 
premium. They choose voluntarily not to become a member. Similarly, a high extent of pooling 
discourages high quality farmers to become a member of the cooperative.  
5.5 Conclusion and further research 
This article examines farmers’ outlet and production choices in a differentiated product market. 
Enterprises in the market choose to adopt either an IOF or a cooperative governance structure. An IOF 
prices products differentially and earns the difference between input prices and output prices. A 
cooperative adopts either a pooling or differential pricing policy and distributes all revenues to 
members. The market consisting of cooperatives is an equilibrium. Farmers’ outlet choices in the 
mixed duopoly depend on the pricing policy of the cooperative. In the market where cooperatives 
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adopt a complete pooling price policy, farmers with low quality products deliver to the cooperative, 
whereas farmers with high quality products deliver to the IOF. The structure of quality premiums in a 
cooperative may reverse this result. 
The presence of the cooperative in the market has a competitive yardstick effect. An IOF is forced to 
increase the procurement prices in order to attract farmers when it competes with a cooperative. The 
commitment of the cooperative to a (partial) pooling price policy is responsible for this effect. Not 
only farmers delivering to the cooperative receive a higher surplus, but also the other farmers receive 
more compared to the IOF market. The competitive yardstick effect of cooperatives is therefore a 
public goods (Staatz, 1984). There is a positive relationship between the market share of cooperatives 
and the prices received by farmers. The yardstick effect becomes stronger when the cooperative 
adopts a more differentiated price policy. The differentiation in pricing provides incentives for high 
quality farmers to join the cooperative. The IOF has to respond with paying higher procurement prices 
to attract farmers. It therefore forces the market towards higher procurement prices.  
There are various possibilities for further research. One possibility is to consider other aspects of the 
governance structure of cooperatives. We have highlighted the structure of income rights in terms of 
the price being paid for each quality level, which determines the quality of products provided by 
cooperatives, and the role of ownership rights in terms of a constitutional rule consisting of majority 
voting. Issues regarding efficiency and equity have to be addressed. The role of decision rights has not 
been addressed. This may turn out to be important for the provision of quality by cooperatives because 
the distinction in a cooperative between ownership of the members and control by managers is 
important for the viability of the cooperative due to their diverging focus and interests. 
Another direction of research is the relationship between the market share of cooperatives and the 
procurement prices paid to farmers. We investigated this relationship by comparing two market 
structures which are not equilibrium outcomes with a market structure which is an equilibrium 
outcome. A positive relationship is established in a model where the equilibrium market structure 
consists of only cooperatives. However, most agricultural markets are characterized by the 
coexistence of IOFs and cooperatives. The question arises therefore whether the positive relationship 
between the market share of cooperatives and procurement prices paid to farmers continues to hold in 
a model where the equilibrium is characterized by coexistence of cooperatives and IOFs. 
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion 
 
There are various governance structures in an agricultural supply chain, such as spot markets, 
contracting, cooperatives, investor-owned firms, and so on. Governance structure is defined as the 
allocation of ownership rights, decision rights and income rights over relevant assets (Hansmann, 
1996). Ownership rights specify the formal rights regarding the residual control of assets, like the 
property rights regarding the assets and the distribution of voting rights over the membership. 
Decision rights in the form of authority and responsibility address the question ‘Who has authority or 
control (regarding the use of assets)?’. Income rights address the question ‘How are benefits and costs 
allocated?’. A cooperative is characterized by member control and member benefit. A farmer 
cooperative is collectively owned to help farmers enter the markets. The focus of this thesis is mainly 
on income rights, but ownership rights and decision rights are considered as well. 
A summary of the chapters, as well as main findings, is presented in this final chapter. This thesis has 
addressed issues on the genesis, the governance structure, the CEO identity, and the quality of 
products of farmer cooperatives. A cooperative is characterized by user ownership, user control, and 
user benefits. Special attention is placed on various aspects of farmer cooperatives in China in the first 
three chapters, while chapter 4 and 5 apply to cooperatives in general. Firstly, it provides an overview 
of farmer cooperatives in China in terms of the history, the governance modes, and organization 
characteristics (chapter 1). Secondly, it describes the genesis of Chinese farmer cooperatives (chapter 
2). Thirdly, it delineates the governance structure of Chinese farmer cooperatives in terms of the 
allocation of ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights between heterogeneous members 
(chapter 3). Fourth, it compares the efficiency of cooperatives with member CEOs and with outside 
CEOs (chapter 4). Fifth, it examines the outlet choices (between cooperatives and investor-owned 
firms) of farmers producing different quality products and the impact of cooperatives’ presence in the 
market on the welfare of various stakeholders (chapter 5). 
An overall introduction of the thesis, including the background and motivation of the research, a 
picture regarding farmer cooperatives in China, research objectives and questions, and the outline of 
the thesis, is presented in Chapter 1. The agricultural supply chain in China is diversified at present 
and undergoing transformation in both structure and management. It includes not only the traditional 
production-supply-marketing system constituting of small farm households, peddlers, processing 
enterprises, wholesalers, and retailers, but also new retailers such as comprehensive supermarkets, 
specialized fruit supermarkets, and chain stores. Small farmers are incapable of negotiating effectively 
with other parties in the supply chain due to the scarcity of market information and their small 
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production scales. Collective action via farmer cooperatives is one of the most important institutional 
innovations serving farmers’ purposes.  
Farmer cooperation in China dates back to the early 1950s and was characterized by collective 
ownership by the State or the government. Farmer cooperatives, characterized by farmer ownership 
and farmer control and benefits, began to emerge in the 1980s. Chinese farmer cooperatives come in 
various forms, like farmer specialized cooperative, farmer specialized association, cooperative union, 
and rural credit cooperative. We gear attention to the farmer specialized cooperatives which are 
referred to as cooperatives or farmer cooperatives in this thesis. 
Chapter 2 charts the genesis of cooperatives in China by a survey from the perspective of main actors, 
as well as the organizational characteristics pertained to the environmental constraints. We find the 
genesis of cooperatives in China is incited by the entrepreneurs’ economic ambitions and the 
government’s economic and political objectives, rather than the small farmers’ collective actions. 
Examples of entrepreneurs are those who used to be a village head, who used to work in the 
governmental department, who used to do transportation and sales of agri-products, who used to run a 
company, and who used to be a large farmer. The genesis of organizations is imprinted by the 
environmental conditions (Carroll and Hannan, 1989). The heterogeneity of farmers in rural China, 
the distinguished capability of a few entrepreneurial farmers and the limited capability of most small 
farmers, determines the alternative roles of farmers. In addition, Chinese governments, both central 
and local, have been promoting the genesis and development of farmer cooperatives through various 
ways such as promulgation of the Cooperative Law, direct guidance and training during foundation, 
tax exemption, funding, and so on.  
In Chapter 3 the governance structure characteristics of 37 farmer cooperatives in Zhejiang province, 
China is delineated in terms of ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights. The factors that 
contribute to the genesis of an organization continue to affect the patterns of the organization later 
(Hannan and Freeman, 1984). In line with the characteristics of the genesis of cooperatives in the 
previous chapter, these entrepreneurial farmers, referred to as core members, dominate in the 
allocation of ownership rights, control rights, and income rights within farmer cooperatives. Core 
members usually have substantial asset capital, marketing capabilities, and/or social relations, while 
common members are good at farming but not experienced at marketing or management. The 
allocation of ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights is therefore quite skewed towards 
core members. 
Ownership rights reside with (the majority of) the membership in a cooperative in China. All the 
members have rights to vote formally, but the number of votes differs between members. Control 
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rights over an asset should lie with those who can make best use of the asset or who can generate the 
most surpluses from using the asset (Hart and Moore, 1996). Common members are aware that they 
are inferior in capabilities and have to free ride on high ability farmers. They regard that their efforts 
will not greatly affect the performance of the cooperative. Neither will they expect their effort getting 
paid. Hence, common members delegate and relinquish voting rights to core members.  
Cooperatives may seem to be hampered by having the ownership rights allocated collectively among 
members, but there are many possibilities for structuring the bylaws, in terms of decision and income 
rights. One possibility is to distinguish formal and real authority. Formal authority resides with the 
members, whereas real authority can be either centralized or decentralized (Hendrikse, 2005). Real 
authority is therefore delegated by the members to the management. The management in Chinese 
cooperatives is comprised of core members. They then have sufficient and dominant influence over 
the management and operation of cooperatives in China. 
There are many degrees of freedom to structure the income rights in a cooperative. Most cooperatives 
in the Western countries return profits on the basis of delivery or patronage. Return on equity capital 
is limited (Dunn, 1988; Cook and Plunkett, 2006). However, the income rights distribution 
mechanism in cooperatives in China deviates from the principle of US cooperatives regarding the 
distribution of benefits. The proportion of the return based on equity capital versus patronage depends 
to a large extent on the capabilities of the core members in the cooperative. Core members have 
superior knowledge over common members and are able to produce more benefits for cooperatives, 
which needs to be complemented by a higher residual income. The allocation of income rights is 
therefore skewed towards core members. In order to protect common members and to maintain the 
cooperative principle of member benefits, the Law requires that the profit distributed on the basis of 
patronage must be at least 60% of total distributable profit. 
In Chapter 4, the efficiency of different CEO identities of cooperatives is investigated. CEO identity 
varies in different countries and different stages of cooperative development. Most cooperatives in 
China nowadays have member CEOs rather than professional outside CEOs. The reverse holds for 
cooperatives in Western countries. This situation is more mixed in Spain and Brazil. A member CEO 
puts efforts in both the upstream farming activities and downstream value-adding activities, whereas 
an outside CEO only devotes time to downstream value-adding activities.  
A principal-agent model is developed to address the CEO incentive problem and to compare the 
efficiencies of a cooperative with a member CEO and a cooperative with an outside CEO. Results 
show that whether a member CEO or an outside CEO is efficient depends on the marginal 
productivities of, and interactions between, upstream farming and downstream value adding tasks. 
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When there is a complementary relation between the two tasks and when alternative CEOs have the 
same marginal productivity regarding the downstream value adding activity, a cooperative with a 
member CEO is always efficient, compared to that with an outside CEO. The efficiency of CEO 
identity depends on the size of the substitution effect as well as the marginal productivities when 
upstream and downstream tasks are substitutes. In cases where the substitution effect of upstream and 
downstream tasks is sufficiently small or large and/or where the difference of the marginal 
productivity between upstream and downstream tasks are sufficiently large, cooperatives with 
member CEOs are efficient. Otherwise, cooperatives with outside CEOs are efficient.  
CEOs with different identities may differ in marginal productivity regarding the downstream value-
adding activities. Outside CEOs tend to be more professional in management and marketing, while 
member CEOs are likely to be more production-oriented. Therefore, the scope for cooperatives with 
member CEOs being uniquely efficient becomes smaller when the marginal productivity of outside 
CEOs’ value adding activity is larger than that of member CEOs’ value adding activity, and vice versa. 
The interdependency between upstream and downstream tasks matters to the efficiency of alternative 
governance structures as well. When the two tasks are complements, as the interdependence becomes 
stronger, the scope that cooperatives with member CEOs being efficient becomes larger. Yet when the 
effect of the substitution effect between the two tasks is small or large, the scope that cooperatives 
with member CEOs being efficient is relatively large.  
In Chapter 5, the outlet choices of farmers with different quality products are examined. Most 
agricultural markets show differentiated products and coexistence of cooperatives and IOFs. Some 
markets have low quality products provided by cooperatives and high quality products by IOFs. 
However, the opposite is also observed. We examine how farmers producing differentiated products 
choose different governance structures in a non-cooperative game with farmers and enterprises. 
Farmers producing low quality products tend to deliver to cooperatives whereas farmers producing 
high quality products would like to deliver to IOFs when cooperatives apply a pooling strategy in 
pricing. Yet differential payments regarding quality in cooperatives provide incentives for high quality 
farmers to join cooperatives. Henceforce, farmers’ outlet choices depend crucially on the payment 
treatment of members regarding quality within the cooperatives.  
The presence of cooperatives in a food market has a competitive yardstick effect, i.e. there is a 
positive relationship between the market share of cooperatives and the price received by farmers. The 
practice of pooling prices is responsible for this positive relationship in the model. If the membership 
increases, and therefore the average quality of products provided by members, then the pooling price 
increases. IOFs have to match the pooling price in order to compete with cooperatives. The yardstick 
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effect gets stronger as the degree of price differentiation within a cooperative increases. The 
differential quality treatment of cooperatives provides an incentive for high quality farmers to join 
cooperatives. IOFs therefore have to increase the procurement prices paid to farmers when the market 
share of cooperatives increases.  
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Appendix 1: Questionnaire 
A Basic information of the cooperative 
1 Name of the cooperative; 
2 The name of the city that the cooperative is located; 
3 The year of the establishment of the cooperative; 
4 Membership size of the cooperative when being established; 
5 Current membership size of the cooperative; 
6 Fixed capital of the cooperative when being established; 
7 Current fixed capital of the cooperative; 
8 Share capital of the cooperative when being established; 
9 Current share capital of the cooperative; 
10 Total shares of the cooperative; 
11 Main products of the cooperative; 
12 Total production areas; 
13 The brand of the cooperative's products; 
14 Total sale volume of the cooperative last production year; 
15 Total sale value of the cooperative last production year. 
B Membership of the cooperative  
1 Geographical scope of the membership; 
Within local village; 
Within local town; 
Within local city; 
Within local province; 
Nationwide. 
International area. 
2 Geographical scope of members’ production basis; 
Within local village; 
Within local town; 
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Within local city; 
Within local province; 
Nationwide; 
International area. 
3 What is the basic membership rule of the cooperative? 
    (1) Open; (2) Limited; (3) Closed. 
4 If there is an open membership rule, then please specify the reasons why the cooperative chooses 
this rule; 
5 If there is a limited membership rule, then please specify the requirements that a farmer has to meet 
to entry the cooperative; 
6 If there is a closed membership rule, then please specify the reasons why the cooperative chooses 
this rule; 
7 Please describe the exit rule of the cooperative. 
C Board members 
1 Number of members in the board of directors of the cooperative; 
2 Are all the directors farmer members? 
Yes; (2) No. 
 If no, then the number of non-members;  
3 The total capital shares of directors (%); 
4 Number of members in the board of supervisors of the cooperative; 
5 Are all the supervisors farmer members/ 
Yes; (2) No. 
 If no, then the number of non-members;  
6 The total capital shares of supervisors (%); 
D Decision making 
1 The yearly frequency of members' general meeting; 
2 The purpose of the general meeting; 
Technology trainings; 
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Decisions regarding technology innovation; 
Decisions regarding business strategy; 
Decisions regarding the board's personnel issues; 
Others. Please specify. 
3 The yearly frequency of core member meeting; 
4 The purpose of the core member meeting; 
Technology trainings; 
Decisions regarding technology innovation; 
Decisions regarding business strategy; 
Decisions regarding the board's personnel issues; 
Others. Please specify. 
5 Please specify the general decision-making process in the cooperative.   
E Income/profit allocation 
1 Describe the cooperative's payment strategy of product procurement; 
Average market price; 
Higher than market price; 
Lower than market price. 
2 The share of profit that is retained as accumulation fund (%); 
3 The share of distributable profit that is allocated based on equity capital (%); 
4 The share of distributable profit that is allocated based on patronage (%).    
F Information of the chairperson 
1 Name of the chairperson; 
2 Age of the chairperson; 
3 Gender of the chairperson; 
4 Telephone number of the chairperson; 
5 The education level of the chairperson; 
Lower than primary school; 
Primary school; 
High school; 
Senior high school; 
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College and university; 
Others. 
6 The equity capital shares of the chairperson (%); 
7 Other jobs that the chairperson is engaged in currently;  
Being a technician of some governmental department; 
Being a member of another cooperative; 
Being a village head; 
Selling agricultural input materials; 
Working in a company; 
Running a company or being a manager of some company; 
Others. Please specify. 
8 What had the chairperson ever done before being a cooperative member? 
Farming; 
Worked in some governmental department; 
Been a village head; 
Sold agricultural input materials; 
Procured and sold agricultural products; 
worked in a company; 
Ran a company or been a manager of a company; 
Others. Please specify. 
9 The technological level of the chairperson;   
Very bad;  
Worse than average; 
Medium; 
Better than average; 
Excellent. 
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Questionnaire in Chinese 
A สᵜؑ᚟˖ 
1 ਸ֌⽮਽〠˖ 
2ਸ֌⽮ᡰ൘৯ᐲ˖ 
3ਸ֌⽮ᡀ・ᒤԭ˖ 
4ਸ֌⽮ᡀ・ᰦⲴ⽮ઈᮠ˖ 
5ਸ֌⽮ᖃࡽ⽮ઈᮠ˖ 
6ਸ֌⽮ᡀ・ᰦⲴപᇊ䍴ӗ˖ 
7ਸ֌⽮ᖃࡽപᇊ䍴ӗ˖ 
8ਸ֌⽮ᡀ・ᰦⲴ㛑䠁ᙫ仍˖ 
9ਸ֌⽮ᖃࡽ㛑䠁ᙫ仍˖ 
10ਸ֌⽮ᖃࡽᙫ㛑ԭᮠ˖ 
11ਸ֌⽮ѫ㩕ӗ૱˖ 
12ਸ֌⽮⭏ӗᙫ䶒〟 
13ਸ֌⽮ӗ૱૱⡼˖ 
14ਸ֌⽮каᒤᓖⲴᙫӔ᱃䟿˖ 
15ਸ֌⽮каᒤᓖⲴᙫӔ᱃仍˖ 
Bਸ֌⽮⽮ઈⲴ⽮ઈ䍴Ṭ 
1⽮ઈѫ㾱ᶕ㠚Ҿ˖ 
˄1˅ᵜᶁ˗ ˄2˅ᵜ䭷˗ ˄3˅ᵜ৯˗ ˄4˅ᵜᐲ˗ ˄5˅ᵜⴱ˗ ˄6˅ޘഭ਴ൠ 
2⽮ઈⲴ⭏ӗสൠѫ㾱࠶ᐳ൘˖ 
˄1˅ᵜᶁ˗ ˄2˅ᵜ䭷˗ ˄3˅ᵜ৯˗ ˄4˅ᵜᐲ˗ ˄5˅ᵜⴱ˗ ˄6˅ޘഭ਴ൠ˗ ˄7˅ᤕᴹ
ഭཆสൠ 
3 ਸ֌⽮Ⲵޕ⽮ᶑԦ˖ 
˄1˅ᔰ᭮ᙗ⽮ઈ䍴Ṭ˗ 
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˄2˅䲀ࡦᙗ⽮ઈ䍴Ṭ˗ 
˄3˅ሱ䰝ᙗ⽮ઈ䍴ṬǄ 
4㤕ਸ֌⽮䟷ਆᔰ᭮ᙗ⽮ઈ䍴Ṭˈ䟷ਆ䘉њ᭯ㆆⲴ৏ഐᱟ˖ 
5㤕ਸ֌⽮䟷ਆ䲀ࡦᙗ⽮ઈ䍴Ṭˈ䛓Ѹߌᡧޕ⽮䴰┑䏣ӰѸᶑԦ˖ 
6㤕ਸ֌⽮䟷ਆሱ䰝ᙗ⽮ઈ䍴Ṭˈ䟷ਆ䘉њ᭯ㆆⲴ৏ഐᱟ˖ 
7 䈧᧿䘠ਸ֌⽮⽮ઈⲴ䘰⽮ᶑԦ઼〻ᒿ˄ᱟ੖ݱ䇨䘰⽮ˈ䘰⽮ᶑԦˈ䘰⽮Ⲵ䘄䘈㛑ԭ䇑㇇ㅹ Ǆ˅ 
C⨶һՊ઼ⴁһՊᡀઈ 
1⨶һՊᡀઈⲴӪᮠ˖ 
2⨶һՊᡀઈᱟ੖䜭Ѫߌᡧ⽮ઈ˖˄ 1˅ᱟ˗ ˄2˅੖Ǆ 
   㤕੖ˈࡉ䶎⽮ઈⲴ⨶һՊᡀઈӪᮠᱟ˖ 
3⨶һՊᡀઈᡰᤕᴹⲴ㛑ԭ˄%˅˖  
4ⴁһՊᡀઈⲴӪᮠ˖ 
5ⴁһՊᡀઈᱟ੖䜭Ѫߌᡧ⽮ઈ˖˄ 1˅ᱟ˗ ˄2˅੖Ǆ 
   㤕੖ˈࡉ䶎⽮ઈⲴⴁһՊᡀઈӪᮠᱟ˖ 
6ⴁһՊᡀઈᡰᤕᴹⲴ㛑ԭ˄%˅˖  
Dߣㆆᵪࡦ઼䗷〻 
1ਸ֌⽮каᒤᓖⲴ⽮ઈབྷՊ⅑ᮠ˖ 
2ਸ֌⽮Ѯ㹼⽮ઈབྷՊⲴⴞⲴ˖ 
˄1˅ᢰᵟษ䇝˗ 
˄2˅ޣҾᢰᵟࡋᯠⲴߣㆆ˗ 
˄3˅ޣҾᐲ൪ㆆ⮕Ⲵߣㆆ 
˄4˅ޣҾ⨶һՊ઼ⴁһՊᡀઈӪһਈࣘⲴߣㆆ 
˄5˅ަԆǄ䈧䈤᰾Ǆ 
3ਸ֌⽮каᒤᓖⲴ⨶һՊ⅑ᮠ˖ 
4ਸ֌⽮Ѯ㹼⨶һՊⲴⴞⲴ˖ 
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˄1˅ᢰᵟษ䇝˗ 
˄2˅ޣҾᢰᵟࡋᯠⲴߣㆆ˗ 
˄3˅ޣҾᐲ൪ㆆ⮕Ⲵߣㆆ 
˄4˅ޣҾ⨶һՊ઼ⴁһՊᡀઈӪһਈࣘⲴߣㆆ 
˄5˅ަԆǄ䈧䈤᰾Ǆ 
5䈧᧿䘠ਸ֌⽮ᡰ䟷ਆⲴสᵜߣㆆ〻ᒿǄ 
E࡙⳺࠶䝽ᵪࡦ 
1ਸ֌⽮ሩߌᡧӗ૱Ⲵᇊԧ৏ࡉ˖ 
˄1˅᤹ᐲ൪ԧṬ᭟Ԉ˗ 
˄2˅儈Ҿᐲ൪ԧṬаᇊ∄ֻ˗ 
˄3˅վҾᐲ൪ԧṬ᭦䍝Ǆ 
2ਸ֌⽮ᨀਆⲴޜ〟䠁઼ޜ⳺䠁ԭ仍˄%˅˖  
3ਸ֌⽮Ⲵਟ࠶䝽࡙⏖ѝ᤹➗㛑䠁࠶䝽Ⲵ∄ֻ˄%˅˖  
4ਸ֌⽮Ⲵਟ࠶䝽࡙⏖ѝ᤹➗Ӕ᱃䟿ᡆӔ᱃仍࠶䝽Ⲵ∄ֻ˄%˅˖  
F ਸ֌⽮⽮䮯/⨶һ䮯ؑ᚟ 
1⽮䮯਽ᆇ˖ 
2⽮䮯ᒤ喴˖ 
3⽮䮯ᙗ࡛˖ 
4⽮䮯⭥䈍˖ 
5⽮䮯ᮉ㛢〻ᓖ˖ 
˄1˅ሿᆖԕл˗ 
˄2˅ሿᆖ∅ъ˗ 
˄3˅ࡍѝ∅ъ˗ 
˄4˅儈ѝ∅ъ˗ 
˄5˅བྷуᡆᵜ、ԕкǄ 
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6⽮䮯㛑䠁ঐਸ֌⽮ᙫ㛑䠁Ⲵ∄ֻ˄%˅˖  
7⽮䮯ⴞࡽᡰӾһⲴަԆᐕ֌˖ 
˄1˅ḀӋ᭯ᓌ䜘䰘ⲴᢰᵟӪઈ˗ 
˄2˅ᶁ䮯/ᶁ᭟Җㅹᶁ㓗ᒢ䜘˗ 
˄3˅䲔Ҷ䈕ਸ֌⽮ԕཆⲴަԆਸ֌⽮Ⲵᡀઈ˗ 
˄4˅㓿㩕ߌ䍴ޜਨᡆ୶ᓇ˗ 
˄5˅ަԆޜਨⲴᲞ䙊ઈᐕ˗ 
˄6˅㓿㩕ޜਨᡆᱟޜਨⲴ㇑⨶Ӫઈ˗ 
˄7˅ަԆǄ䈧䈤᰾Ǆ 
8⽮䮯൘ᡀѪ⽮䮯ѻࡽⲴᐕ֌㓿শ˖ 
˄1˅Ӿһߌъ⭏ӗ˗ 
˄2˅᭯ᓌ䜘䰘ᐕ֌˗ 
˄3˅ᶁ䮯/ᶁ᭟Җㅹᶁ㓗ᒢ䜘˗ 
˄4˅㓿㩕ߌ䍴ޜਨᡆ୶ᓇ˗ 
˄5˅Ӿһߌӗ૱䘄䬰˗ 
˄6˅ަԆޜਨⲴᲞ䙊ઈᐕ˗ 
˄7˅㓿㩕ޜਨᡆᱟޜਨⲴ㇑⨶Ӫઈ˗ 
˄8˅ަԆǄ䈧䈤᰾Ǆ 
9⽮䮯Ⲵߌъ⭏ӗᢰᵟ≤ᒣቡޘփ⽮ઈᶕ䈤ˈ༴Ҿ˖ 
˄1˅ᖸᐞ˗˄ 2˅ѝл˗˄ 3˅ѝㅹ˗˄ 4˅ѝк˗˄ 5˅ࡽ㤵Ǆ 
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Appendix 2: Data (chapter 2) 
Table A2-1. Genesis, main products, and geographical scope 
Coops Genesis Main products Geographical scope of members' 
production bases 
1 2003 1 1 
2 2003 1 2 
3 2002 1 6 
4 2003 1 6 
5 2004 1 2 
6 2004 1 3 
7 2004 1,2 3 
8 2003 1 2 
9 2003 2 3 
10 2002 1 3 
11 2002 1,2 3 
12 2002 1 2 
13 2006 2 6 
14 2002 1 4 
15 2002 2 5 
16 2003 1 3 
17 2003 1 2 
18 2002 1 2 
19 2001 1 7 
20 2005 1 2 
21 2005 1 2 
22 2005 1 3 
23 2005 1 2 
24 2002 1 1 
25 2002 2 2 
26 2003 2 1 
27 2003 1 2 
28 2004 1 3 
29 2005 1 3 
30 2004 1 2 
31 2002 1 6 
32 2003 2 3 
33 2003 2 2 
34 2005 1 3 
35 2005 1 2 
36 2006 1 1 
37 2004 1 2 
Notes: Main products: 1 fruits; 2 vegetables. Geographical scope of members' production bases: 1 within a local 
village; 2 within a local town; 3 within a local county; 4 within a local city; 5 within a local province; 6 nationwide; 7 
international. 
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Table A2-2.  Membership size and composition 
Coops Membership 
size 
Geographical scope of 
the membership 
No. of core 
members 
Education level of 
chairpersons 
Working experiences of 
chairpersons 
1 132 1 5 3 2 
2 46 2 3 3 3 
3 173 3 9 3 2 
4 250 2 5 3 4 
5 108 2 8 2 1 
6 103 3 4 3 2 
7 135 3 3 4 4 
8 103 2 3 2 4 
9 103 2 3 2 1 
10 705 3 5 5 3 
11 100 2 5 4 1 
12 108 1 4 3 2 
13 120 2 3 3 3 
14 132 2 5 4 2 
15 1321 3 5 2 3 
16 125 2 3 3 2 
17 102 2 7 3 1 
18 109 2 4 2 2 
19 328 6 40 1 1 
20 50 2 5 3 2 
21 68 2 3 2 1 
22 78 1 3 4 2 
23 135 1 7 2 1 
24 128 1 5 3 1 
25 47 2 7 4 1 
26 31 1 7 3 1 
27 120 2 5 3 4 
28 109 2 2 4 1 
29 120 2 3 3 1 
30 287 2 3 3 1 
31 158 4 5 3 3 
32 120 3 5 3 3 
33 152 2 3 4 2 
34 86 3 5 3 2 
35 137 2 8 2 1 
36 103 1 5 3 1 
37 102 1 6 3 4 
Notes: Geographical scope of the membership: 1 within a local village; 2 within a local town; 3 within a local county; 4 
within a local city; 5 within a local province; 6 nationwide; 7 international. Education level of chairpersons: 1 below primary 
school; 2 primary school; 3 high school; 4 senior high school; 5 college and university; 6 others. Working experiences of 
chairpersons: 1 used to be a village head or worked in a governmental department; 2 did product transportation and sale; 3 ran 
a company; 4 a large farmer. 
  
 
Appendix 3: Data (chapter 3) 
Coops Year of 
foundation 
No. of 
members 
No. of 
core 
members 
No. of 
general 
membership 
meeting 
No. of 
core 
members' 
meeting 
Capital 
shares of 
core 
members 
Capital 
shares of 
the 
chairperson 
Voting 
rule34 
Decision-
making 
procedure 
Percentage 
of retained 
profit  
Profit 
distribution 
strategy 
Percentage 
of profit 
allocated 
based on 
delivery 
Education 
level of the 
chairperson 
Working 
experiences 
of the 
chairperson 
1 2003 132 5 1 3 53 14 1 2 18 3 68 3 2 
2 2003 46 3 2 6 43 19 2 2 4 3 63 3 3 
3 2002 173 9 2 6 50 9.5 2 2 30 3 60 3 2 
4 2003 250 5 3 12 65.8 18.2 2 2 30 3 70 3 4 
5 2004 108 8 2 6 97.45 18 1 1 30 3 55 2 1 
6 2004 103 4 3 4 65 19.8 2 2 30 3 60 3 2 
7 2004 135 3 4 8 20 10 1 2 30 3 60 4 4 
8 2003 103 3 3 8 60 19.8 2 2 30 3 30 2 4 
9 2003 103 3 4 6 30 15 1 2 30 1 100 2 1 
10 2002 705 5 1 2 29.48 13.9 2 2 30 3 62 5 3 
11 2002 100 5 2 4 30 15 2 2 30 3 60 4 1 
12 2002 108 4 2 4 40 10 1 2 30 3 60 3 2 
13 2006 120 3 3 7 51.6 19 1 2 30 3 60 3 3 
14 2002 132 5 2 10 48.2 16.67 1 2 30 3 60 4 2 
15 2002 1321 5 3 3 66 14 1 2 11 3 60 2 3 
16 2003 125 3 2 6 30 10 1 2 30 3 30 3 2 
17 2003 102 7 1 2 50 20 1 2 13 1 100 3 1 
18 2002 109 4 2 3 41 17.7 1 2 20 1 100 2 2 
19 2001 328 40 8 2 60 2 2 2 6 2 0 1 1 
20 2005 50 5 2 4 49 2 2 2 30 2 0 3 2 
21 2005 68 3 1 2 60 20 1 2 0 1 100 2 1 
22 2005 78 3 3 5 30 7.6 1 2 30 3 60 4 2 
23 2005 135 7 3 8 70 16 1 1 30 1 100 2 1 
24 2002 128 5 2 4 42 19 1 2 25 3 60 3 1 
25 2002 47 7 2 5 21 5 1 2 25 1 100 4 1 
26 2003 31 7 1 4 45 19 1 2 30 1 100 3 1 
27 2003 120 5 3 5 50 20 1 2 30 3 60 3 4 
                                                          
34 Here the voting rule refers to the voting rule of general membership meetings. 
  
Coops Year of 
foundation 
No. of 
members 
No. of 
core 
members 
No. of 
general 
membership 
meeting 
No. of 
core 
members' 
meeting 
Capital 
shares of 
core 
members 
Capital 
shares of 
the 
chairperson 
Voting 
rule34 
Decision-
making 
procedure 
Percentage 
of retained 
profit  
Profit 
distribution 
strategy 
Percentage 
of profit 
allocated 
based on 
delivery 
Education 
level of the 
chairperson 
Working 
experiences 
of the 
chairperson 
28 2004 109 2 1 3 26.9 20 1 2 30 3 60 4 1 
29 2005 120 3 5 3 50 20 2 2 30 3 60 3 1 
30 2004 287 3 4 3 45 20 1 2 30 3 60 3 1 
31 2002 158 5 1 4 57 19 1 2 30 3 8 3 3 
32 2003 120 5 2 5 53.1 16 1 2 25 1 100 3 3 
33 2003 152 3 10 10 35 19 1 2 30 3 60 4 2 
34 2005 86 5 2 4 38 12 2 2 23 3 60 3 2 
35 2005 137 8 12 12 80 20 2 2 30 3 50 2 1 
36 2006 103 5 6 5 95 19 2 2 10 3 60 3 1 
37 2004 102 6 3 10 40 20 2 1 0 3 60 3 4 
 
Notes:  
Geographical scope of the membership: 1 within a local village; 2 within a local town; 3 within a local county; 4 within a local city; 5 within a local province; 6 
nationwide.  
Geographical scope of members' production bases: 1 within a local village; 2 within a local town; 3 within a local county; 4 within a local city; 5 within a local 
province; 6 nationwide; 7 international. 
Voting rule of the general membership meetings: 1 one member, one vote; 2 proportional voting. 
Decision-making procedure: 1 membership voting; 2 core members decide. 
Experiences of chairpersons: 1 used to be a village head or worked in a governmental department; 2 did product transportation and sale; 3 ran a company; 4 a 
large farmer. 
Education level of chairpersons: 1 under primary school; 2 primary school; 3 high school; 4 senior high school; 5 college and university; 6 others. 
Profit distribution strategy: 1 based on patronage; 2 based on equity capital; 3 based on both patronage and equity capital. 
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Abstract (English) 
Governance structure specifies the allocation of ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights. A 
cooperative is characterized by user ownership, user control, and user benefits. The focus of this thesis is 
on various governance structure characteristics and the efficiency of farmer cooperatives. Special 
attention is dedicated to cooperatives in China.  
The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter 1 outlines the structure of the thesis and provides an 
overview of farmer cooperatives in China, especially in terms of the history, the modes, and organization 
characteristics. The genesis of farmer cooperatives in China is described in chapter 2. Chapter 3 
delineates the governance structure of Chinese farmer cooperatives in terms of the allocation of 
ownership rights, decision rights, and income rights within the membership. A principal-agent model is 
developed in chapter 4 to explore the efficiency of cooperatives with different CEO identities, member 
CEO or outside CEO. Chapter 5 examines how farmers producing differentiated quality products choose 
different governance structures in a non-cooperative game. Besides, the impact of the cooperatives’ 
presence in the market on the welfare of various stakeholders is analyzed. We conclude in chapter 6.  
The main conclusions are as follows. Firstly, the genesis of farmer cooperatives in China is mainly due to 
entrepreneurial farmers and the government rather than a bottom-up, collective action process of many 
small farmers in the West. Secondly, the allocation of ownership rights, decision rights, and income 
rights is quite skewed towards core members in cooperatives in China. These cooperatives may seem to 
be hampered by their skewed allocation of ownership rights, but there are many possibilities for 
structuring the bylaws, in terms of decision and income rights, in order to protect common members. 
Thirdly, the efficiency of cooperatives with different CEO identities depends on the interaction between 
the upstream farming task and the downstream value-adding task as well as the productivity difference 
between the two tasks. A cooperative with a member as CEO is uniquely efficient when upstream and 
downstream tasks are substitutes to a certain extent, or complements. The scope of a cooperative with a 
member CEO being efficient becomes smaller when the substitution effect is at an intermediate level or 
the productivity difference between the two tasks is limited. Fourth, the quality provision of cooperatives 
depends on the payment for quality. There is a positive relationship between the market share of 
cooperatives and the price received by farmers. In addition, a larger degree of differentiation regarding 
the cooperative’s payment has a stronger yardstick effect. 
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Abstract (Dutch) 
Een beheersstructuur specificeert de toewijzing van eigendomsrechten, beslissingsrechten en 
inkomstenrechten. In land- en tuinbouwcoöperaties zijn deze rechten toegewezen aan de toeleverancier of 
de afnemer. Dit proefschrift is gericht op diverse beheersstructuur karakteristieken van land- en 
tuinbouwcoöperaties en de efficiëntie van deze ondernemingen. Bijzondere aandacht gaat uit naar 
coöperaties in China. 
Het proefschrift bestaat uit zes hoofdstukken. Hoofdstuk 1 schetst de structuur van het proefschrift en 
geeft een overzicht van land- en tuinbouwcoöperaties in China, in het bijzonder de geschiedenis, de 
verschijningsvormen, en de organisatiekenmerken. Het ontstaan van vele nieuwe land- en 
tuinbouwcoöperaties in China in de laatste 10 jaar wordt beschreven in hoofdstuk 2. Hoofdstuk 3 gaat in 
op de beheersstructuur van Chinese land- en tuinbouwcoöperaties. Een principaal-agent model is 
ontwikkeld in hoofdstuk 4 om de efficiëntie te bepalen van coöperaties met een lid als CEO en 
coöperaties met een buitenstaander als CEO. Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt hoe boeren met producten van 
verschillende kwaliteit verschillende beheersstructuren kiezen. Bovendien wordt het effect van de 
aanwezigheid van coöperaties in de markt op het welzijn van de diverse partijen in de markt geanalyseerd. 
Hoofdstuk 6 sluit af.  
De belangrijkste conclusies zijn als volgt. Ten eerste is het ontstaan van boerencoöperaties in China 
vooral toe te schrijven aan ondernemende boeren en de overheid. In Westerse landen is veeleer sprake 
geweest van vele kleine boeren die zich gezamenlijk organiseerden. Ten tweede is de toewijzing van 
eigendomsrechten, beslissingsrechten en inkomstenrechten erg scheef verdeelt ten gunste van kernleden 
in coöperaties in China. Hierdoor zouden deze coöperaties gehinderd kunnen worden in hun ontwikkeling. 
Er zijn echter vele mogelijkheden voor het structureren van de statuten, op het gebied van besluitvorming 
en inkomensrechten, om alle leden te beschermen. Ten derde, de doeltreffendheid van een coöperatie met 
een specifieke CEO identiteit hangt af van de interactie tussen de activiteiten op het boerenbedrijf en de 
activiteiten in de coöperatieve onderneming, en het productiviteitsverschil tussen deze activiteiten. Een 
coöperatie met een lid als CEO is efficiënt wanneer de activiteiten tot op zekere hoogte substituten zijn, 
of elkaar aanvullen. De mogelijkheden voor een coöperatie met een lid als CEO om efficiënt te zijn 
worden kleiner naarmate het substitutie effect zich op een tussenliggend niveau bevindt of het 
productiviteitsverschil tussen de twee activiteiten beperkt is. Ten vierde, de kwaliteit van de geleverde 
producten door de coöperatie is afhankelijk van de betaling voor kwaliteit. Er bestaat een positieve relatie 
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tussen het marktaandeel van coöperaties en de prijs die de boeren ontvangen. Daarnaast zijn de prijzen in 
de markt hoger wanneer er sprake is van meer differentiatie in de betaling voor kwaliteit in de coöperatie. 
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l)GOVERNANCE, CEO IDENTITY, AND QUALITY PROVISION OF FARMER COOPERATIVES
Governance structure specifies the allocation of ownership rights, decision rights, and
income rights. A cooperative is characterized by collective ownership, democratic control,
and member benefits. This thesis empirically delineates the genesis and the governance
structure characteristics of farmer cooperatives in China and theoretically examines the
efficiency of cooperatives with different CEO identities and quality provision of cooperatives.
The main conclusions are as follows. First, the genesis of farmer cooperatives in China
is mainly due to entrepreneurial farmers and the government rather than a bottom-up,
collective action process of many small farmers. Second, the allocation of ownership
rights, decision rights, and income rights is quite skewed towards core members in
cooperatives in China. Third, the efficiency of cooperatives with different CEO identities
depends on the interaction between upstream farming task and downstream value-adding
task as well as the productivity difference between the two tasks. Fourth, the quality
provision of cooperatives is dependent crucially on the payment treatment of members
regarding quality within the cooperatives. The presence of cooperatives in food market has a
competitive yardstick. A larger degree of differentiation in the payment and a larger
market share of a cooperative indicate stronger yardstick effect.
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